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Abstract 
Drawing on John Keegan’s Face of Battle approach, this MA thesis reconstructs the 
soldiers’ experience during the final phase of the Athenians’ Sicilian Expedition (415-
413 BC). 
By integrating a thorough analysis of the extant historiographical sources (Thucydides, 
Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch’s Life of Nicias) with the intrinsic aspects of ancient Greek 
naval and land warfare, the topography around Syracuse, and the Athenian soldiers’ 
psychological condition, I seek to improve our understanding of how and why the 
Athenians and their allies lost the decisive naval engagement in the Great Harbour and 
failed to escape the Syracusans during their final retreat overland. 
I make the case that the Athenian defeat is largely caused by factors outside of their 
control such as access to resources, geography, and Syracusan preparedness. However, 
the Athenians also suffered owing to their own inaction caused by demoralization. 
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Chapter 1: Objectives, Methods, and Sources 
Objectives 
In September of 413 BC, the Athenian expeditionary corps stationed just south of 
Syracuse was in dire straits. The Athenians and their allies made a final attempt to escape 
from the Syracusans and their allies and to return to their various homelands. This was a 
complete reversal of fortune for the Athenians. They had gone to Sicily with the intent of 
defeating Syracuse and possibly conquering the entire island, and had now become 
themselves besieged, desperately fighting for their very survival. In this thesis, I 
investigate and analyze the Athenian soldiers’ experience from the Battle in the Great 
Harbour to the surrender of Nicias’ forces at the River Assinarus. In the literary sources, 
we learn that the Athenians – although having a few minor successes - were soundly 
defeated and destroyed over a ten day period. While Thucydides’ account provides a 
gripping narrative of the Athenian defeat, his writing does not clearly explain why the 
preeminent navy of Greece was overcome by the Syracusans and why the Athenian land 
army failed to reach a safe haven in Sicily. Essentially, Thucydides’ narrative paints a 
picture of utter consternation with a great emphasis on the pathos of the Athenian army. 
Thucydides’ descriptions of the mood in the Athenian camp are important to our 
understanding of the ineffectiveness of Athenian forces, but he does not provide enough 
information in regard to military affairs.  In terms of the battles themselves, Thucydides 
describes these engagements from a macro level, and sometimes summarizes encounters 
in a single line or less. Writing as a former Athenian general for readers who would 
almost certainly have military experience, Thucydides does not deal with the subtleties of 
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the actual naval and infantry combat, which are necessary for us to understand the cause 
of the Athenian defeat. In this thesis, I intend to rectify this deficiency by exploring the 
underlying causes for the Athenian defeat. Of course, much has already been written in 
regard to the Sicilian Expedition. However, these writings seem to fall into three 
categories. The first group of scholars focuses on the literary goals of Thucydides, which, 
while elucidating and informative in regard to Thucydides’ methods and influences, does 
not have an interest in analyzing the military matters.
1
 The second group of authors 
discusses the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition as but one element in their general 
treatment of ancient Greek history.
2
 The Sicilian Expedition is recounted for its political 
importance. Historians often do not go beyond what is present in Thucydides. Since 
Thucydides’ account is so lucid and detailed, the reader is often presented with a 
condensed version of events. The third group of scholars freely uses their own 
imagination to flesh out Thucydides’ narrative further.3 While these accounts are 
certainly enjoyable to read, a major drawback of these writings is that they tend not to 
have a sufficient level of footnotes or citations, and thus it is difficult to discern what 
                                                 
1
 A few examples are: Allison (1997), Cogan (1981), Connor (1977), Dover (1983), Lateiner (1977), 
MacLeod (1982), Rood (1998), Zadorojnyi (1998). 
2
 This approach is largely found in populist histories that are attempting to cover a massive amount of 
material, such as Robin Lane Fox’s The Classical World (2006). However, even if we consider Victor 
Davis Hanson’s A War Like No Other (2005) (a very enjoyable and informative read), he recounts the 
Battle in the Great Harbour in 2 paragraphs (219). He summarizes the entire Athenian retreat in less than 2 
pages (221-23). In other chapters he provides much useful information that can be applied to these battles, 
but he does not connect them for the reader. The Cambridge Ancient History (1992) similarly gives a 
condensed account of events. This approach is also apparent in Donald Kagan’s emphasis on political 
history in his The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (1981). 
3
 A great example of this is Peter Green’s Armada from Athens (1970). Green provides a great amount of 
new information that goes against the communis opinio, but his work lacks citations which would allow the 
reader to understand how he came to his conclusion. See Cawkwell’s scathing review in The Classical 
Review 22 (1972), 245-48, for criticism of the lack of citations. However, Green’s findings from a survey 
of Sicily’s topography led him to propose a new Athenian marching route during the retreat that has, for the 
most part, become the standard interpretation.  
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information is being filled in by the author and what is either grounded in the text or 
based on other scholarly research. Arguably, there is no comprehensive treatment of the 
failures of the Sicilian Expedition in regard to military matters.  
To get beyond Thucydides’ account, I apply the Face of Battle approach 
pioneered by John Keegan in 1976, which focuses on the experience of individual units, 
but in doing so, I keep my account as close to the text as possible. I ground my work in 
current scholarship and make clear what is supposition on my part.  
The focus of the second chapter is the Battle in the Great Harbour. In it, I attempt 
to explain why the preeminent navy of Greece was soundly defeated by the Syracusans. 
First, I explain what I consider to be the essential aspects of Greek naval combat so that 
the reader can easily understand my reconstruction of the battle. I give details regarding 
what type of troops and men were on a trireme and what the purpose of that troop type 
was on the ship. Next, I lay out the preparations that both sides made for the battle and 
the implications of these measures. I argue that the Athenians made the proper tactical 
decisions given their situation, but that they were defeated owing to conditions that were 
largely outside of their control; most notably, the very space in which they fought as well 
as the preparedness of the Syracusan navy. Following John Keegan’s Face of Battle, I 
consider the impetus for the Athenians to engage in this naval encounter.
4
 Next, I lay out 
the rationale of my battle analysis in the Great Harbour. With extensive use of primary 
and secondary sources in combination with the information that has been garnered from 
                                                 
4
 The Section ‘The Will to Combat’ which is an integral element Keegan’s battle reconstructions. 
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the reconstructed trireme Olympias, I look into the advantages of the Athenian navy as 
well as the disadvantages that plagued the Athenians in the Battle in the Great Harbour. 
When health, experience, location, and positioning are considered, it becomes clear why 
the Athenians failed to overcome the Syracusans in this decisive battle.  
In the third chapter, my objective is to uncover how and why the Athenians failed 
to escape the Syracusans during their retreat through Sicily. To Thucydides’ readers, it 
may seem to be a foregone conclusion that the Athenians have no real hope of ever 
escaping Sicily. However, when one considers the march of the 10000 as described by 
Xenophon in his Anabasis,
5
 it is clear that it was possible for an army, heavily 
surrounded by hostiles, to travel great distances and arrive at a safe haven. I argue that 
there were five major reasons for the Athenian failure. The first was the delay directly 
after the Battle in the Great Harbour. The second reason was the Syracusan’s highly 
effective use of cavalry and light armed infantry, both as a means to harass the Athenians 
and to convey quickly troops to the area in which they were required. Further, the 
Syracusans used the geography of Sicily effectively and managed to keep the Athenians 
in the wide plains where the cavalry could freely operate. The fourth reason was the lack 
of provisions, which caused the Athenians to struggle desperately at the River Assinarus. 
Finally, the disorder of Demosthenes’ troops likely played a large role in the surrender of 
his contingent, and by extension, led to the defeat of Nicias’ forces at the River 
Assinarus. Again, I employ the Face of Battle approach in order to gain a better 
                                                 
5
 This is something that Hanson also notes in A War Like No Other (pg. 220). The fact of the matter is that 
Xenophon’s 10 000 hoplites march a far greater distance against far greater odds and manage to escape 
successfully Asia. 
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understanding of the experience of the Athenian troops during the retreat. First, I provide 
the general mood and events that transpired directly after the Athenian defeat at the Battle 
in the Great Harbour. Next, I come to some conclusions regarding the number of troops 
involved in the Athenians march and explore what such a mass of men would have 
looked like while on the move. Third, I explain the unit types that were involved in the 
march on both the Athenian and Syracusan sides and discuss what the advantages and 
disadvantages of these unit types were. Then, I describe the march by dividing it into the 
8 days, while paying close attention to the factors that adversely impacted the Athenians. 
Finally, I provide a summary of the events that followed the fateful capture of Nicias and 
account for the low number of captives taken by the Syracusans given the number of men 
on the march. 
Methodology 
In this paper I use the Face of Battle approach popularized by John Keegan.
6
 
Keegan was frustrated with the general way military history was written. Past works of 
military history tended to focus on the grand strategy and on the acumen of a particular 
general.
7
 In this type of history, units of soldiers are generally treated as pawns of the 
general with no unique characteristics. In these cases, there is a heavy use of metaphor 
that does not do justice to the realities of war.
8
 We are not told how the soldiers fight, but 
rather what the troop movements were and the outcomes of these actions. The approach 
                                                 
6
 Keegan (1976), See pages 15-78 of John Keegan’s The Face of Battle for a full explanation of the tenets 
of this methodology. 
7
 Keegan (1976), 28-36.  
8
 Keegan (1976), 35-36. Keegan provides a quotation from General Sir William Napier’s account of the 
battle of Albuera that shows the romantic prose used by military historians of the past. 
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of grand strategy pulls away from the personal nature of combat and focuses on an 
isometric view of a battlefield. It fails to take into account the health of the soldier, the 
weather and terrain, and the fear and dread that may grip a soldier in various 
circumstances. However, the psychological and physical factors of combat can have 
massive importance for the outcome of battle.  
Keegan’s approach shows this most beautifully in his description of the battle of 
Agincourt in AD 1415.
9
 Here, the French cavalry charged into wooden stakes which were 
set up by the English archers and impaled the French horses.
10
 We learn that, in general, 
archers fear cavalry; but in this case, the English archers had employed stakes which they 
kept out of view amid their ranks. The cavalrymen fell from their animals.
11
 The archers 
had managed to turn a frightening encounter into a highly advantageous situation. They 
came out from behind their stakes, emboldened, and began to slaughter the French 
knights with the mallets used for establishing the stakes. The horses that survived became 
terrified and ran back into their own lines and wrought havoc on the French infantry, 
leaving them shaken.
12
  
The Face of Battle approach gives us a chance to envision how an actual battle 
unfolds. With this method, I look to explain the reason for the defeat of the Athenians in 
the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition in 413 BC. This approach looks at the 
experience of the individual soldier. What was it like to be in battle? How did the morale 
                                                 
9
 Keegan (1976), 79-116. 
10
 Keegan (1976), 96. 
11
 Keegan (1976), 96-97. 
12
 Keegan (1976), 97. 
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of the soldier affect the outcome? What was the motivation for the troops to engage? 
What were the actual mechanics of battle? What types of weapons were used? What were 
the advantages and disadvantages of these weapons? How did a battle line hold up 
against these weapons? What happened when a ship got rammed? How did the oarsmen 
escape a sinking ship or escape the weapons of a boarding party? How did an army know 
that they had won or lost a battle, if there is not a complete surrender or destruction of the 
opposing force?  
In this thesis, I apply this approach to both naval and land combat. Ancient 
historians, first and foremost Victor Davis Hanson, have applied this approach 
successfully to ancient Greek warfare in general, but naval warfare is not as sufficiently 
studied.
13
 Moreover, this approach has not been applied to the particular engagements in 
the Great Harbour and the Athenian retreat through Sicily. Using this Face of Battle 
approach, I hope to improve our understanding of the cause of the Athenian defeat.  
Thucydides placed great importance on morale and psychological factors. It is 
clear that he felt that such dynamics were important to the outcome of battle. 
Hornblower, writing in regard to Thucydides’ description of the battle in Great Harbour, 
says “it is more of an atmospheric evocation and a report of emotions and morale, well 
suited to recitation, than a piece of conventional military history.”14 While it is certainly 
                                                 
13
 Hanson used the Face of Battle approach in The Western Way of War and A War Like No Other. The 
Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World had specific Face of Battle chapters by John Lee and 
others. John Lee also wrote an account of the march of the ten thousand in The Greek Army on the March. 
Further, Barry Strauss applied the same approach in The Battle of Salamis. J. E. Lendon (2005) used the 
Face of Battle methodology in Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity. 
14
 Hornblower (2010), 693. 
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accurate to say that Thucydides provides some information on the morale and 
psychological state of the combatants, he takes knowledge of the technical aspects of 
warfare for granted among his readers. Therefore, this paper takes the necessary step to 
combine the morale and psychology of battle with the actual reality of physical combat in 
order to answer why the Athenians were annihilated.  
However, there is one caveat to the Face of Battle approach in that it requires a 
heavy amount of supposition by the author in order to flesh out the battle narrative since 
our sources do not provide every minute detail. Yet, since we have sufficient information 
regarding military tactics and procedure from other battles of this period, it is possible to 
make reasonable inferences about the engagements under question. Many modern 
historians attempt to write an account that is both accurate and entertaining, and in some 
cases, this can lead to assumptions that are not grounded in the text. I look to avoid such a 
calamity in this thesis. 
Other scholars have attacked certain aspects of the Face of Battle approach.
15
 
Everett Wheeler notes that this methodology works on the assumption that there is a 
universal human nature.
16
 In this way, the modern scholar projects his own feelings and 
cultural experiences onto the ancient soldier. And yet, thanks to a considerable body of 
5
th
 – and 4th – century literature we are relatively well informed about the Athenians’ way 
of life, general attitudes, and cultural norms, and Thucydides informs the reader explicitly 
of the general mood among the Athenians and focuses on the pathos and emotions of the 
                                                 
15
 Wheeler (2011), 64-75. Kagan (2006). 
16
 Wheeler (2011), 72-73. 
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soldiers. Therefore, it is not necessary to make conjectures regarding the Athenian 
experience. Thucydides was an Athenian soldier contemporary to the events, and 
therefore, his judgments regarding the morale of the soldiers is likely accurate. Another 
objection to the Face of Battle approach concerns the ‘buddy theory’ proposed by Victor 
Davis Hanson. Drawing on the experience of modern soldiers (particularly in World War 
II), ‘Buddy theorists’ argue that a soldier does not fight because of patriotism, but rather, 
the soldier fights for the preservation of himself and his companions.
17
 Wheeler is correct 
to note that it may be incorrect to project this motivational concept into antiquity. In 
regard to the Athenian phalanx, men would not be grouped with their friends or 
neighbours.
18
 On the other hand, the ‘buddy theory’ might be more applicable to the 
Spartan phalanx.
19
 In this thesis, I avoid using the ‘buddy theory’ and instead focus on 
unit types as a whole. 
Sources 
 In comparison to other events in ancient history, we have excellent sources for the 
Sicilian Expedition. There are three extant accounts: Thucydides (ca. 400 BC), who was 
contemporary to the events, Diodorus (40 BC), and Plutarch (ca. AD 100). In addition to 
our extant sources, there are three other sources that are no longer available to us. First, is 
Philistus (ca. 400 BC) who was contemporary to the events, but there is also Ephorus (ca. 
350 BC) and Timaeus (ca. 270 BC). All of the later authors seem to follow the accounts 
of the two contemporary writers, Thucydides and Philistus. In this thesis, I supplement 
                                                 
17
 Wheeler (2011), 66. 
18
 Wheeler (2011), 72. 
19
 Wheeler (2011), 72. 
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Thucydides with the works written by Diodorus and Plutarch. In this way, a fuller 
account of events can be provided. The only contemporary extant source we have for the 
Battle in the Great Harbour and the ensuing retreat is Thucydides’ Histories.      
Thucydides 
In the last few decades, Thucydides’ reliability has come into question, especially 
by those students of Greek history who want to read the works of Greek historians such 
as Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon primarily as literary artifacts. In this section I 
provide examples of Thucydides as a literary artist as well as an historian. I show that 
there does not necessarily have to be a dichotomy between literary goals and historical 
accuracy. Further, I summarize the other sources that can be used to back up Thucydides 
as a legitimate historian. In this thesis, I rely on Thucydides as the primary source for the 
historical information regarding the Battle in the Great Harbour and the following 
Athenian retreat through the Sicilian hinterlands. He has a unique perspective because he 
was an Athenian who was exiled, and while living in exile, he was able to travel among 
the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 5.26.5). Thus, he could gather information from contacts in 
Athens as well as from Sparta and her allies. 
Thucydides as Literary Artist and as Historian 
There has been a movement for quite some time that calls into question the 
reliability of historiographical texts. This movement views ancient historiography 
primarily as a literary artifact rather than a trustworthy historical source.
20
 Proponents of 
                                                 
20
 Feldherr (2009), 1-8, gives an introduction to this movement. 
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this approach look at intertextuality as well as style and thus betray a focus on literary 
artistry rather than substance. In Thucydides’ depiction of the Sicilian Expedition, 
scholars have noted a Homeric as well as a tragic influence.
21
 In this section, I will only 
focus on the sections of Thucydides’ narrative that are relevant to the Battle in the Great 
Harbour and the Athenian retreat. Moreover, this is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather 
to give a few examples regarding how Thucydides drew on his predecessors while 
writing his own narrative. We can see for instance the Homeric inspiration in the 
catalogue of ships in Thucydides, which is similar to Iliad Book II (Hom. Il. 2.494-
759).
22
 It is similar not only in the fact that the number of troops and their respective 
places of origin are noted, but also that the actual narrative composition as written in 
Thucydides closely corresponds to the Homeric poem.
23
 In Thucydides’ catalogue, the 
section for the Athenians is much longer than the list of the forces of the Syracusans. 
Similarly, in Homer’s account, the catalogue of the Greeks is given far more lines of 
poetry than the Trojans. Moreover, the army that is described second is the besieged 
city.
24
 In the case of Homer, this is the Trojan army, and in Thucydides’ account, it is the 
Syracusan forces. Thucydides even mentions Homer’s catalogue of ships at 1.10.4, which 
shows that he was well aware of the particular passage,
25
 and thus, it suggests that he 
used Homer’s catalogue as a blueprint for his own account. Thucydides also seems to be 
                                                 
21
 Hornblower (2010), 12-21. 
22
 Dover (1965), 47. 
23
 Hornblower (2010), 654. 
24
 Hornblower (2010), 654. 
25
 Interestingly, in this passage, Thucydides questions Homer’s numbers, calling them an exaggeration 
because Homer was employing poetic license. In fact, Thucydides goes on to state that the rowers in the 
ships of the Trojan War were also the infantry units. This greatly lessens the number of total troops. 
Thucydides concludes that all things considered, the overall number of troops in the Trojan expedition 
would not be very impressive. 
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indebted to Herodotus’ catalogues.
26
 The first influence is the catalogue of Persian troops 
marching against Greece, wherein Herodotus lists the forces by their ethnic origin (Hdt. 
7.60ff.), which Thucydides also does in his catalogue of ships. More importantly, 
Herodotus’ account of the Battle of Salamis is a model for Thucydides’ depiction of the 
Battle in the Great Harbour.
27
  Those naval battles are undoubtedly the most important 
sea battles in their respective texts. Herodotus tells the reader about the ethnic origins of 
the men in the Battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.43-48), and Thucydides likely paid close 
attention to this account. Thucydides’ categorization of the troops’ ethnicities also merits 
note as it both shows his literary flare as well as his possible mining of earlier works, 
namely, Herodotus.  Dover notes that “the fundamental criterion of classification is 
geographical.”28 The Athenian troops are listed from mainland Greece to the Aegean and 
then Southern Italy and Sicily. Conversely, the Syracusan troops are listed from Syracuse 
to Camarina to northern Sicily to Sicel allies to mainland Greece.
29
 In Herodotus, the list 
starts from the Peloponnese to the rest of mainland Greece to the islands to the one ship 
sent from Croton.
30
 Both authors take care to include the peoples by ethnic group, and 
both end the section with the types of ships that are employed. When Nicias introduces 
the grapnels in his speech, it is presented as new information to the reader. Luschnat 
considers this a technique borrowed from epic to introduce new information in 
                                                 
26
 Hornblower (2010), 654-55. Of course, Herodotus certainly looked to Homer when crafting his own 
narrative in terms of his catalogues. 
27
 Hornblower (2010), 655. 
28
 Dover (1965), 48. 
29
 Dover (1965), 48, 51. 
30
 Hornblower (2010), 659. 
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speeches.
31
 In fact, to withhold critical information until later is one of Thucydides’ 
major literary devices, and it is something that he uses quite commonly in describing both 
the Battle in the Great Harbour and the Athenian retreat. With this narrative technique, 
Thucydides gives the reader hope that the Athenians will overcome the current calamity 
and succeed. However, in terms of the grapnels, we learn in 7.65 that the Syracusans 
were aware of the Athenian preparations and took measures to counteract the grapnels. It 
is a masterful technique in order to create suspense. The reader is held by the constant 
changing of fates. Another example can be seen in the immediate aftermath of the naval 
battle. For a brief moment, it seems that Syracusan celebrations may prevent the 
Syracusans from blocking the roads with troops and thus allow the Athenians to escape 
by land during the night. However, the reader’s hope is quickly dashed when 
Hermocrates’ trick is employed (Thuc. 7.73.3-4).
32
 To illustrate this concept further, on 
the seventh night of the Athenian retreat, 300 men broke through the encircling 
Syracusan army (Thuc. 7.82.5). Now, Thucydides could have noted that these men were 
captured, but instead he leaves the reader with the expectation that the 300 will escape 
and remain free. Thucydides waits until after the Athenians had formally surrendered to 
inform the reader that the 300 escaped Athenians were captured and brought to Syracuse 
as well (Thuc. 7.85.2). Further, the battle in the Great Harbour features a teichoskopia
33
 
which can be seen to mimic the events of Iliad Book III (Hom. Il. 3.161-244).
34
 One 
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could note the theatrical nature of the battle and cite its similarities to the tragic stage.
35
 
The Battle in the Great Harbour itself appears to be a spectacle. The water of the harbour 
is the stage. The Athenians and Syracusans on the shore represent the audience watching 
the spectacle unfold. It can be compared to a modern (or ancient) sporting event in an 
arena where the two teams have their own cheering sections.  
The Athenians began the expedition with early successes. However, the arrival of 
Gylippus led to a reversal of fortune (peripeteia) for the Athenians and their situation 
became more and more hopeless. Again, in the immediate period before the battle, 
Nicias’ speech which suggested that the Athenians had made the appropriate alterations 
to combat effectively the Syracusans in the naval battle quickly became subject to 
peripeteia when the Syracusans took action to counteract any perceived Athenian 
advantages. The retreat of the Athenians after the Battle in the Great Harbour was also 
wrought with reversals of fortune. On the fifth evening of the march, the Athenians 
managed to march away during the night and Syracusans were left unaware (Thuc. 7.80). 
There is a brief glimmer of hope that the suffering of the Athenians will end. Then, the 
Syracusans quickly caught up and forced Demosthenes and his army to submit (Thuc. 
7.81.2). Thucydides’ use of speeches during the expedition is also subject to intense 
scrutiny and debate. At worst, he was simply inventing speeches that never actually 
occurred. At best, he had learned from a Spartan the details of Gylippus’ and Syracusan 
communications and from an Athenian survivor the content of Nicias’ speeches. This 
would also have been the same manner in which he learned the details of the events of 
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the expedition itself. Even if we assume the best case scenario, Thucydides’ rendering of 
speeches, while maintaining a kernel of truth, was not necessarily a verbatim record of 
the statements that were made. Thucydides is honest about this aspect of his 
historiographical technique. In 1.22, Thucydides says:
36
 
So far as all the speeches in this account either told when 
the war was about to begin or when the war was already 
happening, it is difficult for me to remember distinctly the 
precise words of the things having been said, both of the 
speeches which I myself heard and the speeches I heard by 
report from other sources. So, I have put things so as to 
capture how each speaker would have most seemed to say 
what in my opinion should be the most needful thing to say 
concerning the current circumstance, while keeping as 
close as possible to the general opinion of the things having 
been said in truth.
37
  
While the Thucydides’ honesty regarding the accuracy of speeches is admirable, it raises 
other questions. Pelling says that:  
No sentence in the Greek language can be taken quite so 
variously as that on speeches here. Some scholars think it 
clear that the guiding principle here is as much historical 
accuracy as possible, others think that it points to a high 
degree of free composition.
38
 
Pelling further notes that Thucydides cannot be writing what was the right policy to urge 
as this would completely eliminate the debates between statesmen as they occur in 
Thucydides, since both statesmen would be urging for the correct policy and would thus 
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be in agreement.
39
 Pelling correctly notes that it is difficult to judge the historical 
accuracy of Thucydides’ speeches because we do not know which speeches he heard 
himself and we do not know how reliable his informants were.
40
 In some cases, Pelling 
argues that Thucydides would have scarcely any sources for knowing certain speeches. 
He cites Nicias’ final speeches during the Sicilian Expedition as an example of this.
41
 
However, we know that many Athenians survived the Expedition and eventually made it 
back to Athens. It is entirely possible that Thucydides was able to garner information 
from these individuals. Of course, much still hinges on how faithful Thucydides’ 
recording of speeches actually was, and how much content was the product of 
Thucydides’ free composition.    
While these examples highlight Thucydides’ brilliance as a literary artist, I think 
that Thucydides’ account can still be valid, as I will argue.  
We must consider a few features of ancient historiography that make the historical 
works seem less reliable than the reader would hope. It is a naïve assumption to think that 
an historian can simply give an account of events as they actually happened. Every 
historian is telling a story – with a beginning, middle, and an end – and thus he has to 
draw on the various narrative elements of storytelling.
42
 For example, in Thucydides’ 
account of the Battle in the Great Harbour, he is faced with the difficulty of giving a 
linear account of a vast naval battle, with a myriad of individual actions. Thucydides 
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would have, of course, drawn on his predecessors’ accounts of similar naval battles. 
Besides the basic point of historical narrative, we should also not forget the highly 
agonistic nature of Greek society, which also left its mark on the Greek historians.
43
 As 
we can see in Thuc. 1.1, Thucydides was openly competing with his predecessors, Homer 
and Herodotus, which further explains his use of their techniques and his attempt to 
surpass them. Thucydides needed to build on earlier work. So, when Thucydides narrated 
an event that has similarities or could hypothetically contain similarities, he used the 
paradigms as set forth by Herodotus and Homer. Thus, when Thucydides gave his 
account of the catalogue of troops, it is reasonable that he would have looked to the 
methods employed by his predecessors. For the Iliadic examples, the catalogue of ships 
was simply an efficient way of reporting the various forces in action. Thucydides would 
have likely used his predecessors (Homer, Hesiod,
44
 and Herodotus (7.61-99.)) as a guide 
of how such information should be compiled and presented most effectively. He would 
have also looked to his predecessors in order to insert himself into the style of discourse 
of those who came before him. It is important to emphasize, however, that even when 
Thucydides drew on the literary techniques of his predecessors, he was still trying to 
represent situations and events which actually happened as best as he could. Thucydides 
assures the reader that in describing events he was guided by the principal of ἀκρίβεια 
and reports the results of thorough research (Thuc. 1.22). 
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The teichoskopia in fact took place. The walls of Syracuse were directly adjacent 
to the Great Harbour.
45
 It stands to reason that the non-combatants within the city would 
have looked out to see how their friends and family members were faring. Moreover, if 
the battle had gone awry for the Syracusans, this would have given the Syracusans 
immediate warning of an impending threat. Since Homer had already provided an 
example of how one would narrate such an event and every Greek had grown up with the 
works of Homer, Thucydides would have looked to Homer’s work as a foundation. 
Another explanation for Thucydides’ narrative techniques – especially in regard to the 
necessity to create suspense – is the potential for recitation. It has been suggested that 
several sections of Thucydides may have been meant for recitation either at Symposia or 
various Pan-Hellenic festivals.
46
 There is speculation that the entirety of the Sicilian 
expedition could have been a recitation unit that would last roughly 8 hours.
47
 Otherwise, 
the sections could be broken up and the Battle in the Great Harbour and its aftermath 
could have been recited.
48
 Another potential performance piece could have been the 
slaughter at the River Assinarus up to the death of Nicias.
49
 If the potential for recitation 
is the case, there was an even greater importance for Thucydides to use various literary 
techniques in order to hold the attention of an audience.  
The use of direct (speeches) and indirect discourse (summaries of speeches) is a 
technique that can be interpreted in a few ways. First, Thucydides could use indirect 
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speech as a way to distance himself from the narrative, suggesting that his knowledge of 
the speech was either lacking or that he did not feel that the contents of the speech were 
worthy of quotation in full. Second, indirect discourse could be used if Thucydides 
wished to add his own comments to the speech.
50
 The use of direct speech implies the 
opposite; namely that Thucydides was familiar with the speech and felt it was important 
to include. The use of indirect discourse could also be used as a means to maintain pace.
51
 
In some instances, Thucydides simply states that an individual said the same things that 
were said in a previous speech. In this way, Thucydides could avoid repetition and thus 
prevent the text from being bogged down by very similar speeches.  
Ultimately, the historian must make value judgments regarding what is necessary 
to include and what can be omitted. In this way, there is no such thing as an unbiased 
historian. Thucydides notes in 1.23 that he did not accept the first story given to him as 
factual. Instead, he investigated the claims and attempted to uncover the truth. He notes 
that even two witnesses to the same event may give different accounts in regard to the 
occasion. He was the final judge in terms of what is considered factually accurate. It is 
clear that while Thucydides certainly had literary ambitions, it is not correct to say that 
his entire work was an artistic invention rather than a truthful account of events. There 
does not have to be a strict dichotomy between literature and fact.  
In the following sections, I will provide a brief overview of the other 
historiographical sources for the Sicilian Expedition which can be used to supplement 
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Thucydides’ account. The other authors are Philistus, Ephorus, Timaeus, Diodorus 
Siculus, and Plutarch. Both Plutarch and Diodorus are extant sources that can be used to 
back up Thucydides’ narrative. These two writers used all of the sources that were 
available to them including the Philistus, Ephorus and Timaeus, which are no longer 
extant. Notably, although three of the historians are Sicilians (Philistus, Timaeus, and 
Diodorus Siculus), their accounts largely confirm or follow Thucydides which suggests 
that even the ‘enemies’, despite their pro-Syracusan stance, considered Thucydides’ 
account accurate or at least plausible enough not to correct him.  
Philistus 
Philistus is the only other author who was a contemporary to the events of the 
Sicilian Expedition.
52
 Unfortunately, his work only survives in fragments. However, his 
writing was available in its entirety to the later authors, discussed in the following 
sections, either through direct consultation or filtered through an author such as Ephorus 
or Timaeus. Philistus was a Syracusan who lived in the city at the time of the Sicilian 
Expedition.
53
 In fact, he may have been one of the individuals watching from the walls 
during the Battle in the Great Harbour. This is extremely important to the overall 
accounting of events. Those who were writing after the events had the ability to consult 
both Thucydides and Philistus, which would have allowed them to give a potentially 
more accurate rendering of events. Thankfully, owing to the work of Meister and other 
philologists, we have a better idea of which authors were using either Philistus or 
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Thucydides. Plutarch states that Thucydides’ account was superior to that of Philistus by 
saying that Thucydides even outdid himself in his display of vividness and passionate 
writing (Plut. Nic. 1.1). He further states that Timaeus’ writing looked to build on 
Thucydides’ and in turn make Philistus’ work seem “altogether coarse and unskilled” 
(Plut. Nic. 1.1). This seems to speak more to Philistus’ narrative technique than it does to 
the quality of information provided. Regardless, the importance of Philistus’ work cannot 
be overstated because it helps to balance Thucydides. However, there is one caveat 
regarding the use of Philistus. It seems that Philistus was writing after Thucydides and, 
therefore, may have been influenced by Thucydides’ narrative. Theon said that Philistus 
pulled much of his information in regard to the events of the ‘Attic War’ from the 
account of Thucydides.
54
 Certainly, Philistus would have had little knowledge of the 
events that are happening in the Athenian camp unless he asked Athenian captives, but at 
the same time, he would have provided details from the Syracusan side to which 
Thucydides would have little or no access.
55
 In this way, Philistus acted as a check that 
balanced Thucydides’ account. 
Ephorus 
Ephorus, an historian from Cyme in Asia Minor, wrote a universal history around 
350 BC. Like Philistus, his work survives only in fragments. It is apparent that Ephorus 
used Thucydides, but there is evidence that he had used a source other than Thucydides 
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as well.
56
 This other source must most likely be Philistus, “über den Ephoros äußerst 
positiv urteilt.”57 Ephorus, though largely lost, was a major source for the surviving 
account of Diodorus. 
Timaeus 
Timaeus was an historian from Tauromenium (north of Catane in Sicily). He 
composed a history of the Greek world. He was writing in the first half of the third 
century BC. On some occasions, Timaeus’ work seems to differ from both Thucydides 
and Philistus, but it seems that for most points he followed these two authors.
58
 Perhaps 
he had access to another source that is unknown to us, or there are segments in Ephorus 
that differed from the accounts of Thucydides and Philistus. When Timaeus’ account is 
inconsistent with Thucydides or Philistus, it suggests that he is attempting to correct their 
accounts for accuracy and, thus could be using a source that is completely unknown in 
modern times (which is unlikely), or that Ephorus’ attempted to correct the factual 
accuracy of Philistus and Thucydides and Timaeus was simply copying what Ephorus 
had written.  Plutarch says that Timaeus used not only Thucydides, but also Philistus 
(Plut. Nic. 1.1). 
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Diodorus 
Another Sicilian, Diodorus Siculus,
59
 wrote his universal history around 40BC. 
This is the first author after Thucydides whose account of the Sicilian Expedition is still 
extant. He is often accused of being a simple epitomator, abbreviating the accounts of 
previous authors. For our purposes, this is actually advantageous. In this way, we know 
that he was not inserting his own interpretation of events, but rather was rewriting the 
information that was previously recorded by others. For the sections that are relevant to 
this thesis, namely, the Battle in the Great Harbour, and the Athenian retreat, Meister 
argues that the prime source for Diodorus was Timaeus for the sea battle and Ephorus for 
the Athenian retreat.
60
 However, others have argued that Diodorus used Philistus’ work 
as his primary source. Based on the Quellenforschung, even if Diodorus derived his 
information from Timaeus or Ephorus, his account goes back to both Philistus and 
Thucydides. Since he more or less had access to the works of both contemporary authors, 
what he records is essentially a unified account that was likely considered the most 
realistic by Timaeus and Ephorus. Ultimately, Diodorus’ account can be viewed as a 
collation of Philistus and Thucydides.  
Plutarch 
The final literary source for the Athenian Expedition is Plutarch. Plutarch covers 
these events in his Life of Nicias. Plutarch was writing around AD 100, and therefore, he 
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was heavily reliant on the earlier sources. He opens his work by informing the reader of 
the sources that he used. Plutarch used Philistus, Thucydides and Timaeus (Plut. Nic. 
1.1). Since Plutarch’s version of events does not directly contradict Thucydides on any 
major points, and he had access to the work of Philistus, we can assume that the facts as 
presented in Thucydides are likely accurate or at least seemed acceptable to the 
Syracusan, Philistus. However, it is important to note that Plutarch was a biographer. As 
such, he had a different focus from that of an historian who provided a linear narrative of 
events. Instead, Plutarch was interested in the character of Nicias, but there is still much 
in his account that is useful to the historian since the biographer needed to give the 
historical background that applied to the individual about whom he wrote. 
Other Literary Sources 
In addition to the sources that cover the Sicilian Expedition, it is also possible to 
use other military texts in order to explicate Thucydides and the other authors. In other 
works we can look for parallels that can help to elucidate how events came to pass in the 
Athenian defeat. For example, Xenophon’s Anabasis provides a good comparison for an 
army attempting a retreat in hostile territory. Furthermore, Xenophon in his Hellenica 
features a battle on the Munichian hill in the Piraeus in 413 BC that is very reminiscent of 
the Athenian battle for the Acraean Heights during the retreat. Polybius also is important 
as a means to garner information regarding how an ancient army functioned. Thus, in this 
thesis, I will often make comparisons with other events as narrated by other historians as 
well as general information as to how the armies of ancient Greece operated. 
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Non-Literary Sources 
Besides the historiographical sources, there is much other information that can be 
brought to bear in order to gain a better perception of the technical aspects of the Battle in 
the Great Harbour and the military matters of the retreat. The most important for the 
purposes of the Battle in the Great Harbour is the insights gained from the reconstruction 
of an Athenian trireme and its trial runs. The trireme - named Olympias and reconstructed 
by J.S. Morrison and J.F. Coates using information gathered from the ancient sources - 
allows us to gain valuable insights as to how a trireme actually performed at sea.
61
 The 
data obtained from these experiments are critical to understanding the speed, power, and 
size of the ancient Greek warship. In addition, the trials of the Olympias give us an idea 
of how quickly a rower can become dehydrated from his exertion. However, the testing 
of the ancient trireme does not recreate the ancient experience completely. For example, 
the ancient man was on average far shorter than his modern counterpart.
62
 Since the 
trireme is built to its ancient scale, the space provided for the arms to move during 
rowing is not entirely suitable for the modern person who is generally unable to perform 
full strokes. Further, the trials were carried out with volunteers who would not in any way 
be trained as thoroughly as an ancient Athenian rower.
63
  
The equipment of Greek marines is known from both literary sources and from 
archaeological finds. For example, we know that the trireme employed hoplites, and thus, 
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we can deduce the arms and armour of these men based on what we know from the 
information about land battles both from writings and archaeological finds. In terms of 
the armour and weapons involved in the retreat, much information can be garnered from 
the tests performed by Franz as well as Gabriel and Metz.
64
 With their studies, we get a 
better understanding of the form and function of the hoplite panoply. Beyond 
archaeological objects and recreations, there are also inscriptions that can be used as a 
means to confirm the facts as provided by the historians. Athenian tribute lists are 
especially important for gaining information in regard to troops, ships, and money which 
were provided to the Athenians for the expedition.     
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I laid out my objectives, introduced my methodology, and 
discussed the available sources. I investigated Thucydides’ goals as a literary artist. I 
provided some examples of how Thucydides could be perceived as an author who might 
put style before substance and by extension, bring the credibility of his account into 
question. Then, I explained why Thucydides used his predecessors in the way that he 
does by examining the nature of ancient writing and historiography. In discussing the 
other sources for the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition, I suggested that they could be 
used to strengthen the historicity of Thucydides’ account. I also laid out the Face of 
Battle methodology and how I intend to use it in this thesis. 
                                                 
64
 Schwartz (2011), 80-81. 
  
27 
 
Essentially, my modus operandi is to consider every passage in Thucydides’ 
account of the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition and attempt to figure out how the 
actions described would have worked in reality. To do this, I consult other sections of 
Thucydides as well as other ancient authors (especially Xenophon), in order to find 
parallels for strategies and tactics that help elucidate the military actions during the 
Sicilian Expedition. Further, I consult the research of other scholars on specific problems 
of military matters, such as equipment and general strategies, in order to inform my own 
interpretation.
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Chapter 2: The Battle in the Great Harbour 
ὁρῶμεν ἀνθοῦν πέλαγος… νεκροῖς 
ἀνδρῶν Ἀχαιῶν ναυτικοῖς τ' ἐρειπίοις (Aesch. Ag. 659-60). 
Essentials of Naval Battle 
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a sufficient amount of 
information regarding the general techniques employed in a naval battle so that it is easier 
to comprehend the reconstruction of the Battle in the Great Harbour. Thus, I focus 
heavily on trireme strategies. In trireme warfare, there were two main forms of combat, 
ramming and boarding.
65
 These two tactics were not mutually exclusive and navies 
would have used both skills in order to achieve their objectives. Another tactic that is 
generally not included in the forms of combat, but was important in the Battle in the 
Great Harbour, is forced beaching.
66
 This tactic is not included because it does not 
require actual engagement with the enemy, but rather, forced beaching is a maneuver that 
relies on the threat of engagement. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusans 
used forced beaching to take Athenian ships out of the battle. The Athenians tended to 
focus primarily on ramming tactics which required more skill, while the other navies of 
the Greek world preferred boarding enemy ships.
67
 However, in the Battle in the Great 
Harbour, we will see that the Athenians embraced the boarding strategy (Thuc. 7.62.2), 
albeit unsuccessfully. 
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First, it is necessary to discuss the role of the oarsmen in the trireme. The trireme 
had a crew that was composed of several different people or groups with their own 
distinct duties. The crew of an Athenian trireme usually consisted of about 200 men,
68
 
which was less than that of the ships of other Greek states. There were three groups of 
oarsmen (thalamioi, zugioi, and thranitai), a captain (trierarchos), hoplites called marines 
(epibatai), archers (toxotai), a bow officer (prorates), a helmsman (kubernetes), a flute 
player (auletes), a shipwright (naupegos), a boatswain (keleustes), and deckhands.
69
 
However, in the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians increased the number of men 
on the deck (Thuc. 7.62.2. and 7.67.2). The oarsmen provided the ships mobility. A 
trireme crew employed 170 oarsmen on three levels. There were 54 oarsmen on the 
bottom level called thalamioi (27 oarsmen on each side of the ship).
70
 These men put 
their oars through an oar port (thalamia) with leather sleeves called askomata which were 
used in order to prevent water from entering the ship (though small amounts of water still 
did enter).
71
 These men had a distinct disadvantage compared to the other groups of 
rowers. If the ship took in enough water that it began to sink, the thalamioi would have 
been the most likely to drown.
72
 There were another 54 oarsmen on the second level 
called zugioi (27 oarsmen on each side of the ship).
73
 These men also placed their oars 
through oar ports, but there were no askomata for these ports.
74
 There were 62 oarsmen 
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on the highest level called thranitai (31 oarsmen on each side of the ship).
75
 These men 
placed their oars through an outrigger.
76
 The thranitai were the only group that could 
actually see the water while they were rowing.
77
 Therefore, the thranitai could be hit by 
enemy missiles while rowing.
78
 This could be prevented by blocking the outriggers with 
canvas.
79
 Every oarsman had a seat, and the seats were likely padded with sheepskin.
80
 
Unlike modern rowers, ancient trireme rowers did not have a sliding seat, so they could 
not take advantage of their leg strength in order to put more power into their strokes.
81
 
The oarsmen were also quite crowded together. The thalamioi were the closest to the 
center of the ship and each successive level was farther out.
82
 This allowed more men to 
fit in a smaller area, but meant that there was greater crowding. This reduction of vertical 
space for the rowers gave the ship a lower center of gravity so that the trireme was more 
stable in the water.
83
 While the modern rowers in the Olympias reconstruction only 
reached a sustained speed of 7.1 knots (13.1 km/h),
84
 it is believed that the Athenian 
oarsmen might have been able to reach a speed of 10 knots (18.5 km/h).
85
 This can be 
explained by the average height of the ancient man versus the modern man. Because the 
space on an ancient trireme allowed for about 85cm of horizontal movement for the 
hands, the Athenians who were of a much shorter stature (likely no taller than 1.67 
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meters on average) were able to extend fully their arms while rowing which allowed 
greater power for strokes.
86
  
Ramming 
Triremes were equipped with a wooden ram (embolos) that was plated with 
bronze.
87
 It was placed at the lowest part of the prow of the ship.
88
 On the ram were three 
“chisel-like blades just above the water level.”89 Navies that intended to ram their 
enemies rather than to board enemy ships would keep fewer hoplites on deck and craft 
their ships to be as small as possible.
90
 Keeping the trireme light was essential to 
maintaining high speeds. Essentially, the goal was to drive the ram into the sides of the 
enemy ship in order to cut a hole in its hull.  While a trireme would often ram an enemy 
at a 90 degree angle, it was far more effective to ram the ship at a lower angle in order to 
tear a large gash in the ship. This method also helped to prevent the ram from becoming 
jammed in the other ship so that the ramming trireme could back away from the enemy 
vessel, since the ram would not enter as deep into the hull.
91
 Furthermore, a large gash in 
the side of a ship would have made it more difficult to repair, and more water would have 
rushed into the trireme, incapacitating it more quickly. However, ramming could be quite 
a risky endeavor owing to the speed required for a successful penetration of the enemy 
ship. It is estimated that a trireme would have needed to reach a speed of between 
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roughly 2-8 knots (3.7-14.8 km) to cause a gash in the opposing trireme.
92
 The necessary 
speed differs depending on the angle of attack. A sharper angle required a higher speed. 
An attack at a 90 degree angle would have only required a speed of about 2 knots.
93
 The 
speed could be substantially lowered if the target ship was travelling towards the 
ramming trireme. If a trireme did not reach the required speed to breach, the ram could 
very well be more damaging to the attacking ship and leave the target ship nearly 
unscathed.
94
  
A simple way for a trireme to avoid being damaged was to row away from the 
attacking ship, thus making it harder for the attacking ship to reach the required ramming 
speed. With the reconstructed Olympias, the rowers were able to back water (i.e. to go 
backwards) at a speed of 3 knots.
95
 If the rowers physically turned around and rowed 
facing the stern of the ship, the ship could reach a speed of 5 knots.
96
 The rowers of the 
Olympias were able to turn around in their seats in roughly 20 seconds.
97
 However, there 
is no evidence that the Greeks actually used this technique, so physically turning around 
in a trireme is simply conjecture. Another tactic was that a trireme could row close to the 
side of the ship (rowing towards each other). Then, the attackers could pull in their oars. 
If the enemy failed to retract their own oars, the attacking trireme could shatter the enemy 
oars, leaving the ship immobile.
98
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There were two special tactics that the Athenians employed, that relied on their 
superior mobility. These were the periplous
99
 and the diekplous.
100
 These maneuvers are 
generally thought to be group techniques, but Whitehead argues that these tactics refer to 
single ships.
101
 The periplous is a less clear maneuver based on the descriptions given by 
primary sources. Whitehead posits that when an enemy ship began to chase a trireme, the 
chased trireme could attempt a periplous. It quickly circled around with its superior 
maneuverability and rammed the attacking trireme in the side or the stern.
102
 It is 
somewhat similar to the aerobatic technique of the inside-loop (although on a different 
axis) where a chased plane does 360 degree vertical flip in order to get behind the enemy 
plane.  
Alternatively, the periplous has been envisioned as a group flanking attack.
103
 In 
this method, a group of ships were arranged in a line approaching a hostile line of ships. 
The ships on the flanks moved outward in order to attack the sides of the enemy ships.
104
 
Whitehead’s argument is based on the description of the maneuver in our primary 
sources. Thucydides claims that these tactics were only to be attempted by highly skilled 
helmsmen (Thuc. 7.36.4). The group version of the periplous would not have required a 
high level of skill.  
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The diekplous was a breakthrough maneuver.
105
 The goal was to go between two 
ships and then quickly maneuver back in order to ram the side or the stern of the enemy’s 
ship.
106
 Holladay argues that another reason to attempt a diekplous was to break the 
enemy oars.
107
 An enemy navy would have used a kuklos formation
108
 as a defensive 
measure against the diekplous.
109
 The kuklos formation required a group of ships to form 
a circle (hence kuklos) with their rams facing toward the outside of the circle. Then, a 
much smaller group of ships would form a star formation inside the kuklos. These ships 
would also have had their rams pointing outwards. With this technique, a diekplous 
became very risky. If the attacking ship broke in between the ships of the kuklos, it would 
have been rammed by one of the ships in the star formation inside the kuklos. The kuklos 
was utilized by the slower heavier navies of the non-Athenian Greek states as a way to 
counteract the quickness and maneuverability of the lighter Athenian ships.
110
 A 
successful ram would tear into the hull of an enemy ship. However, it seems rare that a 
ship actually sank.
111
 Instead, the ship dipped into the water, but tended to have enough 
buoyancy to stay afloat.
112
 Generally, once rescued or cleared of enemy fighters, the 
‘sunken’ ship could be towed to a port and be repaired and redeployed.113 This is not to 
say that drowning was not an issue for the thalamioi, who were on the lowest level of the 
three tiers of rowers. A successful ram could cause hundreds of gallons of water to storm 
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in the ship very quickly and submerge most of the hull which would have left the 
thalamioi in a dangerous situation.  
Boarding 
The other major tactic of Greek naval warfare was boarding. Boarding turned a 
naval battle into what was essentially a land battle.
114
 The objective of the attacking ship 
was to get close to the opposing vessel. This could be achieved by ramming or simply 
pulling up beside the enemy, but it was also an option once a ship was rammed. 
Ramming or being rammed could cause the ships to become jammed together, which 
allowed the hoplites to leap across and to engage in infantry combat. The Athenians tried 
to avoid infantry fights once they had successfully rammed an enemy ship, and they were 
well versed in reversing away from the ship that they had rammed. Since the Athenians 
tended to keep fewer hoplites on the deck, it was of the utmost importance that the 
Athenian trireme avoided being boarded. During the Sicilian campaign, both sides came 
up with a few innovations. For example, if a ship was still in close proximity to the 
enemy ship, the crew could throw grapnels and hook onto the other ship (Thuc. 7.62.3). 
The ship that has been hooked by the grapnels could then be pulled beside the attacking 
ship and boarded.  
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A ship could make it more difficult to be hooked by placing animal hides along 
the outrigger (Thuc. 7.64.2). It was also important to make sure that the mast was down 
in battle,
115
 most likely both to prevent the mast from being hooked by the grapnel and to 
stop the wind from wreaking havoc on the maneuverability of the trireme. Once a ship 
had successfully become attached to another vessel either by ramming or by the use of 
grapnels, the hoplites attempted to engage the enemy upon the ship in what was 
essentially a land battle.  
However, getting aboard the enemy ship could be a difficult task in itself. First, if 
the water was rough, a hoplite may have leapt unsuccessfully to the opposing ship. He 
could fall into the water, and the weight of his armour (roughly 19.82 kg)
116
 would make 
it difficult to swim to safety. Not only did the fallen hoplite have to struggle with the 
weight of his armour in the water, he might also be assaulted with arrows, stones, and 
javelins being thrown from the men on the deck of the enemy ship.
117
 The hoplite leaping 
to another ship also had to contend with these projectiles. Further, if the area of contact 
between the two ships was minimal (such as when a ship was rammed at a 90 degree 
angle), the hoplite would have to leap directly into the enemy hoplites since they would 
guard the point of contact between the two triremes. Thus, it was ideal to be able to hop 
onto the enemy trireme when the ships were parallel to each other. This was possible if 
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multiple grapnels were used to hook the enemy trireme. If the attacking hoplites could 
defeat the enemy hoplites as well as the archers and javelin men, there was little to stop 
the boarding hoplites from acquiring the ship. The oarsmen (especially in the summer 
months) were likely wearing only a loin cloth,
118
 and it seems rare for them to have been 
armed.
119
 Therefore, the oarsmen could be quickly slaughtered while attempting to 
escape the ship if they did not manage to flee before their own comrades on the deck of 
the ship were overcome. If the trireme was hooked by grapnels and was never rammed 
during the battle, the hoplites could gain a trireme in perfect condition for their own 
navy.
120
 Otherwise, the ship could be towed to shore and repaired by the naupegos.
121
 
Since boarding did not require highly trained oarsmen capable of engaging in complex 
tactical maneuvers, it was the preferred method of naval combat for most Greek navies. 
The Athenians had the advantage of employing professional oarsmen who trained with 
their fellow rowers,
122
 and thus were skilled enough to rely on pure ramming combat. The 
oarsmen of other Greek and barbarian navies generally did not have this skill level, and 
thus it was better for them to engage in infantry combat, a fighting style with which the 
men of a Greek polis would be very comfortable. It is important to note how fortunes 
could quickly change in a naval battle. Even after a successful ramming, the attackers 
could be overcome by the hoplites on the rammed trireme if the hoplites on the ramming 
ship failed to defend the deck, and they did not manage to back water and get away 
quickly enough. 
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Forced Beaching 
There is one other strategy that a navy might have used to gain an advantage, 
although it did not require any actual contact with the enemy ship. This tactic was forced 
beaching. This method was important for the Battle in the Great Harbour because it was 
used by the Syracusan navy against the Athenians (Thuc. 7.70.1). To perform a forced 
beaching, two or more ships surrounded an enemy ship. If the ship did not dare to 
engage, owing to the odds against it or because the ship had taken too much damage and 
could not afford to be rammed, and it tried to escape, it could be forced toward the shore 
by the other ships. If a ship was forced to beach, its crew could escape unharmed, but the 
ship would be removed from battle for some time. Either the crew would have to push the 
boat back out to sea or if the ship beached in friendly territory, the comrades on the shore 
could push the boat back out to sea. It was far more advantageous to force an enemy ship 
to beach in one’s own territory. In this circumstance, the men on the shore could either 
kill the men on board, or prevent them from getting the ship back into the water, 
effectively removing the trireme from combat. If the men on the ship somehow managed 
to fight off the men on the shore, the ship was still greatly delayed and thus no help to its 
allies. If the men on the shore could take over the ship, they could acquire a new ship for 
their own navy.       
Before the Battle 
 In early 414 BC, the Athenians successfully blockaded Syracuse by both land and 
sea and besieged the city (Thuc. 6.103.3; Diod. 13.7.5; Plut. Nic. 18.4-5). The Syracusans 
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were very close to suing for peace (Thuc. 6.103.3; Plut. Nic. 18.4),
123
 but the Spartan 
commander, Gylippus, arrived in Sicily with a small force and collected allies throughout 
Sicily (Thuc. 7.1; Diod. 13.7.7; Plut. Nic. 19.4). A Corinthian fleet came to Syracuse’s aid 
as well (Thuc. 7.2.1; Diod. 13.8.3).
124
 Nicias sent a letter to Athens asking for troops and 
money and for himself to be relieved from duty because of a kidney problem (Thuc. 7.14-
15; Diod. 13.8.6).
125
 The Athenians decided to send Demosthenes and Eurymedon with a 
large number of troops and ships (Thuc. 7.16; Diod. 13.11.1). In 413 BC, the Athenians 
attempted a night raid at Epipolae, but failed owing to a limited knowledge of the terrain 
and the confusion caused by the darkness (Thuc. 7.43.6-45; Diod. 13.11.3-6; Plut. Nic. 
21.5-9). The Athenians postponed their escape from Sicily, due to an eclipse (Thuc. 7.50.4; 
Diod. 13.12.6; Plut. Nic. 23.1). Advised by the soothsayers, Nicias proclaimed that the 
troops needed to wait 27 days before making any attempt to escape (Thuc. 7.50.4).
126
 Once 
the Syracusans had become aware that the Athenians were going to remain in Sicily, they 
attacked the Athenian ships in a naval battle and were victorious (Thuc. 7.52.1-54; Diod. 
13.13.1-13.8; Plut. Nic. 24.1-2). Eurymedon was killed in the battle (Thuc. 7.52.2; Diod. 
13.13.3; Plut. Nic. 24.2). 
                                                 
123
 Plutarch states at 18.7 that the Syracusans actually held an assembly to debate what the peace terms with 
Nicias should be. 
124
 Plutarch says that the Corinthians came with a single trireme to inform the Syracusans that Gylippus 
was en route (Plut. Nic. Nic. 20.1). 
125
 This is not mentioned in Plutarch. 
126
 Diodorus claims that the Athenians only had to wait 3 days before departing (Diod. 13.12.6). Plutarch 
says that they had to wait another full cycle of the moon (Plut. Nic. 23.6).  
  
40 
 
Preparations 
With the reinforcements sent in early 413 BC, the Athenians were still unable to 
win the war. However, owing to the eclipse, the Athenians sat around for too long. By the 
time the decision was made to sail home, the Syracusans had become emboldened by 
their recent victories and wanted to prevent an Athenian escape and to destroy the 
Expedition Corps. Ultimately, the Syracusans looked to encircle the Athenians and entrap 
them within the Great Harbour and the small area of land which they still held beside the 
harbour.
127
 In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians were engaging in a battle of 
breakthrough. The goal was to break out of the Great Harbour of Syracuse and to escape. 
The Syracusans made the opening maneuver by blockading the harbour with merchant 
ships and triremes along with smaller ships (Thuc. 7.40.5). The Syracusans attached the 
ships together with chains and planks (Thuc. 7.59.3; Diod. 14.1-2).
128
 The exit of the 
harbour was completely blocked off except for a small gap in the very middle (Thuc. 
7.59.3).
129
  
At this point, the morale of the Athenians and their allies was dangerously low. 
Soon after the arrival of Demosthenes and Eurymedon, the Athenians had lost a land 
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battle during the night (Thuc. 7.43-45; Diod. 13.11.3-6; Plut. Nic. 21.5-8).
130
 
Furthermore, the Athenians had been defeated in an earlier naval battle, which was an 
embarrassing outcome for the preeminent navy of the Greek world (Thuc. 7.52-55.1; 
Diod. 13.13.1-8; Plut. Nic. 24.2). In that battle, the Athenian general Eurymedon had 
been slain (Thuc. 7.52.2; Diod. 13.13.3-4; Plut. Nic. 24.2), and the Athenians had lost 18 
ships (Thuc. 7.53.3; Diod. 13.13.8).
131
 This was especially damaging to the psyche of a 
navy which thought it was invincible. Conversely, the Syracusans gained a massive 
morale boost for having defeated such an imposing naval force (Thuc. 7.67.1). When this 
lack of confidence was combined with the illness (Plut. Nic. 22.4) and hunger that was 
running through the Athenian army, the Athenians were in dire need of a morale boost. 
Nicias attempted to cull the negative attitudes that were present in the army in two 
speeches.
132
 He appealed to the emotions of the Athenians and their allies by inspiring 
fear for their families in their various homelands (Thuc. 7.64.1). He also warned them of 
the consequences for their own lives should they not escape the present situation 
successfully (Thuc. 7.64.1; Diod. 13.15.1-2).
133
 However, in terms of their preparations 
for the impending battle, he assured the navy by pointing out the changes that had been 
made that he felt would give them a competitive advantage in combat.
134
 However, the 
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changes were a massive departure from the tactics that were generally used by the 
Athenians. Normally, the Athenians relied on their superior maneuverability in the water 
on account of their highly trained oarsmen.
135
 For this battle, since the harbour would 
constrain the movement of the ships, Nicias adopted the strategy of the Syracusans, 
which had been highly successful in the preceding naval battle (i.e. boarding rather than 
ramming). Thucydides repeatedly uses words that reference the narrowness of the battle 
area, such as στενοχωρία (Thuc. 7.70.6). Thus, the new plan was to fill the decks with 
hoplites and bowmen and javelin throwers, whereas the normal Athenian method was to 
include roughly 10 hoplites and 4 archers. The javelin throwers and bowmen could harass 
the hoplites on the enemy ships, and the hoplites could board the opposing ships and 
effectively commandeer them.
136
 The less experienced navies of the Greek world tended 
to put more hoplites on deck with the intent of boarding.
137
 Nicias chose to use grapnels 
in order to make the boarding of ships more effective (Thuc. 7.62.3). The strategy was to 
get close to another ship, and then the grapnels could be used to latch on to the enemy 
ship in order to make it easier for the hoplites to board. Moreover, Nicias informed the 
troops that they had taken the proper counter-measures to combat the thickness of the 
enemies’ catheads, which he claimed had the most devastating effect in the previous 
battle (Thuc. 7.62.3). A cathead is a device used to lower and raise anchors in order to 
keep the anchor from damaging the ship by keeping it sufficiently far away from the ship 
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proper. Thick catheads helped to strengthen the prow of the ship.
138
 The specific counter-
measures taken by the Athenians are difficult to discern. 
While Nicias’ assurances were able to coerce the Athenians and the allies to 
engage in a final effort to escape Sicily, there were a few issues with his plan. First, the 
Athenian navy lacked experience in this form of naval warfare. As the Spartan 
commander, Gylippus, states in his speech to the Syracusan troops: 
Concerning their close imitation of our preparation, it (the 
army) strains in our manner and we will be well-prepared 
against each of them, when there are many hoplites upon 
the deck – contrary to their established method – many 
javelin men, Acharnanians and others who are men of the 
land so to speak, having got on board on a ship, they will 
not even discover how it is possible to discharge a missile 
while sitting. How will they not make the ships unsteady, 
all will be confused amongst themselves, moving forth in a 
manner that is not their own? (Thuc. 7.67.2)
139
 
Here, Gylippus questioned the Athenians’ ability to engage in battle in a manner in which 
they were not familiar. Most important is the statement that the javelin throwers would 
not be able to figure out how to effectively hurl their weapons (Thuc. 7.67.2). Barry 
Strauss uses this passage as proof that javelin throwers were required to be seated to 
throw their weapons “because standing would cause the ship to roll and upset the 
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oars.”140 However, I argue that this cannot be the case. The javelin throwers may remain 
seated before engaging, but a seated man would not be able to throw effectively a javelin 
with a sufficient amount of force. Instead, Gylippus should be regarded as engaging in 
laconic wit rather than making a factual statement concerning naval warfare. This relies 
on the interpretation of οὐδέ in this passage. The οὐδέ should be taken to mean ‘not even’ 
instead of simply meaning ‘not’.
141
 In this way, the fully expressed thought behind 
Gylippus’ witty statement is meant to be “the Acharnanians, being land people, will not 
be able to discharge their weapons while standing; they will not even be able to do it 
while sitting.” Certainly, standing on the ship would be more difficult than sitting, and 
Strauss is correct to point out the dangers of rolling the ship. However, sitting in order to 
discharge missiles was certainly impossible. If we consider the crowding on the decks of 
the ships, where would the javelin men even sit in order to discharge their weapons? 
They certainly could not sit in the middle of the deck, as their line of sight would be 
blocked by the hoplites in front of them. The only possibility was that they would sit on 
the edge of the deck, but this would cause other problems. First, there was the potential to 
fall off the deck especially if the ship rolls, and second, the javelin men were wearing 
little armour, and their shields would be difficult to manipulate in a sitting position and 
therefore, sitting on the edge of the deck would put them in an extremely dangerous 
situation. Thus, it is quite possible that the javelin throwers remained seated until they 
were in a position to engage, and then they stood up. Gylippus’ point is that the 
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Athenians and their allies would not be able to do this effectively given their lack of 
experience.  
Another issue was the introduction of the grapnels. The Syracusans saw the 
Athenians preparing their ships and took measures to counteract the grapnels (Thuc. 
7.65.2). The Syracusans placed animal hides over the prows and a considerable portion of 
the upper works of the ships (Thuc. 7.65.2)
142
 which helped to prevent the grapnels from 
successfully grabbing hold of the ships. The hides were also used to block arrows, which 
was a common tactic.
143
 It would make sense for the Syracusans to take this precaution 
after having seen the Athenians increasing the number of archers and javelin throwers on 
their triremes (Thuc. 7.67.2). It is difficult to interpret what exactly Thucydides means by 
the ‘upper works’ (Thuc. 7.65.2). Thucydides could simply mean the railings (outrigger) 
along the side of the boat. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, it is unknown whether the 
Athenians had access to animal hides or canvas to protect the thranitai and to prevent the 
triremes from being hooked by grapnels. It is possible that when the Athenian storehouse 
was captured, the Athenians had lost such items,
144
 and therefore, the thranitai of the 
Athenian triremes were in far more danger than their Syracusan counterparts. In 
conclusion, the Athenians were given a boost to their morale through Nicias’ appeals and 
with his assurances regarding their changes to strategy. However, because they had failed 
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to make these changes in secrecy, their perceived advantages were nullified. Furthermore, 
their lack of experience in naval boarding put them at a disadvantage against the 
Syracusans who tended to fight in such a manner. 
 Nicias’ Tactical Decisions 
In this section, I will argue that, regardless of the outcome of the battle, 
Nicias made the best possible tactical decisions. Nicias’ fault was that he was 
reactive to the movements of the Syracusans rather than proactive. He was 
largely responsible for the delay in the decision to sail home and for giving in to 
the soothsayers after the eclipse, as we have seen. Nicias did not attempt to escape 
at the earliest possible moment. However, once the Syracusans had blockaded the 
harbour with ships (Thuc. 7.58.3; Diod. 13.14.1-2; Plut. Nic. 24.3), the Athenian 
strategy to escape by ship was sound. It was necessary that the Athenians break 
out, since they had told Catane to stop delivering supplies even before the eclipse 
(Thuc. 7.62.2),
145
 and thus, the Athenians would eventually starve should they not 
take action. The risk for the Athenians would have been much higher if they 
attempted to escape by the land as they would not have had a clear contingency 
plan to escape the island. Moreover, travelling across Sicily would do little to help 
the Athenians. In this circumstance, the Athenians would have had to burn all of 
their ships or to surrender all of their ships to the Syracusans. On land, the 
Athenians could forage for food, but their journey back to mainland Greece 
would rely on the kindness of strangers and their allies to provide them with 
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ships. Therefore, it was better for the Athenians to attempt to break the blockade 
and arrive at Catane. This would have allowed them to acquire food from Catane 
and also keep their navy. Regardless of their defeat in the preceding battle, the 
strength of the Athenians still lied in their navy. The Athenian side still had 
more ships than the Syracusans.
146
 Nicias made massive changes to the general 
Athenian tactic of ramming, as he had decided to fight on the terms of the 
Syracusans, where there was a greater reliance on boarding enemy ships. He 
decided to emulate the other navies of Greece in this way, and to focus on 
boarding (Thuc. 7.67.2) for a few good reasons. While the Athenians were not 
well versed in this form of naval combat, it was the best method given their 
situation. The Athenian navy shone in the open water. Their triremes were able 
to out-maneuver their foe owing to their lighter weight and their more 
experienced rowers.
147
  Further, the Athenians were superior at rowing in the 
rougher waters that are present in the open sea.
148
 However, in the Great 
Harbour, the space was narrow and the water was calm. Thus, the Athenian 
rowing advantages were nullified to a degree. Another issue for the Athenians 
was that their ships were waterlogged (Thuc. 7.12.4-5). Usually, a navy would 
beach their ships after a day of sailing in order to let them dry. However, the 
Athenians had left the triremes in the water in case of a quick Syracusan attack 
(Thuc. 7.12.4-5). A waterlogged ship was heavier and therefore, more sluggish 
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in the water and not able to perform difficult maneuvers. Furthermore, the ships 
could not receive proper maintenance by the naupegos.
149
 The Athenians might 
still be able to maneuver their boats more efficiently owing to their experience, 
but the actual area of combat made this advantage negligible.  
In the previous year (414BC), Gylippus captured an Athenian naval 
storehouse which had been filled with equipment for repairs (Thuc. 7.23.1; Plut. 
Nic. 20.2).
150
 Therefore, their ships were in bad shape for the upcoming fight 
and it was especially important for the Athenians to avoid being rammed since 
they may not have had sufficient materials to repair the ships during and after 
combat.
151
 Generally, a trireme kept roughly 30 extra oars as replacements for 
the rowers.
152
 If some of these oars were kept in the naval storehouse, the 
Athenian rowers had to be very careful with their oars. Shattered oars could 
leave a trireme immobile. Based on this, the Athenians made the reasonable 
decision to focus on avoiding ramming and being rammed and to rely on 
grapnels to attach their ships to enemy triremes (Thuc. 7.62.3). If the Athenians 
could capture a boat with the grapnels and pull it parallel to their own ships, they 
would have a large boarding area. This would allow the large number of hoplites 
on the trireme to leap onto the enemy ship simultaneously, making it more 
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difficult for the Syracusans to prevent the attack. Since the Athenians happened 
to have a large number of hoplites on this campaign, they might as well use 
them for fighting on board the ships rather than have them sit and watch the 
battle from the shore. While the Athenians were less familiar with this type of 
combat, it was the most effective way to achieve victory given their current 
circumstances. 
The Will to Combat 
What was the impetus for the Athenians and their allies to stake everything on a 
naval battle with the Syracusans at this particular point in the conflict? The Athenians 
were moved largely by necessity and fear. At this point in the war, the Athenians were 
dealing with sickness among the ranks of the army (Thuc. 7.50.3; Diod. 13.12.4; Plut. 
Nic. 22.4).
153
 It stands to reason that the rate of illness among the troops would increase 
owing to a lack of provisions (Thuc. 7.60.2). The Athenians had informed Catane not to 
send them any more provisions because they had expected to leave before the eclipse 
postponed their departure (Thuc. 7.60.2). Thus, the Athenians were hungry and tired with 
no hope of obtaining food unless they made an excursion inland which would bring them 
into collision with hostiles. To add to the Athenian plight, the Syracusans were 
attempting to block the Athenians in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, preventing them 
from receiving provisions and supplies by sea and forcing them to travel inland. If the 
Athenians were to make it to Catane,
154
 they would either have to break the blockade or 
                                                 
153
 Also, the sick are mentioned again at 7.60.2. 
154
 See Figure 11: The distance between Syracuse and Catane. 
  
50 
 
attempt to travel across the island on foot. The Athenians chose to rely on their naval 
ability since they still felt that they held an advantage (although they had lost the previous 
naval engagement with the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.55.1)).
155
 However, Nicias was able to 
alleviate the damage done by the previous defeat by unveiling what he felt to be a 
winning strategy. Nicias impelled the Athenians and their allies to fight by instilling in 
them the fear of the consequences of failure. He appealed to the Athenians by informing 
them that if they were to lose and fail to escape Sicily, the consequences for their families 
back at Athens would be dire. He said:  
And to those of you who are Athenians, I remind you 
again, that you left behind no other ships in your docks that 
are equal to these ships here nor did you leave behind any 
hoplites fit for military service, and if anything shall 
happen other than for you to prevail, our enemies here will 
sail straightaway to there (Athens), and those of us 
remaining in that place (Athens) will be unable to ward off 
those enemies that are present and those coming upon them 
(Thuc. 7.64.1).
156
  
 
Thus, Nicias made an emotional plea to the Athenians to think about the potential 
repercussions that might come upon Athens should their forces fail to escape. Further, he 
invoked ancestors and reminded the Athenians of their great deeds in battle (Thuc. 
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7.69.2). Nicias managed to put similar fear into the hearts of the Athenian allies as well. 
He said:   
And the rest of you (Sicilians) will come under the 
Syracusans straightaway, you yourselves know with what 
sort a purpose you came upon them, and those who are 
there (from the Greek mainland) will come under the 
(compulsion of) the Lacedaemonians (Thuc. 7.64.1).
157
 
Here Nicias instilled the troops with the fear of enslavement or the loss of independence 
(Thuc. 7.64.1). He implied that the troops knew that they came against the Syracusans 
with the intention of conquest and enslavement (Thuc. 7.64.1). Should the Athenian 
alliance fail to ward off the Syracusans, the Syracusans would be likely to retaliate in 
kind. Those who lived in mainland Greece would be punished and enslaved by the 
Spartans and the Peloponnesian League.   
Another fear for the Athenians was that if they failed to break out of the harbour and 
were forced to retreat into Sicily, it would be necessary to burn their ships in order to 
prevent the enemies from acquiring the armada for themselves (Thuc. 7.60.2). The ships 
would be lost for the Athenian state and the Athenians would be left at Syracuse with 
even less hope of fleeing the island.  
At the time of the battle, the Athenians still held a beach head (Thuc. 7.60.2; Diod. 
13.16.6). While other parts of the harbour were controlled by the Syracusans, the 
Athenians still maintained a wall (although they had pulled back from it) and commanded 
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a small portion of land (Thuc. 7.60.2).
158
 The break out from the harbour needed to be 
attempted as soon as possible while the Athenians had troops on the ground and before 
the land army could come under assault. Moreover, if the naval battle were unsuccessful, 
the Athenians still would have an opportunity to safely land their troops on the beach 
among friends. If the Athenians were forced to swim or land ships on a hostile shore, the 
troops would likely be cut down before they could gain a foothold.  
Therefore, the Athenians and their allies were driven to fight by both necessity and 
fear. The illness that was inhibiting the troops would only become further compounded 
by the lack of provisions available to support the army. Further, the sick Athenians being 
in close quarters with others would spread illness amongst the troops. Moreover, the 
swampy terrain would bring a greater chance of widespread infection. They must move 
against the Syracusan blockade in order to obtain supplies and escape Sicily. The 
Athenians still held some portion of the Great Harbour, but it was not something that 
could be maintained forever owing to the aforementioned lack of provisions and the 
ailments among the troops. Being pushed from the beach would leave the Athenians with 
only the option to retreat to safety on the much more risky march over land to Catane if 
they failed to break the blockade or to destroy the Syracusan fleet. Thus, the longer the 
Athenians delayed, the worse the situation on the ground would become. Nicias 
compelled both the Athenian and allied troops by reminding them of the potential 
consequences should they fail either to crush the Syracusan navy or to run the blockade. 
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We can reasonably assume that this fear compelled the Athenian alliance to fight with 
zeal against the enemy even though they had become discouraged by the previous naval 
defeat. Essentially, each passing moment weakened the chance of victory, so the 
necessity of the situation forced the Athenians into action. 
The Battle 
Thucydides’ narrative paints a picture of mass confusion. Neither side seemed to 
know which side is winning the battle. Thucydides notes the differing reactions of 
various Athenians watching the battle from the shore. People looking at different areas of 
the Great Harbour had diverse opinions regarding either the plight or the success of their 
navy. There is little information in the narrative that provides evidence as to why the 
Athenians were defeated. Therefore, it is important to attempt to recreate the battle using 
the scant details that we have regarding the flow of battle. Using the Face of Battle 
approach, it is possible to give an explanation for the outcome. In the next sections, I will 
account for the Athenian defeat by analyzing the various roles of the different classes of 
troops on the triremes, and their experience of this battle.  
In John Keegan’s seminal work, the battles that are analyzed are infantry 
battles.
159
 Therefore, it is simple to organize the recreation based on the different lines of 
battle engaging in steps (archers, cavalry, and infantry). However, in a naval battle, 
especially one as chaotic as the Battle in the Great Harbour, it is not apparent how the 
recreation is best organized. Therefore, the battle must be broken into artificial divisions. 
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Hornblower, following Rutter, notes that Thucydides divides the narrative into groups of 
three.
160
 First were the “initial efforts of the rowers, the steersmen, and the soldiers on 
board.”161 Next, we learn of the “activities of the same three groups in reverse order 
(soldiers fighting hand to hand, steersmen attacking and defending simultaneously, 
sailors unable to hear orders).”162 Finally, Thucydides elucidates the reactions of those on 
the shore who were viewing the battle. These men are broken into three groups. There are 
those who were viewing a part of the harbour where their side was winning, those who 
were viewing a part of the harbour where their side was being overcome, and those who 
were viewing a part of the harbour where the battle was inconclusive.
163
 This is the 
manner in which I reconstruct the battle. 
Initial Charge 
After loading the ships, the Athenians made a run at the blockade with 110 
triremes (Thuc. 7.60.4).
164
 First, the Athenians had to pass the Corinthian ships that were 
blocking the way to the line of merchant ships. Thucydides reports that the Athenians got 
the better of the Corinthians and were able to arrive at the blockade itself (Thuc. 
7.70.2).
165
 They reached the wall of ships and attempted to break the chains and escape 
(Thuc. 7.70.2). The Athenian triremes likely sailed out in rows of ships abreast. The 
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Syracusans, who probably had their ships in the water already, launched their ships from 
the parts of the harbour that they controlled, which seem to have been both the north and 
south sides of the harbour and the battle proper commenced (Thuc. 7.70.1).
166
 The 
Syracusans and their allies launched 76 triremes, and were thus disadvantaged in terms of 
pure numbers (Thuc. 7.52.1).
167
 It seems that the Syracusans were hoping for the 
Athenians to become bogged down at the barricade, where the Syracusans would be able 
to encircle the Athenians and to batter their ships with their strengthened prows. 
Once the Syracusan ships headed towards the Athenians, the Athenians were in a 
very dangerous predicament. Since the Syracusans were coming πανταχόθεν (from all 
sides) (Thuc. 7.70.2), the Athenians were effectively surrounded. Now, the Athenians 
needed to turn their ships to face the enemy. Those on the left flank turned left to face the 
Syracusan ships coming from the north part of the harbour, and the triremes on the right 
flank turned right to face the ships attacking from the south of the harbour. The Athenians 
would most likely have maneuvered their ships into a modified kuklos formation. There 
would have been ships that were still attempting to break the barricade, but the ships in 
the rear would have turned either left or right to create a semi-circle.  
These commands would have been carried out by the oarsmen by order of the 
kubernetes with assistance from the keleustes. The helmsman (kubernetes) was the de 
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facto captain of the ship.
168
 He was an experienced sailor.
169
 He controlled the steering of 
the ship with two steering oars.
170
 The steering oars, and thus the helmsman himself, 
were at the stern of the ship.
171
 The kubernetes had the greatest responsibility on the ship 
and could be credited with victory or defeat based on his reactions to the circumstance of 
the battle. The helmsman stood in a vulnerable position and could be struck by enemy 
missiles, and therefore, he was protected by other troops.
172
 The boatswain, called 
keleustes, was another assistant to the helmsman. It was his duty to manage the rowers.
173
 
His exhortations were intended to maintain the morale of the oarsmen.
174
 A disheartened 
and tired rowing crew would make a trireme very ineffective. Thus, it was necessary to 
make sure that the spirits of the rowers remained high. The keleustes was also a 
communications medium between the helmsman and the oarsmen.
175
 This would be 
especially necessary in the din of battle, where the shouting of soldiers and the clashing 
of ships could drown out the voice of the helmsman (Thuc. 7.70.6; Diod. 13.16.5).
176
 He 
likely spent most of his time under the deck with the oarsmen,
177
 but sometimes he may 
have popped up above the deck in order to clarify commands from the helmsman. 
Xenophon notes the negative effect of a bad boatswain, suggesting how important this 
man was to the morale of the rowers. Xenophon says:  
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As for example on a trireme, it is said, when they cross the 
sea, and there is need for the sailors to travel a day voyage, 
some of the boatswains are able to say and do such things 
so that they sharpen the souls of the men to work hard 
willingly, while others are senseless in this way, so that 
they accomplish the same voyage more than in double the 
time. The former boatswain and rowers when they 
disembark perspire and applaud each other, while the latter 
boatswain and rowers arrive slowly, the rowers hating the 
boatswain and being hated by him (Xen. Oec. 21.3).
178
 
 
While this passage refers simply to making a voyage, a particularly incompetent keleustes 
would certainly have a similar impact on oarsmen in battle. Since the orders would have 
been able to be heard clearly at this point, the rowers should have been able to turn 
roughly 90 degrees rather quickly in order to form a kuklos. For example, the triremes on 
the left flank would turn left by having the rowers on the port (left) side row backwards 
and those on the starboard (right) side rowing forwards. The kubernetes would likely 
assist the starboard side by pushing the left rudder outwards. The ship could pivot and 
turn. However, this left the Athenian ships with no forward momentum while the 
Syracusan ships were barreling towards them. This was extremely troublesome for the 
Athenians owing to the strengthened catheads of the Syracusan ships (Thuc. 7.62.3). The 
Syracusans could simply ram the Athenians directly in the bows of their ships and cause 
massive damage. If Nicias’ claim that the Athenian ships were properly outfitted to 
counteract the power of the prows of the Syracusans was correct, the damage to the 
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Athenian prows may have been lessened (Thuc. 7.62.3). The Athenians were 
disadvantaged either way, because they likely suffered a lack of supplies to repair their 
ships owing to the capture of the Athenian storehouse by Gylippus (Thuc. 7.23.1-2; Diod. 
13.9.4). The carpenter of the ship (naupegos) made repairs to the ship. Morrison argues 
that the carpenter spent most of his time below the deck, where there would be a place for 
him to store his tools.
179
 He would attempt to make immediate repairs during sail,
180
 and 
when the ship was beached, he would perform further maintenance.
181
 On the other hand, 
the Syracusans, having come from the city, were fully supplied and capable of fixing 
holes in the hulls of the triremes. 
Missile Infantry 
Once the Syracusan ships approach the Athenian triremes,  
The men attacked the opposing ship plentifully with darts 
and arrows and stones from the decks of their ships (Thuc. 
7.70.5).
182
  
In this moment, the javelin throwers, bowmen, and likely also the deckhands were 
engaging. The bowmen (toxotai), like the hoplites, were on the ship for offensive and 
defensive purposes. On an Athenian trireme, there were usually four archers.
183
 The 
archers stood at the stern of the ship in order to protect the helmsman.
184
 When their own 
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hoplites attempted to board an enemy ship, the archers could fire arrows toward the 
enemy in order to assist the hoplites in boarding. Conversely, the archers could send 
volleys at hoplites who were attempting to board their own ship. If an enemy ship failed 
to cover the outriggers of the ship, archers could attack the thranitai.  
In the naval battle that preceded the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Syracusan 
navy was able to strike the thranitai with projectiles (Thuc. 7.40.5).
185
 Not only did this 
create panic amongst the oarsmen, it also could throw off the balance of the rowers 
because there would be a disparity in the number of rowers on each side of the ship if 
enough oarsmen were incapacitated. Also, a dead or severely injured oarsman could 
impede other rowers if his oar was in the way of the other oars, or if the oarsman should 
collapse onto other rowers. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, it seems that the Athenians 
placed more archers than usual on the ship, which gave the helmsman more protection, 
and also allowed the Athenians to overwhelm the enemy decks with projectiles.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
the helmsman other than essentially being human shields is a topic for debate. The best that they could do 
was keep a watchful eye and shoot at potential attackers.  
185
 It seems that the Syracusans used much smaller boats to achieve this. Thucydides calls them ‘light ships’ 
(perhaps something like a skiff) and they were able to sail under the oar banks of enemy ships and toss 
javelins into the outrigger and thus incapacitate some of the thranitai. Diodorus says that the Syracusans 
attacked the men on the decks with javelins, but makes no mention of the specific targeting of oarsmen 
(Diod. 13.10.5). 
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The deckhands, of which there were normally ten, seem to have been broken into 
two parties.
186
 One group followed the orders of the helmsman, while the other group 
obeyed the bow officer.
187
 Thus, half of the deckhands were stationed at the stern and the 
other half were stationed at the bow.
188
 On voyage, the deckhands were responsible for 
raising and lowering the two sails of the trireme.
189
 The deckhands could also be used as 
spare oarsmen, bailing water from the ship, and taking control of the rudder when 
necessary.
190
 In this part of the battle, the deckhands were certainly throwing stones at the 
enemy. The javelin throwers were a new addition to the Athenian ships. As Gylippus 
pointed out, these men had no experience fighting on a naval vessel (Thuc. 7.67.2). Their 
throws would have certainly suffered from inaccuracy. The missile troops had the same 
issues that the Athenian hoplites had in this battle. The mass of men on the trireme deck 
would have made it more difficult to position oneself in a way that was conducive to 
one’s needs, since the Athenian archers were not used to this level of crowding on their 
triremes. Unlike the hoplites and rowers, archers did not need as much energy to function 
effectively, and thus the lack of provisions was far less damaging to them. The deckhands 
should have been roughly as effective as they normally were. They were used to walking 
about a trireme, and had likely thrown rocks from the deck of the ship in the past. An 
issue that was unique to the missile troops involved their equipment. The Athenians did 
not have an unlimited supply of javelins, arrows, and stones. Since the Athenians had 
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completely changed their tactics in this particular battle, it is possible that they were ill-
prepared to engage in missile attacks for a prolonged period of time. Once these men ran 
out of missiles, they became a detriment to the trireme. Their added weight made the 
trireme more sluggish. Additionally, their movement on the ship caused the oarsmen to 
have greater difficulty in regard to efficient rowing. Further, they took up large amounts 
of space which the hoplites would require to defend the ship. 
Hoplites 
Once the ships came into close contact, both sides began to attempt to board and 
commandeer the enemy ships. This duty was left to the hoplites on board. The hoplites on 
the ship were used as either a boarding party or to prevent enemies from boarding their 
own ship. While the oarsmen were rowing, the hoplites remained seated in order that the 
ship did not roll.
191
 The Athenians usually kept around 10 hoplites on board while other 
Greek navies tended to have around 40 of them.
192
 The Athenians used fewer hoplites for 
a few reasons. First, less weight meant that the ship was lighter and therefore easier to 
maneuver.
193
 Second, the Athenians focused on ramming rather than boarding, so the 
hoplites on board were only necessary for defending the ship from enemy boarding 
parties in case their ship became stuck after a successful ram.
194
 Since the hoplites wore 
their full armour, falling into the water was incredibly dangerous. The weight of the 
armour would make it difficult for the hoplite to swim to safety. In the Battle in the Great 
Harbour, the Athenians more likely had 40 hoplites on board, much like their Syracusan 
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counterparts, since they intended to fight in the same manner as the other navies of 
Greece. It is quite possible that only 10 of the hoplites on each of the 110 Athenian 
triremes had any experience as marines (epibatai) when it came to fighting on ships.
195
 
Regardless of the actual general training and skill of the hoplites, it seems that around 3/4 
of the Athenian hoplites had no boarding experience.
196
 We can infer from Xenophon that 
Athenian hoplite training was particularly lax. Xenophon wrote: 
(When) will the Athenians train (just as the Spartans do), 
(the Athenians) who not only neglect good health, but 
mock those who cultivate their bodies? (Xen. Mem. 
3.5.15)
197
 
Later, Xenophon’s Socrates says: 
Because the city does not train (men) publicly for war, on 
account of this, one ought not to be negligent in private, but 
rather to take care (of his training) not any less (Xen. Mem. 
3.12.5)
198
 
This is not to say that the Athenians did not have skilled hoplites, but if the men were not 
training fully for land combat, the expectation that they would be acclimated to naval 
combat is quite unlikely. This would certainly lead to an increase in mistakes on the 
Athenian side. Some men would fail to board the ship properly and fall into the sea. 
Unless the soldier fell near the shore, his fate was surely sealed. Other hoplites who did 
successfully board the enemy ship were still disadvantaged. Those without experience 
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were not used to fighting on an unstable platform. The stability of the ship would become 
even more compromised when there were a number of hoplites attempting to board 
simultaneously. The inexperienced hoplites might lose their balance and simply fall to the 
deck, putting them in a dire situation, or fall off the trireme entirely and perish.  
Another issue was the ineffectiveness of the grapnels used by the Athenians. Since 
the Syracusans witnessed the Athenians preparing grapnels, they equipped their ships 
with animal hides. This made it more difficult for the grapnels to hook onto the outrigger 
of the Syracusan triremes. Thus, boarding the enemy ship became a more hazardous 
affair. The Athenians had to rely on the boats being locked together by ramming. 
Thucydides never clarifies whether the Athenians used animal hides to protect their own 
outriggers and the thranitai. In the previous naval battle, the Athenians did not have this 
protection (Thuc. 7.40.5). After the capture of the storehouse, it stands to reason that the 
Athenians were not using animal hides. If the Athenians did not have animal hides, this 
means that the Syracusans could use their grapnels and link to the Athenian ships on their 
terms.  
A final issue for the Athenians, which would likely have the greatest effect on the 
hoplites and oarsmen, was the lack of provisions. The famous maxim that “an army 
marches on its stomach”199 was no less true here. Fatigue would set in quickly and the 
troops would be less effective overall. Conversely, the Syracusans were almost certainly 
well fed, and thus they would not suffer fatigue as quickly. From the trials of the 
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Olympias, we have learned that the rowers would drink roughly 1 litre of water per hour 
of rowing.
200
 However, this amount could be reduced if sodium was included in the 
water.
201
 It is possible that the ancient triremes kept salt on board for this purpose.
202
 
Owing to the dire position of the Athenians, it is unknown whether they would have been 
able to supply their rowers and other troops with sufficient amounts of water. It is almost 
certain that the Syracusans would have had far more access to safe drinking water, and 
would be less likely to become dehydrated. Thus, the longer the battle continued, the 
more disadvantaged the Athenians became. Both Thucydides and Diodorus point out that 
the battle raged for a very long time (Thuc. 7.71.5; Diod. 13.16.17). The Athenians were 
attempting to win a quick victory in order to escape the harbour. The Syracusans simply 
needed to block the Athenians from succeeding to obtain their objective. With the 
Athenians’ lack of provisions, they would quickly begin to suffer the effects of 
dehydration, and their effectiveness as a fighting unit would degrade. On the other hand, 
the well fed Syracusans could certainly maintain their energy for a longer period of time. 
After describing the efforts of the hoplites on the deck, Thucydides writes a 
perplexing sentence:  
In many places, it happened that – on account of the narrow 
space to ram against others, and on the other hand, to be 
rammed by others, two ships and – and it is possible that it 
is more than two ships – become entangled around one ship 
by constraint. And it is for the helmsmen to attend to guard 
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here and attack there, not in one place, but rather in many 
places from all sides (Thuc. 7.70.6).
203
 
 
How are we supposed to imagine this? The statement illustrates the absolute chaos 
unfolding in the harbour. However, the actual mechanics described in this sentence are 
quite confusing. Triremes would certainly become entangled during combat. It seems that 
hoplites on a single trireme were both boarding another ship while having their own ship 
boarded. Utter confusion would take hold of hoplites who were inexperienced with 
respect to boarding enemy ships. It is difficult to determine whether this would have been 
a greater issue for the Athenians or the Syracusans. However, I would argue that the 
Athenians would have come off worse from these confrontations. For the Athenians, 
since their hoplites were used to defending against boarding parties, they might have had 
more success preventing their ship from being overtaken. On the other hand, the vast 
majority of Athenian hoplites were unfamiliar with boarding an enemy ship, and many 
had no experience fighting on a trireme at all. These men would be in a state of confusion 
and may have even been more of a detriment to the Athenian cause than a benefit. The 
Syracusans, living in Magna Graecia, would be used to both the attacking and defending 
in this form of naval combat. Their overall experience in this form of warfare would lead 
to a more organized and thus a more effective force. 
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The Din of Battle 
Next, Thucydides points out that:  
The great din from many ships crashing together caused 
consternation and at the same time caused a deprivation of 
the hearing of orders which the helmsmen uttered (Thuc. 
7.70.6).
204
 
Therefore, it became an exercise in futility for the oarsmen to follow orders because they 
were unable to hear the commands. It is possible that the other members of the ship who 
were not engaged in battle became message runners for the helmsman. The only people 
left on the ship who were not actively involved in either repairs, fighting, or maneuvering 
were the trierarch, bow officer and the double-pipe player; these men could be used as 
messengers for the kubernetes. The trierarch was the man who paid for the maintenance 
and outfitting of the ship.
205
 This was a liturgy and thus the trierarch was of the Athenian 
elite.
206
 While the name trierarch suggests that he was the legitimate commander of the 
ship, this was not accurate. The helmsman was the individual who was really in control 
of the trireme. The trireme double-pipe player (auletes) was used to keep timing for the 
rowers.
207
 However, Aristophanes mentions that the oarsmen also kept time with their 
own chants, specifically ‘o op op op op’ (Aristoph. Frogs, 208) and ‘rhyppapai’ 
(Aristoph. Frogs, 1073). Thus, well-trained rowers could function under the orders of the 
thranitai who could still see the water. The auletes was essentially an assistant to the 
helmsman, and kept time based on the decisions of the helmsman. He would likely 
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remain under the deck with the rowers.
208
 The bow officer (prorates referring to the bow 
of the ship, not the archery weapon) was a lookout while the ship was sailing.
209
 A 
vase
210
 shows the prorates looking sternwards, which suggests that he kept in 
communication with the helmsman, in order to keep him informed of potential dangers 
(both from enemies and nature).
211
 It stands to reason that these men could also 
communicate with each other through hand signals, not unlike soldiers in a fire fight in 
modern times. Thus, even when the sounds of battle were at their loudest, orders could 
still be followed. One can assume that either side had a particular natural advantage in 
this situation. The Athenians’ better trained rowers could still perform their duties to 
some degree owing to their sailing experience. The Syracusan hoplites could act 
autonomously because of their knowledge of boarding. Also, the ability to hear orders 
was likely more difficult for rowers due to their position in the confined hull of the ship. 
On the other hand, the hoplites standing in the open air had a better chance of hearing 
direct orders. Thucydides says that the men could not hear the orders of boatswains 
(Thuc. 7.70.6; Diod. 13.16.5).
212
 This suggests that he means that particularly the rowers 
had trouble hearing commands, since it was the duty of a boatswain to be a medium 
between the helmsman and the rowers. The rowers were in a semi-enclosed space and 
thus the sound of the water splashing, the crashing of ships, and the various yells of men, 
allied and hostile, would have merged into a grand cacophony that would have drowned 
out any clarity of orders. Since the Great Harbour did not allow for advanced naval 
                                                 
208
 Morrison (2000), 129. 
209
 Morrison (2000), 112. 
210
 See Figure 10: An Attic Black Figure vase showing the position of the helmsman and the bow officer. 
211
 Morrison (2000), 256. 
212
 Plutarch does not include this detail. 
  
68 
 
maneuvers owing to space constrictions, any advantages that the Athenian oarsmen might 
have had were nullified. Though the Athenians were more likely to be able to keep time 
while rowing, it was not really important when collision with other ships was a certainty 
in such a small space.  
Generals 
Thucydides mentions the actions of the generals of either side (Thuc. 7.70.8).
213
 
He states: 
Moreover, the generals of either side, if they were to see 
any ship anywhere backing water not by necessity, calling 
again and again the trierarch by name, the Athenian 
generals asked if they withdraw, because they believe the 
land to be of the most hostility now more their own than the 
sea which Athens procured for itself through no little toil. 
On the other hand the Syracusan generals asked if the men 
knew clearly that the Athenians were eager to flee in any 
manner, they would flee these ones who were fleeing 
(Thuc. 7.70.8).
214
   
The exhortations of the generals played a large role in the overall morale of the troops, as 
well as enforcing bravery. While the remarks are generic encouragement that would 
persuade the soldiers to carry on the fight, I think the aspect of shaming was far more 
important for the battle. When a general saw his own ships being routed, he called out the 
name of the trierarch and chastised him for cowardice (Thuc. 7.70.8). Calling out the 
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name of the trierarch was simply a way to identify the ship in question. We know in 
Greek society that shaming someone was the primary means for maintaining social 
control and cohesion.
215
 When a trierarch was shamed, by extension the bravery of every 
man on the ship was questioned. Thus, the men were compelled to continue fighting lest 
they dishonoured themselves and the other men aboard the ship in the eyes of the other 
allied ships. While shaming undoubtedly stopped ships from being routed, there was a 
limit to how long a crew could fight in losing circumstances. Eventually, no amount of 
shaming or encouragement would prevent a crew from refusing to follow orders.  
Troops on the Shore 
The troops on the shore seem to have provided the same benefits to the triremes at 
sea as the generals, but at the same time, could also be damaging to morale. Thucydides 
reports that the men on the shore shouted statements of joy when they saw their side 
winning (Thuc. 7.71.3). On the other hand, when the men on the shore witnessed their 
side faring badly, they started to proclaim that all hope was lost (Thuc. 7.71.3). Surely, 
this would have had a negative effect on the morale of the men on the trireme. Again, it 
must be questioned whether the men on the ships could hear the laments and cheers of the 
men on the shore. One could conjecture that the men on the decks could hear but the 
rowers would be oblivious to any comments owing to the aforementioned din that 
drowned out the sound.
216
 Thucydides’ statement at 7.70.6 suggests that it was only the 
rowers who could not hear anything.  The men on the shore provided other benefits 
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though. As stated in the Forced Beaching section, the men could push friendly triremes 
back into the water. They could also attack enemy ships that beached near them. This 
gave the Syracusans a distinct advantage. The Syracusans controlled a larger section of 
the harbour, and based on that information alone, it was more likely that ships would 
beach in areas that they control. Since the Syracusans held the mouth of the harbour and 
the areas closest to the mouth, and the Athenians only possessed the area farthest from 
the mouth of the harbour, some assumptions can be made. The battle began at the mouth 
of the harbour where the blockade had been established and the Corinthian, Pythen, was 
in position with his triremes and it moved back into the harbour as time progressed 
(Thuc. 7.70.2). It was far more likely that ships would beach in areas that were occupied 
by Syracusan forces. We can conclude that there was a higher instance of ships beaching 
in Syracusan territory, and the advantages that came with this gave the Syracusans an 
edge in regard to the outcome of battle. 
Unanswered Questions 
The Athenian objective, while seemingly clear, was actually quite troublesome 
and was never actually spelled out in our sources. At the most basic level, the Athenians 
intended to escape the Great Harbour of Syracuse and to come to the port of Catane. 
However, what was planned for the troops who remained on the shore at Syracuse? The 
distance from Syracuse to Catane is between 60 and 70 kilometers.
217
 Thus, even at a full 
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sailing speed, the journey would take at least 4-5 hours.
218
 However, when we factor in 
the added weight of the extra troops on the deck, the weakened state of the oarsmen, and 
the waterlogged ships, the progress would have been much slower. It seems that the best 
course of action would be to collect the Athenians on the shore before the triremes left 
the Great Harbour, provided that the Athenians did not plan to abandon the troops to a 
grizzly fate. To do this successfully, the Athenians would have had to obtain a total 
victory. They would have needed to keep as many ships in working order as possible to 
transport the troops. They must have hoped to break the blockade and hold the entry of 
the harbour open. They must have planned to win a decisive victory and control the entire 
harbour which would have allowed ships to come to the Athenian controlled section of 
the Great Harbour and load up the troops to sail away.  
Conclusion 
While one cannot say for certain why the Athenians lost the battle in the Great 
Harbour, I believe that using the Face of Battle approach, I have given a reasonable 
explanation for the defeat. When the battle ended, the Athenians still had more triremes 
than the Syracusans, but the rate of loss was far higher for the Athenian navy. The 
Athenians saw that there was no chance to reach the objective of breaking the blockade 
and controlling the Great Harbour. If the battle had continued, it is safe to assume that the 
Athenians would have been utterly destroyed. Certainly there are many issues that can 
never be resolved simply because we do not have the necessary source material. Yet, 
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when we bring to bear the knowledge that we have regarding ancient naval warfare, it 
becomes clearer how the preeminent navy of Greece was soundly defeated by the 
Syracusans. The Athenians were disadvantaged by a few factors. First, the narrow space 
of the harbour nullified the superior ability of the Athenian oarsmen. Second, the 
Athenians were forced to fight in a manner that went against their standard practice. 
Third, the lack of provisions left the Athenians in a weaker state. Fourth, the quick 
modifications made by the Syracusans counteracted the Athenian preparations. Finally, 
when ships were beached by the enemy, there was a greater chance that a ship would land 
on an area of the shore controlled by the Syracusans. When we consider these factors, it 
is clear why the Athenians were completely outclassed by the Syracusans. 
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Chapter 3: The Athenian Retreat 
Οὐδεὶς γὰρ οὕτω ἀνόητός ἐστι ὅστις πόλεμον πρὸ εἰρήνης 
αἱρέεται· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ οἱ παῖδες τοὺς πατέρας θάπτουσι, 
ἐν δὲ τῷ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας (Hdt. 1.87). 
Aftermath of the Naval Defeat 
The Athenians were utterly demoralized after the crushing victory of the 
Syracusans in the Great Harbour. The decision was made to march through the Sicilian 
hinterlands (Thuc. 7.72.5).
219
 However, they did not arrive at this decision easily. 
Demosthenes thought it would be best to man the ships immediately and reattempt to 
escape the harbour (7.72.3). In Thucydides’ account, Nicias agreed with Demosthenes, 
but the troops refused the orders (Thuc. 7.72.4).
220
  
At this point, the Athenian oarsmen were about to mutiny. Jordan argues that the 
fleet mutinied, but not the army.
221
 However, I would think that it would be more than 
sailors that were refusing the orders. Since the triremes were packed with hoplites and 
light infantry, it stands to reason that these men would be weary of attempting to flee by 
ship a second time as well. Ultimately, the threat of a mutiny was enough to convince 
Nicias that the soldiers must march inland. Hornblower makes the astute observation that 
sailors were considered to be anarchic and prone to mutiny, citing Thuc. 8.84.3, where 
Thucydides says the following:  
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The multitude of the soldiers, when they saw, just as sailors 
(do), they rushed, dashing forth toward Astyochos so as to 
throw (missiles at him).
222
 
This suggests that sailors are perceived to be more mutinous than other unit types. This 
might, of course, simply reflect the bias of the aristocratic Thucydides against the lower-
class oarsmen. The other issue to consider is that the Athenians were using a multi-
national force, and thus there are bound to be problems - especially from men who had 
lost faith in the Athenian cause and were forced by the Athenians to join the expedition in 
the first place. This is also important when we consider the retreat, as some men had 
essentially become hostile to the Athenians, and thus would have been less likely to assist 
an Athenian when necessary.  
The historian, Diodorus, claims that the blockade had been broken, and thus it 
was simply a matter of sailing through the harbour and avoiding enemy ships. However, 
if the Syracusans saw the Athenians outfitting their ships once again, they would have 
certainly followed suit, and the Athenians would have been forced to engage in another 
naval battle where the numerical advantage that they previously maintained would have 
been largely diminished. The Athenians would have had 60 ships and would have come 
against nearly 50 Syracusan triremes. In the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians 
had outnumbered the Syracusans 110 to 76 in terms of the number of triremes and were 
still soundly beaten. It stands to reason that if another naval battle had ensued, the 
Athenians would again have suffered defeat.  
                                                 
222
 Thuc. 8.84.3 τὸ δὲ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς εἶδον, οἷα δὴ ναῦται, ὥρμησαν ἐκραγέντες ἐπὶ τὸν 
Ἀστύοχον ὥστε βάλλειν· 
  
75 
 
The decision to march, however, forced the Athenians to destroy their ships or to 
cede them to the Syracusans, which greatly lessened their chances of ever escaping Sicily 
and returning to the Greek mainland. The sick and injured begged not to be left behind by 
their comrades (Thuc. 7.75.3-4; Plut. Nic. 25.3).
223
 This fact can help to explain why the 
Athenians spent the entire day after the battle at the shore. Men did not want to abandon 
their wounded comrades and relatives.
224
 The issue was that the Athenians could not 
afford to carry the wounded for the entire march. As Sternberg notes, their number of 
pack animals and carts were likely severely limited because the attack on Sicily began as 
a naval expedition.
225
 Therefore, animals or carts could not really be used to carry the 
injured at an acceptable pace, especially when the rough terrain ahead was considered. It 
is certainly possible that some of the sick or wounded pushed on and travelled with the 
retreating army. Further, the dead were not collected from the harbour (Thuc. 7.75.3; 
Plut. Nic. 25.3).
226
 The standard Greek practice was to send a herald to ask the victors to 
allow the defeated to collect their dead (Thuc. 4.44.5).
227
 A comparison can be made with 
this situation and the events at Athens during the plague. Thucydides says: 
For, the plague pressing exceedingly heavily, the men 
turned themselves toward indifference to religious customs 
and sacred things alike, not having control of what would 
come to pass. All customs concerning burial which they 
used before were thrown into disorder and they buried the 
dead as they were able. Many, by lack of necessary (means 
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of burial) on account of many of their own that had died 
already, turned toward shameful methods of burial. For 
having first come toward pyres which belonged to others 
who heaped it, they, having placed the corpse of their own 
upon (the pyre of another), light it from underneath. Having 
cast the body - which they carried - of their own from 
above upon the other one that was burning, they departed 
(2.52.3).
228
 
 
Thucydides paints this event at Athens as a disgrace to Athenian moral character. He 
notes that people became greedy and dishonourable (Thuc. 2.53.1). It indicates that 
improper treatment of corpses was a sign of decline both during the plague and after the 
Battle in the Great Harbour. Ultimately, it speaks to the complete demoralization of the 
Athenian troops.  
Both Thucydides and Diodorus recount that the Athenians delayed their march 
due to a trick employed by the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.73.3-4; Diod. 13.18.3-5).
229
 The 
Syracusans, specifically Hermocrates, sent men to the Athenian camp and told them not 
to march because the Syracusans were already blocking the roads. Hermocrates had 
insisted that the Syracusans begin to fortify the major roads immediately, but his request 
was denied with the explanation that the Syracusan soldiers would refuse (Thuc. 7.73.1-
2). We see the Syracusans and Athenians on opposite ends of the spectrum – one group 
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 Thuc. 2.52.3. ὑπερβιαζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅτι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν 
ἐτράποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως. νόμοι τε πάντες ξυνεταράχθησαν οἷς ἐχρῶντο πρότερον περὶ τὰς  
ταφάς, ἔθαπτον δὲ ὡς ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο. καὶ πολλοὶ ἐς ἀναισχύντους θήκας ἐτράποντο σπάνει τῶν 
ἐπιτηδείων διὰ τὸ συχνοὺς ἤδη προτεθνάναι σφίσιν· ἐπὶ πυρὰς γὰρ ἀλλοτρίας φθάσαντες τοὺς νήσαντας οἱ 
μὲν ἐπιθέντες τὸν ἑαυτῶν νεκρὸν ὑφῆπτον, οἱ δὲ καιομένου ἄλλου ἐπιβαλόντες ἄνωθεν ὃν φέροιεν ἀπῇσαν.  
229
 Diodorus differs from Thucydides’ account in a small way. In Thucydides, Gylippus urged the 
Syracusans to block the passes, but the Syracusans were celebrating a festival of Heracles and thus, 
Hermocrates came up with the idea of tricking the Athenians. In Diodorus, Hermocrates was the man who 
both urged the Syracusans to act and when denied employed the deception. Further, Diodorus does not 
mention the celebrations. Instead, he reasons that the generals would not agree to send out the armies 
because they had been exhausted by the day of fighting. In reality, both authors’ reasons likely played a 
part in the decision, and both are valid explanations. 
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drunken with victory, the other group utterly depressed in defeat – but both unwilling to 
follow orders. The Athenians were fooled into believing that the men sent by 
Hermocrates were friends of Athens and were speaking with the best interest of the 
Athenians in mind. In reality, the Syracusans were engaged in a drunken revelry to 
celebrate Hercules and also their recent victory in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7.73.2). 
Diodorus claims that the Athenians would have escaped safely had the deceit not taken 
place.  
This statement may seem exaggerated when we consider some of the factors. 
Diodorus states that the Athenians were heading towards Catane, north of Syracuse. In 
order to reach Catane, the Athenians would have to march west and then head north 
either through or around Monte Climiti to avoid Syracusan detection. If they attempted to 
march directly north, the Athenians would pass directly beside Syracuse. The path 
directly north would have required a march that is greater than 50km. Can one expect that 
the Athenians could have made such a march in the darkness in any reasonable length of 
time? The Athenians were hungry, some were sick, and the soldiers were weary from the 
naval battle. Xenophon’s Anabasis claims that a march of 360 stades is a three day 
journey. Depending on the measurement used, this is roughly 60 km. Thus, an army 
would travel around 20 km per day. The Athenians would require 3 days of marching 
simply to reach Catane. One would think that the Syracusan cavalry would have been 
able to catch up and harass the Athenians long before they could reach their destination. 
The Syracusan cavalry could harass the Athenian troops in order to slow their progress. 
This would have allowed infantry units to catch up to the fleeing army. While these 
factors make it seem unlikely that the Athenians could have avoided the Syracusans 
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completely, there are a few reasons why Diodorus may be correct in his claim. First, the 
Athenians would have begun their march during the night while the Syracusans were 
celebrating in a drunken revel. We know that on the fifth night of the retreat, the 
Athenians were able to escape during the night and left the Syracusans completely 
unaware. Thus, if the Athenians had left on the evening of the naval battle with due care, 
they might have been able to march without Syracusan detection. Further, the geography 
of Sicily provides some advantages for the Athenians. If they could have made it to the 
Acraean heights, they would have found themselves on a plateau that was difficult for 
cavalry to access without traveling far north of Syracuse and then heading east and south. 
The Syracusans would have had their speed advantage somewhat negated by this. 
Moreover, the Athenians would have become more difficult to track. An early start may 
have provided unforeseen advantages in the days to come. As we will see on the first day 
of the march when the Athenians came into contact with Syracusan hoplites who had 
already drawn up into battle and thus presumably in a phalanx, their progress was 
delayed (Thuc. 7.78.3). If the Athenians had left during the night, would they have been 
able to bypass this confrontation entirely? To compound matters, the Athenians remained 
at the harbour for two more days, which gave the Syracusans time to set up defensive 
points along strategic routes. The delay was for a few reasons. While Hermocrates’ 
successful ruse was what prevented the Athenians from leaving during the night, the 
entire next day and evening were wasted by the Athenian army. Thucydides lays out the 
issues quite clearly.   
First, it is evident that the Athenians feared what was ahead, knowing that the 
march would involve fighting their way through Syracusan forces (Thuc. 7.75.4; Plut. 
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Nic.26.3), and thus would have had feelings of despair considering how the Syracusans 
had completely turned the tides of the war after the arrival of Gylippus. Second, many 
soldiers did not want to abandon friends or relatives who were not physically able to join 
the retreat (Thuc. 7.75.3-4; Plut. Nic. 26.3). Third, the Athenians were in great need of 
food (Thuc 7.75.5; Plut. Nic. 26.3). Thucydides focused on the mourning of the 
Athenians in regard to the loss of their comrades (which certainly played a large role in 
the collective mental state and furthers Thucydides’ concentration on pathos). However, 
the lack of provisions is the most damning for the Athenians. Considering that the 
hoplites would have to march in full gear because of the necessity to be prepared for 
Syracusan assaults, they would be marching in the hot Syracusan sun, which would 
require a great amount of energy, especially when the hoplites had to attack and defend. 
Further, the Athenians were forced to watch the Syracusans gather the Athenian ships 
(Thuc. 7.74.2), and saw that the corpses of their companions lay unburied on the shore. 
Thucydides explains that the Athenians were so distraught by their defeat that they did 
not even bother to ask for permission to bury their corpses (Thuc. 7.72.2). Both of these 
events would have certainly increased the despair of the army, since the loss of ships 
made it clear that the Athenians’ chances of escaping Sicily were limited, and the 
unburied dead were an affront to Greek religious sensibilities. 
Athenian Troop Numbers 
The main point of this section is to gain a better understanding of what the actual 
body of men would look like marching through the Sicilian hinterlands. To do this, 
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however, we need a solid estimate of the number of hoplites, since the hoplites were the 
troops within which the rest of the men were contained. Thucydides writes: 
The army marched, ordered in a hollow rectangle, the army 
of Nicias leading and the army of Demosthenes following. 
The hoplites held the baggage-carriers and the majority of 
the throng within (Thuc. 7.78.2).
230
 
The size of the 2 hollow boxes is tied to the body of hoplites which create the ‘outside’ of 
the box.  
At the beginning of the march, Thucydides claims:  
They looked like nothing other than a city either having 
been forced to surrender or having retreated, and this was 
not a small city, for the number of the whole throng that 
was marching was no less than 4 myriads (40 000) (Thuc. 
7. 75.5).”231  
While Thucydides is rather thorough in terms of the original expeditionary corps sent in 
415 BC, he is not straightforward in regard to the number of casualties, the number of 
camp followers, the number of slaves, or the number of troops gathered as Athenian allies 
in Sicily. Thucydides concerned himself with actual combatants rather than the massive 
number of support personnel that would be required to assist the combat force. This has 
been an issue that has troubled scholars, and I have attempted to come to a suitable 
figure.
232
  First, it is necessary to tally the number of troops that joined the expedition 
according to Thucydides, while subtracting the number of casualties that are provided. 
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 Thuc. 7.78.2. τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλαισίῳ τεταγμένον, πρῶτον μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ Νικίου, ἐφεπόμενον δὲ τὸ 
Δημοσθένους· τοὺς δὲ σκευοφόρους καὶ τὸν πλεῖστον ὄχλον ἐντὸς εἶχον οἱ ὁπλῖται.  
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 Thuc. 7. 75.5. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπολιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγούσῃ, καὶ ταύτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ· 
μυριάδες γὰρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ὄχλου οὐκ ἐλάσσους τεσσάρων ἅμα ἐπορεύοντο.  
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 See Appendix A for a chart that gives a breakdown of Athenian and allied troop numbers. 
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After this point, all numbers become conjecture, but some estimates can be made. In 
Appendix A, I have noted a figure of 34179 men for the retreat plus the uncounted light 
armed troops , hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters, merchant ship crews, merchants and 
traders that may have become trapped with the Athenians, minus the unaccounted 
number of light armed and cavalrymen casualties, deserters, captives and deaths caused 
by illness. Of course, large amounts of conjecture are required. However, many scholars 
fail to include the vast number of men required to support such a large body of troops. It 
seems quite possible that the number of troops could have ranged between 30 and 40 
thousand.  
To begin, even in the most recent commentary on book VII of Thucydides,
 233
 
there is no attempt to include the number of men for the 130 ships and the uncounted 
merchant ships that sail with the expedition (Thuc. 6.44.1). The crews of the ships as well 
as the cooks, masons and carpenters must be included. While certainly most merchants 
would have left long before the situation became so dire, it is possible that some 
merchants remained stuck with the Athenians and were forced into the retreat.  
Second, the number of slave runaways seems to be exaggerated. Thucydides says 
that attendants had abandoned the Athenians before the Battle in the Great Harbour, and 
the majority after the defeat (Thuc. 75.5). However, there are no clear numbers for 
desertions. Moreover, Thucydides’ account can be interpreted to mean that the majority 
of those who deserted left at this time (during or after the naval defeat), not necessarily 
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that the majority of attendants had fled. It is clear that hoplites and cavalry still had slaves 
since directly before mentioning the desertions, Thucydides reports that: 
The hoplites and cavalrymen, contrary to their custom, 
(carried) their own food, some for lack of attendants, and 
others for distrust of their attendants. (Thuc. 7.75.5)
234
 
Thus, it is clear that some hoplites and cavalry men still had attendants. I would assume 
that many of the slaves that fled had been owned by hoplites who died in the Battle in the 
Great Harbour or who were engaged in the naval battle. During this time, the slave could 
have planned his escape and ran away. However, the Athenians still had many hoplites on 
the shore, and these men would have certainly tried to prevent their own slaves from 
abandoning them, and might also have helped to prevent the slaves of others from 
fleeing. It is apparent that nearly every hoplite would have travelled with at least one 
slave in order to carry his arms.
235
 Thucydides (3.17.3) says that each hoplite in the 
garrison at Potidaea was paid two drachmae; one for himself and one for his servant. This 
suggests that each hoplite had an attendant and this was standard Athenian practice. If 
each hoplite and cavalryman had an attendant on the Sicilian Expedition, there would be 
more than 10000 slaves in Sicily, and it is very difficult to believe that the vast majority 
of these slaves completely disappeared from the Athenian camp.
236
 Further, trierarchs, 
being of the Athenian elite, would certainly have had a slave and likely more than one 
slave.  
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 Thuc. 7.75.5. οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία ὑπὸ τοῖς ὅπλοις, οἱ 
μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ· 
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 Hanson (1989), 62. Pritchett (1971), 49-51. 
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 Hornblower (2010), 1064 cites van Wees number of 10000 slaves. This number is likely based on the 
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Another issue with the troop estimate is the argument in regard to exactly how 
many men could fit on either a fast trireme or a troop trireme. The general argument is 
that troop-carrying triremes were probably triremes that were undermanned in terms of 
rowers.
237
 I agree with this idea. Beloch believed that these triremes would have used 60 
oarsmen. I argue that 62 oarsmen would have been used (a full set of thranitai), and in 
this way, the top level of the hull would have been filled with rowers who would have 
been able to see the water. The estimated number of hoplites that could have been carried 
on these troop carrying transports varies from 30
238
 to 85
239
 to 100
240
 men. If the trireme 
was only manned by thranitai as oarsmen, there would have been 108 available seats 
inside the trireme alone.  
I think the one issue with these interpretations in regard to the Sicilian Expedition 
is that scholars would like to have every man seated comfortably. The Athenian objective 
was not to sail in comfort, but rather to get as many boots on the ground in Sicily as 
possible. Thus, it would be reasonable to have men on the deck that were not part of the 
standard crew. There were already 10 hoplite marines who were stationed on the deck at 
all times, so it is certainly feasible that other hoplites could have shared this burden. 
Further, other soldiers could have been sent on some of the other 130 ploia that sailed 
along with the triremes (Thuc. 6.44.1). Hornblower claims that 40 000 is “close to the 
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 Morrison (2000), 226. However, Hornblower (2010), 1064, misinterprets this statement. Morrison is 
arguing that there would be 30 extra hoplites on the deck, in addition to the 10 epibatai. This does not 
account for the men that could be stationed within the hull of the ship. 
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 Casson (1971), 93. 
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 Böckh (1886), 348; Busolt (1904), 868f.; Van Wees (2004), 221f. 
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maximum which could have been conveyed on the 220 or so triremes”241 However, this 
fails to account for the allies gathered in Italy and Sicily and also he does not seem to 
include the vast number of deck crews that were involved. Essentially, each ship had 16 
men that are not accounted for by Hornblower.
242
 I would think that even the fast trireme 
with a full complement of oarsmen (170), would still have added hoplites on the deck. 
There is no reason why each trireme could not have been carrying around 250 men 
(either citizens or slaves). This is likely how many men were on the ships in the Battle in 
the Great Harbour, and that was with the expectation of being rammed. When the 
Athenians were sailing to Sicily, they traveled near to the coasts in order to avoid rough 
waters. Thus, they sailed north up the eastern side of the Adriatic Sea, then west to the 
western side of the Adriatic Sea. Then, they would have sailed down the east coast of 
Italy in order to arrive at Sicily. Thus, the chances of men falling off the ship were quite 
low. Further, when we consider the attendants of the hoplites, there is no way that all of 
these men could have been sailing in comfort. Ultimately, I conclude that when we 
attempt to account for all of the variables, the total number of the men involved in the 
march could indeed have been between 30000 and 40000 men.
243
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Logistics of the March 
How are we to imagine the sight of such a massive force wandering through the 
roads and fields of Sicily? First, it is necessary to reflect on standard Greek marching 
procedure in order to see how the Athenian marching formation differed. Generally, the 
Greeks kept their forces split by unit type.
244
 However, what troops were in the van and 
in the rear was dependent upon the situation. For night marches, the troops tended to be 
organized from slowest to fastest, in which case, the hoplites would have led.
245
 In any 
situation, regardless of what troops led the army, baggage carriers tended to be kept 
between formations of armed men.
246
 In the Athenian retreat, we are dealing with a mob 
that was larger than the citizen population of most Greek poleis. The force was composed 
of hoplites, bowmen, slingers, javelin men, oarsmen and other naval units, slaves, and 
other miscellaneous units such as cooks and masons. When the Athenians were marching 
without fear of attack, the soldiers would have traveled in a loose formation that still 
allowed for quick maneuvering into a defensive formation. Thus, the largely unarmed 
oarsmen, other naval units, and slaves (baggage carriers) would have marched in a box of 
hoplites. This was standard military practice, where the weaker troops were surrounded 
by the stronger troops (Thuc. 7.77.2). Brasidas, in 423 BC, was the first general to use 
this formation (at least in out written records).
247
 Brasidas placed the hoplites on the 
outside of the box with his light armed troops within the box. He then had his youngest 
and fastest men charge out at the enemy when the enemy neared the ranks (Thuc. 
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4.125.2-3). Any hoplite was a stronger soldier, as he was one of the few with proper arms 
and armour. Much like Brasidas, the Athenians would certainly have kept their light 
armed troops closest to the hoplites with the rest of the throng enclosed within the box 
formation. The other men had limited or no protection and had to rely on the hoplites for 
their safety.  
The army was split into two contingents; the van led by Nicias and the rear 
headed by Demosthenes. However, this formation was not conducive to fighting against 
cavalrymen armed with javelins (or in fact any highly maneuverable troops armed with 
missiles) since it was difficult for the hoplites to engage with these fast moving troops. 
On the other hand, it was much better than marching in a thin column or having the men 
split up by unit type. In that case, the baggage carriers could have been targeted and 
harassed, making survival even more difficult. While the danger of quick javelin 
throwers, slingers, and archers is apparent for a squadron of heavy armoured hoplites (as 
the Spartans learn at Leuctra in 372BC), it is especially apparent in an army that was 
largely composed of men with improper defensive equipment. Javelins that were thrown 
over the heads of the defending hoplites would wreak havoc on the men in the centre of 
the box formation. 
First, we must consider the number of hoplites that were involved in the march. 
Overall, 10950 hoplites joined the expedition along with an unspecified number of 
Thourian and Corcyrean hoplites and Sicel infantry.
248
 Using Ray’s numbers, 3375 
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hoplites were killed in land engagements.
249
 In the first 3 naval battles of the war, if we 
assume that the 10 epibatai were killed on each ship that was destroyed, 280 men were 
lost.
250
 However, in the Battle in the Great Harbour, if we suppose that there were 40 
hoplites upon each ship and every hoplite on a destroyed ship was slain, there would have 
been 2000 Athenian hoplite casualties.
251
 There were also an unspecified number of 
casualties caused by illness. In terms of the numbers however, there were 5655 hoplite 
deaths.
252
 Thus, the Athenians would have been marching with roughly 5295 hoplites. 
Now, since these men were said to have formed two boxes, if each box employed the 
same number of hoplites, the number can be cut in half, with one half representing one 
hollow box. Thus, each box was composed of roughly 2647 hoplites. If I use the lower 
estimate of total troops on the march, there were 30000 men. Now, the number of 
hoplites must be subtracted, leaving 24705 men inside the boxes. Demosthenes had a 
greater number of men in his formation (Thuc. 7.80.4), so it is possible that Nicias’ 
contingent had roughly 11500 troops while Demosthenes’ formation held the rest. If the 
box is imagined to be 100 men wide, some assumptions can be supposed.
253
 For Nicias’ 
group, his 11500 miscellaneous troops would have taken up exactly 125 rows.
254
 It is 
likely that the entirety of the box would have had hoplites stacked a few men deep. I am 
going to suppose that the Athenians would have kept 8 rows of hoplites at the front and 
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 Lee (2007), 155-159. Lee imagines that Xenophon’s 10000 hoplites marched with a front of roughly 300 
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rear.
255
 Thus, in each box, 1600 hoplites can be counted in the front and rear. This still 
left roughly 1000 hoplites to cover the flanks of the box. If the sides were also covered by 
4 columns of hoplites, the men in the middle would have had uniform coverage (as it 
would require about 1000 men to cover the 125 rows of men). Now, if we assume during 
normal marching that the men kept roughly two metres of both breadth and depth 
between them, each box would have been roughly 200 metres wide.
256
 In terms of depth, 
Nicias’ contingent would have been roughly 282 metres in length. Demosthenes, on the 
other hand, needed to fit 13205 non-hoplites in his formation. Again, the width of the box 
would have probably been 100 men with 2 metres of breadth between each one. The 
depth of the formation would have probably included 8 rows of hoplites at the front, 8 
rows of hoplites at the back and roughly 144 rows of men inside the box. Demosthenes’ 
box would have needed 1152 hoplites to guard the side, which would have left him about 
100 men short of uniform coverage. Demosthenes’ contingent would have thus been 
roughly 200 metres wide by 320 metres deep. Once a threat was perceived, each box 
would have closed in a way that would leave 1 metre of space in circumference around 
each man. Thus, each box was effectively cut in half. Thus, each box would have been 
roughly 100 metres wide. Nicias’ formation would have been 141 metres deep and 
Demosthenes’ would have been 160 metres deep. What I have described is one 
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possibility. Since Thucydides and our other sources do not provide any specific 
information regarding either the width or the length of the boxes, this is strictly a 
conjecture. Ray believes that the two boxes combined would cover roughly 1km while 
marching.
257
 Imagining any sense of normal military order seems useless given the 
Athenian situation. At this point, the Athenians were simply trying to survive, so the box 
formations should be viewed as more of a mob than a disciplined military unit. Either 
way, such a vast mass of men would have been an impressive and intimidating sight.    
How much food and water would have been required to nourish the retreating 
army? Ultimately, each man would have probably required roughly 2 litres of water per 
day in order to prevent dehydration. Thus, between 60 and 80 000 litres of water would 
have been consumed by the army on a daily basis. Water could be gathered at the rivers 
that the Athenians often pass (Anapus, Cacyparis), and also collected during the rain.  
The amount of food required is a little bit tricky. Given the lack of supplies, the 
Athenians would likely be marching on a starvation diet. I think the amount of food 
offered by the Syracusans in the stone quarries is a good starting point. In the quarries, 
each man was given a pint of grain per day (Thuc.7.87.2). This seems to be the absolute 
minimal amount required. Thus, the Athenian army would consume 30 to 40000 pints of 
grain per day at the very minimum. When the Spartans were captured at Sphacteria, they 
were given 2 quarts (4 pints) of food per day (Thuc. 5.15.1). I think the Athenian diet 
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would be somewhere between these numbers. Food would be collected by foraging and 
by requisitioning supplies from houses and farms in Sicily. 
Syracusan Strategy 
 For the Syracusans, the main goal was to either destroy or capture the Athenians. 
However, the latter was preferred because, in this way, they would encounter less risk 
and would profit from selling captives. In order to achieve this, the Syracusans simply 
needed to hinder the Athenians from reaching their destination through both shows of 
force and general harassment. The desired effect was to delay the Athenians until the 
point of starvation so that they would surrender. In this way, the Syracusans could obtain 
victory at low risk to their own lives. The Syracusans could not leave the Athenians to 
their own devices since this would have put their city in danger. If the Athenians arrived 
at a friendly polis, such as Catane, they could have potentially resupplied and attempted 
to besiege the Syracusans once again. Seeing how the Syracusans had been nearly forced 
to capitulate before the arrival of Gylippus because of the Athenian siege, the Syracusans 
must have realized that it was not in their best interest to allow a massive group of 
enemies to wander throughout Sicily. Thus, the only real options for the Syracusans were 
either to destroy the Athenian army or to force it to surrender. In terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis, the hardships and loss of life for the Syracusans would be greater bear if they 
were forced to engage with a refreshed Athenian coalition. Keeping these general 
strategies in mind, I will now lay out the essentials of land combat. 
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Essentials of Land Combat 
In this section, I shall provide the information that is necessary to understand the 
engagements that take place during the Athenian retreat. Therefore, I intend to focus on 
the general equipment and tactics of hoplites, cavalry, and missile troops. Furthermore, I 
aim to elucidate the concerns that both armies would have in the current situation.  
Hoplites 
The hoplite panoply generally consisted of a breastplate, helmet, greaves, a spear, 
a shield, and a short sword.
258
 The actual make-up of the panoply differed in practice. 
Since hoplites were required to purchase their own gear, there would have certainly been 
differences in quality.
259
 The breastplate could be composed of either bronze, leather, or 
linen reinforced with leather and hides.
260
 The bronze breastplate was created by making 
a front half and a back half and then binding these two pieces together.
261
 The breastplate 
provided suitable protection of the chest and stomach - and in some variations the groin - 
but seems to have left the neck largely exposed.
262
 The purely bronze breastplate could 
have weighed over 15 kg depending on the materials added to reinforce the bronze.
263
 
Not only was this cumbersome, but it caused increased heat in the summer and decreased 
warmth in the winter.
264
 On the other hand, the bronze breastplate was essentially 
impenetrable by any weapons employed on the battle field when we assume a thickness 
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of 2mm.
265
 Since the other breastplates were made of materials that decompose, it is 
impossible to know accurately the weight or protective capacity. However, it is safe to 
assume that the leather and linen cuirasses weighed less but provided less protection.  
The hoplite shield (the hoplon or aspis) was a circular shield roughly 1m in 
diameter.
266
 The shield was made of thin wooden planks that were lathed and bound.
267
 
The wood was generally covered with a thin layer of bronze (ca. 0.5 mm) in order to 
prevent the wood from splitting.
268
 Moreover, the bronze was effective for both stopping 
and deflecting arrows, especially with the concave nature of the shield. Much like the 
breastplate, the hoplon was basically impossible to pierce with conventional Greek 
weaponry.
269
 The soldier rested the shield on his arm and shoulder through two bands of 
bronze.
270
 One band was placed in the middle (porpax) while the other was placed on the 
far right (antilabe) of the shield in order to maximize control.
271
 The shield likely 
weighed between 8 or 9 kg.
272
  
The helmet was made of bronze.
273
 Some helmets provided some protection for 
the sides of the neck and face (such as the Corinthian helmet),
274
 while others were more 
like a metal cap (such as the Spartan pilos).
275
 The roundness of the helmet caused 
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weapons to glance off, and thus, the helmet did not need to be as thick as the breastplate. 
The helmet weighed between 1 and 2 kg.
276
  
The greaves weighed between 1.2 and 2.2 kg.
277
 The bronze was so thin that it 
was simply bent and placed around the shin with no need for binding.
278
 Some greaves 
only covered the shins while others covered the knees as well.
279
 The flanges of the 
greave would nearly meet at the back of the calf.
280
  
The main offensive weapon of the hoplite was the spear (dory).
281
 It had a spear 
head and a butt spike.
282
 In this way, if one side of the spear were to shatter, the spear 
could simply be turned and used. Spears seem to have ranged from 6-10 feet
283
 and 
weighed less than 2.5 kg.
284
 The spear could be wielded in either an overhand or 
underhand fashion.
285
 Performing an underhanded stab provided less force, but the area 
of unprotected flesh was larger.
286
 The attacker would have attempted to pierce the 
enemy in the thigh or groin.  This injury could very quickly lead to death.
287
 An overhand 
thruster would have tried to stab the enemy in the neck, which would have certainly been 
fatal.
288
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A hoplite also carried a small sword used for slashing.
289
 The sword would have 
been used if the hoplite lost or broke his spear. A sword-wielding hoplite would have 
been at a great disadvantage against a man with a spear which had a much greater range.  
One can see that the hoplite presented a nearly impenetrable front.  However, the 
flanks and the backs of the hoplite provided larger areas of flesh to attack. Further, the 
weight
290
 of the hoplite armour made the hoplite incredibly slow in comparison to light 
armoured troops and also impeded his maneuverability. Thus, during the general 
harassments that took place during the Athenian march, the hoplites were most effective 
in providing defense by use of their shield, but in terms of offense, failed to impact the 
enemy in any meaningful way.  
A scholarly debate rages regarding the fighting style of the Classical hoplite 
formation. The traditional orthodoxy has been that the hoplites fought in an extremely 
close formation with shields nearly touching or overlapping which essentially created an 
impenetrable wall of shields.
291
 However, this description of combat has come under 
attack by scholars such as Hans van Wees, who questions how these mechanics could 
actually work while providing sufficient room for the hoplites to wield their weapons 
effectively.
292
 In the traditional view, hoplite battles were largely decided by the 
‘othismos’ (shoving).293 Here, the hoplites in close formation would push with their 
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shields against the back of the man in front of them and try to push the enemy back and 
break their balance, eventually forcing the enemy to retreat.
294
 Van Wees questions this 
with a few observations. First, he wonders how a deep formation could ever have been 
defeated by a shallow formation.
295
 If the shoving was the most important aspect of a 
hoplite battle, then the side with the greatest mass would always have had more force and 
thus would have been able to push the enemy army with ease. The Thebans used 
formations that ranged between 25 and 50 men deep.
296
 If this is the case, then how could 
they be defeated by Spartans in a rank that was 12 shields deep?
297
 On the other hand, 
why would a deep formation be used at all? Since the men in the backs of the ranks 
would have been essentially useless in battle, it makes sense that they would have been 
pushing the men in front of them.  
Goldsworthy argues that the use of deep formations was mainly for marching 
purposes.
298
 He argues that a shallow formation would have covered exceptionally wide 
tracts of land that would have negatively affected the phalanx’s attempt to march at the 
same pace.
299
 On the other hand, the use of deep formations could also have been used 
for intimidation purposes. A long column of hoplites might seem impenetrable to the 
enemy, and thus, have a psychological factor. Hanson, in The Western Way of War, 
concludes that the concavity of the hoplite shield was conducive to the idea of shoving 
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the enemy army.
300
 Goldsworthy rebuts this by stating that the Macedonians did not use 
these concave shields. However, Polybius states that the back ranks in these armies 
pushed (Plb. 18.30.4).
301
 Krentz concludes that the term ‘othismos’ is taken too literally 
and should be considered more metaphorical in sense.
302
 Goldsworthy also argues that 
the ‘pushing’ of the rear rank should be regarded as a use of force to keep the weaker 
forces in the middle from attempting to flee the battle.
303
  
Recently, Matthew has argued that the stance of the hoplite should not be thought 
of facing forwards or sideways, but rather, standing at a 45 degree angle. In this way, he 
is able to strike a middle ground between scholars who favour the ‘othismos’ and those 
who prefer the looser formation.  
For the Athenian retreat, it is apparent that both interpretations of hoplite warfare 
could apply. The Athenians used a tight formation and the men in the back rows of the 
phalanx provided psychological ‘weight’. The battles could have certainly ended in a 
shoving match. However, in the beginning of combat, enough room must have been 
provided for the hoplites to wield their weapons freely in the first 4 ranks. Athenians 
would have used the phalanx to force fords and in the attempt to break through the 
Syracusan defences at the Acraean Heights.         
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Cavalry 
Horses seem not to have been used as a primary fighting force, but rather in 
support roles such as scouting, attacking flanks, pursuing fleeing hoplites, protecting their 
own hoplites while in retreat and harassing marching columns. This is largely because a 
cavalry rush against a line of prepared hoplites would have ended in disaster for the 
cavalry.
304
 A phalanx was equivalent to a line of pike men during the medieval period. 
Further, a horse would have instinctively avoided charging into a solid phalanx as John 
Keegan has argued convincingly in regard to the Battle of Agincourt in AD 1415.
305
 
Nevertheless, cavalry remained effective for attacking the flanks of an enemy as well as 
for pursuing fleeing combatants.  
First, it is necessary to note the importance of cavalry in terms of the geography 
of Sicily. While the centre and northeast of Sicily are largely mountainous, the remainder 
of the island is filled with large plains.
306
 These areas were conducive to the fast 
movement afforded by horses. Thus, cavalry did not need be forced into narrow passages 
or rocky crags, but rather, could engage the enemy on smooth ground and used to their 
full advantage. However, “hilly or rough ground had the potential either to damage the 
horse or to reduce the security of the rider’s seat.” 307  
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The ancient Greek horse was protected by light cloth over the face, thighs, and 
chest.
308
 There were no stirrups,
309
 so the rider could not use a lance or stand up for 
greater leverage when hurling projectiles.
310
 Further, in antiquity, horses were not shoed. 
Xenophon recommended that a horse trainer has the equine step on small rocks to round 
the hooves (Xen. Cav. 1.16). However, like modern horse-riding, the ancient horse was 
outfitted with a saddle, albeit made of cloth.
311
  
The rider wore a helmet, a breastplate, and knee-high boots.
312
 The cavalryman 
forwent a shield, but carried a sword, a spear, and javelins.
313
 The shield, being between 7 
and 9 kg, would likely have made it too difficult for a soldier to be able effectively to 
employ their weapons while also controlling the reins. The lack of stirrups compounded 
this issue since it required greater leg strength in order to maintain balance. The javelin 
could be used as a missile weapon, while the cavalryman also had a shorter spear to use 
as a lance.
314
 However, when using a spear as a lance, the rider had to let go of the spear 
upon impact in order to prevent himself from falling off of his own horse due to the 
impact. This was because of the lack of stirrups which would have allowed the rider to 
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remain firmly in place. The sword was meant for close-quarters combat, where the rider 
could slash an enemy from the flank or from behind.
315
  
Rarely, Greek armies contained horse archers.
316
 One can imagine the difficulty 
of attempting to draw a bow and fire an arrow accurately while riding a horse without 
stirrups. Only a highly trained horseman would have been capable of such a feat unless 
the horse came to a complete stop, which is unlikely. Halting the horse would have made 
the cavalry an easier target as well.  
While pursuing the Athenians through Sicily, the Syracusan cavalry excelled at 
the harassment of Athenian forces. Since each cavalry unit only had a few javelins, their 
main effect was the causation of panic and delay since they were not able to attack the 
Athenians head-on and could not cause mass casualties owing to their limited projectiles. 
Further, cavalry was highly effective in terms of preventing the Athenians from 
foraging.
317
 The Athenians could not split into small gathering parties because of the 
threat of cavalry (Thuc. 7.78.7). Small groups out of formation would be cut down by 
cavalry. Those who fell behind the main group of Athenians would also suffer a cruel fate 
at the hands of the cavalry. Thus, the Athenians were forced to remain in a relatively 
close formation. This in turn, made it difficult for the army to feed itself and allowed the 
Syracusans to easily keep track of the enemy.  
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The Syracusans maintained roughly 1200 cavalry units,
318
 but none of our sources 
state how many cavalrymen would be sent out on these missions. Regardless, we know 
that the Syracusans were able to keep the Athenians at bay in Catane by the mere threat 
of the cavalry during the early stages of the war.
319
 It was only through trickery (and by 
sea) that the Athenians were able to approach the city of Syracuse (Thuc. 6.64.1).  
Later, the Athenians were sent 250 cavalrymen from Athens as well as money to 
purchase horses in Sicily (Thuc. 6.94.4).
320
 The Athenians managed to acquire between 
600 and 800 horses.
321
  
At this point in Greek history, the effective use of horses in combat had not quite 
been perfected. While the Thessalians had been effectively training cavalrymen and 
employing them in combat,
322
 the rest of Greece was using horses as either defensive 
troops, as flanking troops, or as pursuers of routed hoplites.
323
 Therefore, cavalry usually 
remained to the sides of the hoplite battle lines in order to protect their own flanks. 
During combat, the side with the superior cavalry (or any cavalry) could attack the flanks 
of hoplites that had engaged.
324
 Finally, if the enemy hoplites were routed, the cavalry 
would be used to chase them down quickly and either capture or slaughter fleeing troops.  
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The Syracusan cavalry, like that of most other Greek poleis, probably tended to 
use rectangular formations both while marching
325
 and while fighting.
326
 Depending on 
the space available, the Syracusans would use an 8 X 10 or a 16 X 5 formation.
327
 A 
squadron leader marched in front of the rectangle in both formations. The 8 X 10 
formation would have had three file leaders in a row at the front of the column of the 
formation and a troop leader would be adjacent to him.
328
 From the 8 X 10 formation, the 
squadron could quickly form into the 16 X 5 formation where the section leaders would 
move up to the front of a column and alternate with the file leaders.
329
 The 16 X 5 
formation would have taken up roughly 31 yards in length and 27 yards of depth, 
allowing nearly 6 feet for each horse in width and slightly more than 16 feet per horse in 
terms of depth.
330
 Conversely, the 8 X 10 formation would have taken up roughly 47 feet 
in width and 162 feet in depth.
331
 Here, we see that these cavalry squadrons were more 
malleable than hoplite formations and could quickly change their positioning as the 
situation required.
332
  
Not only were the horses more flexible than the hoplites in terms of formation, 
but also in combat as they possessed both missiles and hand-to-hand weapons.
333
 For 
cavalry charges at the flanks, the Syracusans would have wanted to use the wider 
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formation in order to cause as much chaos and damage in the enemy units. Further, the 
formation had less depth, and the horses in the back rows would not have been able to 
force themselves against the enemy flanks anyways. When marching, the shorter width 
was preferable, so that the horses could march on the roads. When the cavalry squadrons 
would reach the Athenians during the march, it seems that they would have broken 
formation in order to attack from all angles. Upon hurling their javelins, they would have 
retreated into a standard formation. Our sources do not mention the Athenian cavalry 
during the march. It is possible that the Athenians ate the horses owing to their lack of 
provisions.
334
 This suggests that cavalry numbers were so few as to be ineffective in 
combat. In the grand scheme of Classical Greek warfare, the cavalry must be regarded as 
an afterthought for most Greek poleis. The main focus of combat was the hoplite. 
Peltasts 
The peltast was a javelin throwing soldier.
335
 He was named after his shield, the 
pelte.
336
 The pelte was a crescent shaped shield of Thracian origin that was likely 
composed of wicker covered with skins.
337
 While this shield did not provide the level of 
protection provided by the hoplon, it did not have the same function. The hoplon had to 
contend with both hurled weapons, the thrusts of opposing hoplites, and pushing. The 
peltast, as an auxiliary troop meant for harassment and ambushes, was not meant to come 
into direct hand to hand combat with the enemy (though some did carry a small sword in 
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case of such a circumstance).
338
 Thus, the shield was meant to deflect missiles, of which 
it was surely capable. The advantage of this smaller shield was that it was lighter than a 
hoplon which allowed the peltast greater mobility. The greater speed of the peltast 
ensured that he could avoid direct conflict with the superior armoured hoplites.  
The peltast spear had a throwing strap which gave a hurled spear better accuracy 
and power owing to the spin provided.
339
 Generally, the peltast would have carried two 
javelins.
 340
  However, in the Syracusan assault on Athenian troops, I would conjecture 
that the peltasts carried more spears or perhaps slaves would have been used to carry 
more spears so that the peltast could have carried on an assault for a greater amount of 
time.  
Peltasts, like the cavalry, tended to stay at the flanks or rear of the hoplite 
phalanx. They usually skirmished with their opponents while both phalanxes 
deployed.
341
 Peltasts, while obviously not as fast as cavalry, held some advantages. First, 
the peltast was not inhibited by rough terrain.
342
 As we will see in the Battle at the 
Acraean Bald, the peltasts were able to harass the Athenians from high above on a 
rock.
343
 Second, a horseman was at the will of the horse. A horse might react 
unexpectedly to various stimuli that would not have hindered a peltast with complete 
bodily autonomy. The modus operandi of the peltast was to assault the enemy quickly 
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and - if the enemy approached – to retreat. When the enemy hoplites stopped the chase 
and began to withdraw, the peltast moved in to attack again.
344
 Thus, like cavalry, these 
troops excelled at harassment and demoralization.  
Ultimately, the peltast could not stand toe to toe with the hoplite, and thus the 
tactics of the peltast reflected this. Since the peltast was the only unit other than the 
hoplite that carried a shield, it was likely that the peltast would have marched directly 
behind and beside the hoplites in the Athenians’ hollow box formation that they 
employed during the retreat because the Athenians would have positioned the box from 
the most well-protected men to the least protected men in the middle.      
Archers 
The archer was a light armoured soldier and possibly wore no armour at all.
 345
 
The necessity of using two hands to draw and fire a bow meant that the Greek archer did 
not carry a shield. However, the use of tension in the bow permitted a greater effective 
range than that of the peltast’s javelin and thus he stood further away from the enemy. 
Therefore, the archer did not require the same protection as a peltast. Like the peltast and 
cavalry, the archer did not fight with hoplites head on. The shield and armour available to 
the hoplite made it difficult for an enemy arrow to be lethal. Instead, the archer attacked 
the flanks of a hoplite formation. Upon the approach of the enemy, the archer retreated 
and attacked when the enemy turned away in the same manner as the peltast. Another 
major use of archery was to combat other missile troops. The archer could fire an arrow 
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up to 150 m,
346
 which was certainly farther than a peltast could hurl a javelin. However, 
the lack of a shield or armour made the archer susceptible to other archers and of course 
any other missile troop provided that the enemy could bring within range of the bowman. 
Also, archers were especially vulnerable to cavalry. The Greek archer used a composite 
bow.
347
 Composite bows are easily damaged by submersion which could be a factor when 
the Athenians crossed fords.
348
 An issue that arose for both the peltasts and archers (at 
least on the Athenian side) was that there was a limit as to how many projectiles were 
available for use. Eventually, the men would run out of arrows and become another 
unarmed unit during the Athenian march.    
Slingers  
The sling consisted of a leather pouch attached to two strings made of sinew on 
either side.
349
 The slinger loaded a projectile which could be a ball of lead or a rock or 
even clay.
350
 Then, the slinger held both strings and spun the pouch horizontally.
351
 When 
the slinger was ready, he let go of one of the strings and the projectile was hurled a great 
distance owing to the momentum acquired by the spinning of the pouch.
352
 It is claimed 
that a trained slinger could hurl a projectile farther than an archer could fire an arrow 
(200 m vs. 150 m).
353
 The slinger could not engage hoplites from the front. Thus, the 
slinger was another harassment soldier who engaged the enemy in the same way as 
                                                 
346
 Hunt (2008), 122. 
347
 Hunt (2008), 122. 
348
 Hunt (2008),  122. 
349
 Hunt (2008), 123. 
350
 Hunt (2008), 123. 
351
 Hunt (2008), 123. 
352
 Hunt (2008), 123. See Figure 20: Slinger. 
353
 Hunt (2008), 123. 
  
106 
 
archers. The slinger needed a greater amount of space than the other missile troops in 
order to use his sling properly so that he did not injure his own men.
354
 The advantage of 
the sling was its simplicity. Ammunition could be acquired nearly anywhere. So, unlike 
the cavalry and the other missile troops, the slinger could maintain an assault for as long 
as necessary. 
Non-Military Forces of the Athenians 
The unarmed men in the Athenian retreat includes slaves, oarsmen who were 
unable to arm themselves with any weapon, cooks, masons, carpenters, and men who 
played a role on the ships that were unnecessary for infantry combat such as the 
deckhands and the keleustes. These men would have had little or no protection and would 
have had to rely on the other forces for their safety. However, this does not imply that 
they had no way to attack. They could gather rocks and hurl them at the enemy, much 
like the deckhands would in a naval battle.
355
 A large number of this group would have 
essentially been carriers of supplies. However, by this point there were little provisions to 
be carried. As Thucydides states, these men were kept within a box formed by the 
hoplites (Thuc. 7.78.2). This way, the Athenians could keep their supplies safe from 
cavalry harassment. The major issue with such a large body of men who did not 
necessarily contribute to the Athenian advance was their use of resources on the march. 
The men needed to eat, and those who could not contribute offensively simply became a 
hindrance to the overall survival of the force. 
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The Athenian March 
The Athenian march took place over 8 days (Thuc. 7.75-86), ending with the 
complete surrender of all Athenian forces who had survived the persistent attacks during 
the march and the slaughter at the River Assinarus. In the ensuing sections, I, following 
Thucydides, separate the narrative in terms of daily events,
356
 starting with the affairs 
immediately following the defeat of the Athenians and their allies in the Battle in the 
Great Harbour.  
Diodorus merely summarizes the march (13.19.1-3). He notes that the Athenians 
were attempting to reach Catane. He claims that the Syracusans harassed the Athenians 
over three days and successfully blocked a direct route toward Catane. This slightly 
contradicts Thucydides, wherein the Athenians attempted the direct route to Catane on 
the fourth day and a slightly less direct route on the fifth day. Similarly, Plutarch gives 
scant details regarding the march (27.1-5); however, this is reasonable given that his topic 
was the life of Nicias. Thus, Plutarch focuses on the energy displayed by Nicias at the 
beginning of the march in order to give confidence to his troops (26.4-6). Then, he states 
how the Athenians were constantly assaulted (27.1). His main attention is placed on the 
eventual surrender of Nicias (27.3-5), which he suggests was caused by of the surrender 
of Demosthenes (27.1-2). Notable differences in accounts will be noted in the appropriate 
sections of this thesis as those differences arise. 
                                                 
356
 This is the manner in which Thucydides narrates the retreat march (7.78-85), and this is the most logical 
way to organize the proceeding events. Thucydides is the only extant source (and of course, the only extant 
contemporary source) that covers the more minute details of the march, and thus, just as in the previous 
chapter, I will use Thucydides primarily while supplementing Thucydides with other authors; namely 
Plutarch and Diodorus. 
  
108 
 
Day One 
On the first day of the march, which was the second day after the Battle in the 
Great Harbour, the Athenians began the march from the western side of the harbour, 
heading west.
357
 The army was extremely disheartened by the recent setbacks. The men 
were roused by a speech from Nicias (Thuc. 7.77). In the speech, Nicias argued that the 
situation could not possibly get any worse, for the gods must take pity on the Athenians 
(Thuc. 7.77.3).
358
 He also claimed that the Sicels had been contacted (likely by cavalry) 
and told to meet the Athenians with supplies (Thuc. 7.77.6). This is the first time that it is 
mentioned that another group had already been contacted to resupply the Athenians. The 
last instance of the Athenians sending messages to Sicilian allies was to tell the men of 
Catane before the eclipse not to bring further provisions because the Athenians would 
have already departed (Thuc. 7.50.2). Athenian food supply was limited and was carried 
by the baggage handlers in the middle of the hollow box formations made by the 
Athenian hoplites (Thuc. 7.78.2). Contrary to standard practice, some hoplites and 
cavalry carried their own provisions, which Thucydides claims was because the hoplites 
and cavalry were lacking attendants, or the baggage carriers were not to be trusted (Thuc. 
7.75.5). This is because the Athenians had lost many servants through desertion during 
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 Nicias was attempting to escape Syracusan territory, but the plan was to essentially head west and find a 
way to head north and reach Catane. 
358
 Scholars are uncertain as to why the gods are said to have punished the Athenians. Furley (1996), 4, 
suggests that Nicias is claiming that the Athenians were punished because of the destruction of the Herms 
in 415 BC. Hornblower (2010), 718, argues that Nicias was referring to attacking Sicily in general. This is 
almost certainly what Nicias meant in this passage as he immediately states that many others have attacked 
their neighbours in the past. Thus, Nicias is stating that it is unjust that the Athenians are being punished so 
fiercely by the gods when others have went to war before and were not punished in such a severe fashion. 
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the campaign, but especially after their defeat in the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7.75.5).
359
 
Thus, the cavalry and hoplites did not want to entrust their minimal supplies to a person 
who may very well have abandoned them and took their provisions. It is reminiscent of 
the breakdown of morale after the defeat at the Great Harbour. While some men on the 
shore ran to help their comrades, others simply ran to the remainder of the Athenian wall. 
These men, according to Thucydides, were only thinking of themselves (Thuc. 7.71.6). In 
the present situation, essentially, every man was thinking only of himself, and this was 
dangerous for an army that had to act as a cohesive unit. Further, this lack of trust in the 
army was damaging to morale and overall performance. Xenophon states that: 
A disorderly army…is most confused and easiest to master 
for enemies and most useless and inglorious thing for 
friends to witness – donkey, hoplite, baggage carrier, light-
armed troop, cavalry, and chariot together – for how could 
they march, if they should hinder each other in this way, 
one walking while another runs, one running while another 
stands still, chariot interfering with cavalry, ass with 
chariot, baggage carrier with hoplite? (Xen. Oec. 8.4)
360
  
Distrust and animosity in the ranks of the army could have startling repercussions for 
both the speed in which the army could travel, and even their effectiveness in combat. 
Moreover, there was another complication posed by a lack of trust for attendants or a lack 
of attendants in general. If a hoplite was forced to carry his own gear, he could be 
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 The deserters are almost certainly Sicel allies and slaves. Thucydides mentions that the cavalrymen and 
hoplites that were carrying their own provisions were lacking an attendant or were distrusting of them. This 
implies that some slaves died, while others simply left. The other allies of the Athenians have no other 
means of escape, so desertion isn’t really an option.  
360
 Xen. Oec. 8.4. καὶ στρατιά γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ γύναι, ἄτακτος μὲν οὖσα ταραχωδέστατον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν 
πολεμίοις εὐχειρωτότατον, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀκλεέστατον ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀχρηστότατον, ὄνος ὁμοῦ, ὁπλίτης, 
σκευοφόρος, ψιλός, ἱππεύς, ἅμαξα·  – πῶς γὰρ ἂν πορευθείησαν, <ἐὰν> ἔχοντες οὕτως ἐπικωλύσωσιν 
ἀλλήλους, ὁ μὲν βαδίζων τὸν τρέχοντα, ὁ δὲ τρέχων τὸν ἑστηκότα, ἡ δὲ ἅμαξα τὸν ἱππέα, ὁ δὲ ὄνος τὴν 
ἅμαξαν, ὁ δὲ σκευοφόρος τὸν ὁπλίτην; 
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carrying up to 31 kg of gear for the entire day.
361
 However, with this mass of men, it was 
pertinent that the Athenians eventually foraged for resources.  
Thucydides reports that the Athenian army came into contact with the enemy at 
the Anapus river (Thuc. 7.78.3), which was directly west from the Athenian camp. Here, 
a minor skirmish ensued. If Thucydides’ distances are accurate, the point of contact must 
have been at or near the modern ponte di Capocorso, which crosses the Anapus river 
about 6 km from Syracuse.
362
 Since the Syracusans were forced to consider many 
possible trajectories for the Athenian forces, they had to split their troops up in order to 
guard the various passageways. However, it would have required a massive force to 
defeat the Athenian army completely because it was so large. This Syracusan detachment 
had to fulfill two functions.  
The first purpose was to provide intelligence for the Syracusans in order to predict 
the intended path that would be taken by the Athenians. This would give the Syracusans 
the opportunity to shift troops to areas where they would be more effective. The second 
was to slow down the Athenian march by forcing them to engage.  
This would allow the Syracusan cavalry and light armed troops to catch up to 
them. Thucydides summarizes the battle in a single line, saying “having routed them 
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 Lee (2007), 126. Lee includes the following items above and beyond the standard panoply: basic mess 
kit, rations, water, a portion of tentage, possibly an axe, and miscellaneous personal effects. If the hoplites 
were only carrying food – as suggested by Thucydides – this would only add a few pounds to their overall 
weight. Further, the Athenians abandoned many personal effects after the Battle in the Great Harbour. 
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 Green (1970), 321. 
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(Syracusans) and having held sway over the ford, they marched forth (Thuc. 7.78.3),”363 
so it seems that the Syracusan resistance was easily countered. Perhaps the Syracusans 
were routed without even fighting, given that the vast numbers of Athenians made the 
resistance futile. Regardless, the presence of Syracusan troops would have given the 
Athenians pause and slowed their march. Having crossed the river, the Athenians were 
assaulted by Syracusan cavalry and light infantry (Thuc. 7.78.3). This would be the 
modus operandi of the Syracusans for the majority of the march. It seems likely that the 
Syracusans who had been guarding the river crossing sent a messenger to inform the 
other Syracusan troops where the Athenians were located. Then the Syracusans hurried to 
that location in order to harass the Athenians. We are given some information in other 
sections of Thucydides’ work about how the light infantry engaged the enemy in these 
situations. Narrating a battle between the Aetolians and the Athenians in 426 BC, he says: 
They (The Aetolians) withdrew a little and stationed 
themselves upon a hill above the city, for the city was on a 
high spot, about 80 stades away from the sea. The 
Aetolians (who were already near to Aegytion, having 
come to their aid), running down from the hills from one 
place or another, struck against the Athenians and their 
allies and they hurled javelins, and when the infantry of the 
Athenians would come upon them, they retired, but when 
the Athenians withdrew, they attacked. The battle was such 
for a long time – pursuit and withdraw, and in both 
pursuing and withdrawing, the Athenians were the weaker 
party. But as long as the Athenian archers had arrows and 
were able to use them, they withstood (for the Aetolian 
men, being light armed, withdrew when being shot at with 
arrows. When the captain of the archers was slain, the 
archers dispersed, but the soldiers were worn out, 
struggling for a long time with the same exertion and the 
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 τρεψάμενοι αὐτοὺς καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ πόρου ἐχώρουν ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν· 
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Aetolians pressed hard and threw many javelins at them, in 
this way, the Athenians fled. Having been routed, and 
falling into gullies without outlet, and into the regions of 
which they were inexperienced, they perished… The 
Aetolians, hurling javelins, seizing many men in the rout on 
foot and the Aetolians being swift-footed and light armed 
destroyed the Athenians utterly (Thuc. 3.97.2-98.2).
364
  
The engagements with the light infantry during the retreat seem to have followed this 
same pattern. The men would approach the Athenian hoplites, hurl their weapons and 
retreat if they were approached. Once the Athenian pursuers attempted to return to their 
ranks, they would be harassed again. A similar event occurred in 425 BC at Sphacteria, 
but this time, the Athenians were on the winning side and the Spartans were 
overwhelmed by missiles (Thuc. 4.32.2-35.1).  
Thucydides and the other historians do not tell us exactly how these skirmishes 
unfolded in regard to the cavalry, but we can make some assumptions based on our 
knowledge of Greek military tactics. Thucydides notes: 
Syracusans, riding alongside, and the light infantry, hurling 
javelins at them, pressed them hard (Thuc. 7.78.3).
365
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Thuc. 3.97.2-98.2. ὑπέφευγον γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ τῶν λόφων τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως· ἦν 
γὰρ ἐφ' ὑψηλῶν χωρίων ἀπέχουσα τῆς θαλάσσης ὀγδοήκοντα σταδίους μάλιστα. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοί 
(βεβοηθηκότες γὰρ ἤδη ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὸ Αἰγίτιον) προσέβαλλον τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις καταθέοντες 
ἀπὸ τῶν λόφων ἄλλοι ἄλλοθεν καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐπίοι τὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, 
ὑπεχώρουν, ἀναχωροῦσι δὲ ἐπέκειντο· καὶ ἦν ἐπὶ πολὺ τοιαύτη ἡ μάχη, διώξεις τε καὶ ὑπαγωγαί, ἐν οἷς 
ἀμφοτέροις ἥσσους ἦσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι. μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἶχόν τε τὰ βέλη αὐτοῖς καὶ οἷοί τε ἦσαν 
χρῆσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀντεῖχον (τοξευόμενοι γὰρ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ  ἄνθρωποι ψιλοὶ ἀνεστέλλοντο)· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ τε 
τοξάρχου ἀποθανόντος οὗτοι διεσκεδάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐκεκμήκεσαν καὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῷ αὐτῷ πόνῳ 
ξυνεχόμενοι, οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ ἐνέκειντο καὶ ἐσηκόντιζον, οὕτω δὴ τραπόμενοι ἔφευγον, καὶ ἐσπίπτοντες ἔς τε 
χαράδρας ἀνεκβάτους καὶ χωρία ὧν οὐκ ἦσαν ἔμπειροι διεφθείροντο· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἡγεμὼν αὐτοῖς τῶν ὁδῶν 
Χρόμων ὁ Μεσσήνιος ἐτύγχανε τεθνηκώς. οἱ δὲ Αἰτωλοὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ τροπῇ 
κατὰ πόδας αἱροῦντες ἄνθρωποι ποδώκεις καὶ ψιλοὶ διέφθειρον. 
365
 Thuc. 7.78.3. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι παριππεύοντές τε προσέκειντο καὶ ἐσακοντίζοντες οἱ ψιλοί. 
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The Syracusan cavalry would break from their standard formations (an 8 X 10 or 16 X 5 
rectangle) and form in a line. Upon the approach of the enemy, the Athenian hoplites 
would gather closely in order to provide as much protection with their shields as possible, 
both for themselves and their comrades.
366
 Meanwhile, the Athenian light infantry would 
hurl their weapons from within the ranks in an attempt to cause casualties on the 
Syracusan side. The less disciplined of the hoplites might step forward and attempt to 
engage the light infantry or cavalry. This would have been advantageous for the 
Syracusans. The Athenian hoplite simply could not match the speed of the Syracusan 
light armed troops or cavalry. When the Athenians broke their ranks in order to chase the 
light infantry or cavalry, it was possible for the Syracusan light armed troops and cavalry 
to pick off the men who had become separated from the main mass of troops. Since the 
Athenians were being assaulted from every side, both confusion and panic would have 
taken hold. Inexperienced hoplites would have had great difficulty in holding their 
position. The Syracusan cavalry and light infantry could not expect to cause massive 
casualties among the Athenians. For certain, many projectiles would miss their mark or 
be blocked by the shield of a hoplite. Further, the number of missiles that each man had 
was limited,
367
 so the offensive could only be maintained for a short time, but many light 
wounds would have resulted regardless.  
                                                 
366
 However, it seems unlikely that the march comes to a complete halt. Instead, the marching becomes 
slower as the Athenians become bunched together. I posit that Thucydides would mention if the army 
completely stopped, since he says this when Demosthenes makes his final stand on the sixth day of the 
march (Thuc. 7.81.4).  
367
 See Cavalry in Essentials of Land Combat in Chapter 3: The Athenian Retreat. However, if the 
Syracusan cavalry and light infantry know that their mission is to harass the Athenians, it stands to reason 
that they may bring more javelins for this purpose. 
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And yet, these harassments allowed the Syracusans to control the pace and 
direction of the Athenian march, while also demoralizing the Athenians. The only way 
for the Athenians to avoid confrontation with the cavalry was to travel into rocky regions 
which were not suitable for horses.
368
 This would not prevent the assault from light 
infantry, but the lack of cavalry support would have made such an attack manageable for 
the Athenians and riskier for the Syracusans. The lack of horseshoes made the movement 
of cavalry troublesome on uneven terrain.  
Thucydides informs us that the Athenians managed to travel 40 stades (between 
5.2 and 6.8 km)
369
 and encamped on a hill (Thuc. 7.78.4). Presumably, this was a hill that 
was not suitable for cavalry to climb and was easily defensible. The camp was almost 
certainly protected by palisades built upon arrival.
370
 We can infer from other instances 
that building palisades was common practice. The Athenians built similar defences in a 
few places; at their camp at Catane (Thuc. 6.64), and in front of their ships (Thuc. 7.38.2 
and again 7.53.1).
371
 It seems that these palisades would have been carried during the 
march and quite possibly taken from their fortifications at the Great Harbour. 
Day Two 
On the second day, the Athenians continued their march beginning early in the 
morning (Thuc. 7.78.4). The Athenians were granted a reprieve since the Syracusans 
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 Green (1970), 324. 
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 Dover, (1965), 2. Dover argues that for Thucydides’ distances to make sense, Thucydides understanding 
of a stade must range between 130 and 170 metres.  
370
 Dover (1965), 342. 
371
 Pritchett (1974), 144. Pritchett believes that slaves were used to build these palisades, but there is no 
written evidence about this matter. 
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chose not to confront them, but instead had decided to forge ahead in order to make a 
wall within the upcoming pass at the Acraean Bald (Thuc. 7.78.5). Thus, the Athenians 
were able to take the time to gather supplies which they required from the houses in the 
area (Thuc. 7.78.4). This suggests that the Athenians both foraged in farmers’ fields and 
took food from the houses in the area. The Athenians seem to have picked this area for 
encampment because of the houses and farms that would provide easy access to 
provisions. Therefore, the Athenians were reenergized to some degree. They had 
collected water from the river which would prevent dehydration in the blazing Sicilian 
sun (Thuc. 7.78.4). Meanwhile, the Syracusans were fortifying the pass at the Acraean 
heights (Thuc. 7.78.5). We are told that the Athenians had travelled 20 stadia (2.6 to 3.4 
km) (Thuc. 7.78.4). Green suggests a location for the camp roughly 3km NNE from 
modern Floridia based around the Anapus River in a valley.
372
 Directly north of the 
Athenian position was a pass through a mountain (the Acraean Bald). This pass was the 
next objective for the Athenians. If the Athenians could travel through the pass, they 
would arrive on a plateau that would allow them to march without cavalry harassment 
since the ancient cavalry had much difficulty moving on rough terrain.
373
 While this 
would not grant complete safety for the troops, it would greatly increase their chances of 
arriving at Catane,
374
 since the army would only have to contend with Syracusan hoplites 
and light armed troops.  
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 Green (1970), 323. See Number 2 in Figure 15: Map of the Athenian Retreat. 
373
 Green (1970), 324. 
374
 Diodorus claims that the original destination was Catane (Diod. 13.18.6). In the following section for the 
third day of the march, I will argue that the Athenians attempted to head north and that their ultimate 
destination must have been Catane. 
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Day Three 
The location of the ‘Acraean Bald’ has been a matter of scholarly debate. 
However, the reigning communis opinio is now that this site is on the southwest side of 
Monte Climiti.
375
  
Earlier, many scholars felt that the Acraean Bald must refer to an area that is near 
modern Acrae, 20 km west of Syracuse.
376
 However, there is nothing in the area that 
accurately represents the topographical requirements as set forth by Thucydides.
377
 
According to Thucydides, the area in question had a steep hill with a ravine on either side 
of the hill (Thuc. 7.78.5). Second, the distance required to reach Acrae is too far to be 
consistent with Thucydides’ narrative. At this point, the Athenians had travelled 10.2 km 
at the absolute maximum
378
 which is roughly 10 km short of Acrae. Monte Climiti on the 
other hand is 12.8 km northwest of Syracuse.
379
 When we consider that the Athenians 
first headed almost directly west and then north, the distances stated by Thucydides are 
essentially accurate. Thus, Green’s finding is the most likely candidate for the Acraean 
Bald. Green has identified the pass as Cava Castelluccio.
380
  One problem with this 
identification is that it seems to contradict Thucydides’ statement that the army was 
marching in the direction of Camarina and Gela (Thuc. 7.80.2). While Gela is almost 
exactly west of Syracuse, Camarina is southwest of Syracuse. After the failure to take the 
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 Green (1970), 323. Hornblower (2010), 723. Hornblower and Dover have been persuaded by Green. 
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 Lazenby (2004), 163. 
377
 Green (1970), 322-23. 
378
 Roughly 60 stades. On the first day they travelled 40 stades (Thuc. 7.78.4). On the second day they 
marched 20 stades (Thuc. 7.78.4). 
379
 Green (1970), 323.  
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pass, the Athenians, according to Thucydides, decided to march in the opposite direction. 
Thucydides continues with the following sentence: 
ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ 
στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τῆς Σικελίας τὸ 
πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ 
Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. 
The entire way for the army was not [no longer] toward 
Catane, but rather toward the other part of Sicily, toward 
Camarina and Gela and to cities either Greek or Barbarian 
(Thuc. 7.80.2).
381
 
Many scholars have taken this sentence as an explanation of the previous line of march 
(i.e. the original objective of the march was toward Camarina and Gela).
382
 Their 
interpretation of this sentence rests largely on the meaning of ‘οὐκ’. We would expect 
‘οὐκέτι’ to give a meaning of ‘no longer’. However, just before this, Thucydides employs 
the word ‘μηκέτι’ and thus the ‘οὐκ’ used here is meant to be inferred from the earlier 
line as meaning ‘no longer’.
383
 The original plan, had the Athenians won the Battle in the 
Great Harbour, was to head to Catane (Thuc. 7.60.2), so it would be bizarre if the plans 
for the land march had changed and Thucydides did not inform the reader. When the 
Athenians later attempted to avoid the pass at the Acraean Bald and to go around Monte 
Climiti, they would have essentially been heading west.
384
 The interesting implication of 
Green’s finding that the Acraean Bald is Monte Climiti is the confirmation that the 
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 Thuc. 7.80.2. ἦν δὲ ἡ ξύμπασα ὁδὸς αὕτη οὐκ ἐπὶ Κατάνης τῷ στρατεύματι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μέρος 
τῆς Σικελίας τὸ πρὸς Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ πόλεις καὶ Ἑλληνίδας καὶ βαρβάρους. 
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 Incidentally, this fits to the older identification of the Acraean Heights with Acrae. Smith (1958), 165, in 
this Loeb translation, seems to follow this line of argument. 
383
 Hornblower (2010), 725-26. 
384
 On the fifth day of the retreat (Thuc. 7.79.4). 
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original goal of the Athenian march was to reach Catane, as Diodorus states (Diod. 
13.18.6).  
This raises the question as to where the Sicels were to whom Nicias had sent a 
message. It is possible that these Sicels were people that were living south of Leontini in 
the mountainous regions rather than peoples living further east near Gela. While the 
attempt to force a way through the pass was daring and bold, the potential reward was 
huge. The Syracusan cavalry would have been rendered ineffective and the territory on 
the plateau above contained Sicels who were hostile to Syracuse.
385
 It would become 
difficult for the Syracusans to maintain their assault on the Athenians and their allies. 
They most certainly would not have had the freedom to harass the Athenians and control 
their movements without their cavalry.  
On the third day of the march, the Athenians headed toward the pass. First, the 
Athenians had to cross the Anapus where there is a ford directly at the elbow of the 
river.
386
 While crossing, the Syracusans set upon them with their standard tactics. The 
Syracusan cavalry and light armoured troops rushed alongside the Athenian columns 
while hurling javelins into the ranks (Thuc. 7.78.6-7). Since the Syracusans had a full day 
to prepare themselves for the Athenians, their assault was far fiercer than at the river 
during the first day of the march and probably included a greater number of both cavalry 
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 Green (1970), 324. The Syracusan cavalry would have to head back east toward Syracuse and the north. 
Once they were in reach of Leontini, they could head back west and arrive on the plateau where the 
Athenians would be marching north. However, the cavalry would encounter hostility with the Sicels in the 
region. 
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and light armed units.
387
 The Athenians were contending with a flurry of missiles while 
attempting to march into the pass. Casualties were certainly high, and only the most 
battle-hardened troops would be able to maintain their composure under such 
circumstances. Eventually the Athenians gave up and retreated to their camp from the 
previous day (Thuc. 7.78.7). The Athenians failed to even make it into the pass where the 
Syracusans’ main defensive position was located and, thus, where the staunchest 
resistance would have been found. This suggests that the Athenians had little chance of 
actually breaking through the ravine, given that the Syracusans had built fortifications 
which the Athenians would have struggled to dislodge. This setback must have been 
devastating for the Athenians. Not only would the Syracusans have been able to send 
more forces into the area to assist with the defence, but it forced the Athenians to use up 
their recently acquired provisions without traveling farther. Thucydides claims that the 
Syracusan cavalry made it unsafe for the any Athenian troops to split from the main body 
of the army to forage for food (Thuc. 7.78.6). 
Day Four 
On the fourth day of the march, the Athenians attempted to force the pass again 
(Thuc. 7.79.1). One must question the decision of Nicias and Demosthenes. Considering 
that the army had been forced to retreat before even entering the ravine on the day before, 
it seemed nearly suicidal to try the same tactic a second time. It suggests that the benefit 
of making it to the plateau in order to avoid enemy cavalry and reach Catane was so 
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 Thucydides claims that the Syracusans were in ‘considerable force’ which suggests that there were more 
troops than in earlier confrontations of the march (Thuc. 7. 78.6) 
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important that it seemed worth every sacrifice. The level of desperation in the Athenian 
camp must have been at its utmost. To further complicate matters, Gylippus was 
marching with troops toward the Athenian rear.
388
 If Gylippus could make his way 
around behind the Athenians, not only would the Athenians be effectively surrounded, 
they would also have to enter into a hoplite engagement with enemy troops on both sides.  
The Athenian march passed through the valley with little incident and climbed up 
the pass. Here, they encountered Syracusan hoplites protected by a make-shift wall 
(Thuc. 7.79.1). Given that the troops were in a ravine, it is likely that the wall was 
composed of rocks stacked upon one another. The wall would have been high enough to 
make it difficult to step over, but low enough that the Syracusans could still use their 
spears and shields efficiently.
389
 Since the Athenians were coming from below, the wall 
was valuable for protecting the feet and legs of the Syracusan hoplites. The narrowness of 
the ravine allowed the Syracusans to be stacked many shields deep, making it even more 
troublesome for the Athenians to eject them (Thuc. 7.79.1-2).
390
 The Athenian hoplites 
would have marched into the ravine while the camp followers stayed near the entrance 
with a rear guard of hoplites to protect them from potential attacks.
391
 Further, the rear 
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 Gylippus arrives during this day and attempts to enclose the Athenians (Thuc. 7. 79.4). It seems that 
Gylippus was coming down from the heights, possibly from a different ravine, and marching around in 
order to encircle the Athenians. 
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 Ray (2009), 230. 
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 This battle has certain affinities with the battle of Munichia that is narrated by Xenophon. In this battle, 
taking place on the Piraeus, oligarchic and Spartan forces attempted to dislodge Athenian exiles from the 
hill. However, when the oligarchic forces tried to mount the hill, they were assaulted by the exiles. The 
exiles used missile infantry from behind the hoplites. Though the oligarchic forces were stacked 50 shields 
deep, they were still routed by the exiles who were a mere 10 shields deep (Xen. Hell. 2.4.12-4.19). In the 
battle for the Acraean heights, the attacking forces were even more disadvantaged than the oligarchic 
troops, so it is not at all surprising that they were not able to force the pass. 
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 Green (1970), 325. 
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guard prevented the front-line men from becoming trapped in the ravine and crushed on 
both sides.
392
  
When the Athenians had travelled a fair distance into the pass and began to 
engage with the Syracusan hoplites, the trap was sprung. Light infantry such as slingers 
and archers appeared from the heights above the ravine and began to pelt the Athenian 
army relentlessly (Thuc. 7.79.2). The height advantage and proximity to the enemy 
presented the opportunity for the Syracusan missile infantry to bombard the Athenians 
ruthlessly with great accuracy and with impunity. It was not impossible that the 
Athenians would have succeeded in this battle had it not been for the missile infantry of 
the Syracusans. The Athenians had proven themselves to be superior to the Syracusans in 
hoplite warfare in the earlier stages of the war.
393
 However, in the current situation, the 
Athenian hoplites were simply overwhelmed by missile infantry, and the use of the stone 
wall cemented the Syracusans in position. The Athenians in the first two or three rows 
were holding their shields in front desperately trying to dislodge the Syracusans from 
their position. Those in the rear must have been holding their shields above their heads in 
order to defend against the shower of missiles. It was unlikely that even the most well 
trained troops could have prevented themselves from panicking. Again, casualties on that 
day must have been extraordinarily high. What is more - albeit a more gory detail - troops 
that were killed or otherwise wounded would quite possibly have fallen into the men 
behind them, causing these soldiers to lose their balance. At this point, while the 
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Athenians were withdrawing, it began to rain (Thuc. 7.79.3). Thucydides relates that the 
soldiers became even more depressed (Thuc. 7.79.3). However, the rain provided both an 
advantage and a disadvantage. On the one hand, it allowed the Athenians to collect water 
in pots or possibly helmets, which would have allowed the men to quench their thirst. On 
the other hand, the muddy ground would have made marching more difficult, and wet 
feet could cause ailments for the men. Eventually the Athenians again retreated a short 
distance (Thuc. 7.79.2), probably just outside the pass in order to rest and regain their 
composure. At this point, Gylippus arrived from the rear with a small party and attempted 
to build a wall in order to shut in the Athenians (Thuc. 7.79.4). The rear guard of the 
Athenians (which, like the front-lines of a hoplite army, held experienced troops) moved 
quickly to prevent this from happening (Thuc. 7.79.4). Again, the Athenians retreated to 
level plains and encamped for the evening (Thuc. 7.79.5). 
Day Five 
Nicias was still set on making it to Catane, but decided to take a slightly different 
approach. Instead of marching into the same pass and ending up in the same quagmire as 
on the day before, he decided to march northeast, south of Monte Climiti, but north of the 
Anapus River in a northwest direction.
394
 Here, the land is very flat and thus an ideal 
location for cavalry attacks.
395
 The Athenians must have been trying to find another way 
to gain access to the plateaus above. The Athenians began their march in the morning, 
and again the Syracusans assaulted them from all sides with cavalry and missile troops 
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(Thuc. 7.79.5). On this day, the Syracusans were particularly elusive. Thucydides relates 
that whenever the Athenians advanced against the enemy, the enemy retreated, but when 
they went to return to the main army, they were again attacked (Thuc. 7.79.5). Gylippus 
focused especially on the rear of the enemy in hopes that he could capture Athenian 
supplies, pick off stragglers, and create panic throughout the entire army (Thuc. 7.79.5). 
The army stopped their march after 5 or 6 stadia (less than a kilometer) (Thuc. 7.79.6). 
The Syracusans withdrew to their own camps as well (Thuc. 7.79.6). The Syracusan 
withdrawal allowed the Athenians to perform a trick that would help them escape from 
their current situation (Thuc. 7.80.1).  
Nicias and Demosthenes decided that it was no longer feasible to travel to 
Catane.
396
 In order to escape under the cover of night and without arousing suspicion, the 
Athenians kindled many fires in their camps (Thuc.7.80.1). The Syracusans would 
certainly have kept watch on the Athenian camp from a distance, so a lack of fire or noise 
in the camp would have caused the Syracusans to investigate and to find that the 
Athenians had left. Ray makes the reasonable suggestion that some men were left behind 
to stoke the fires and to create noise that would suggest that the Athenians were still 
encamped.
397
 Thucydides points out that there were many injured men in the Athenian 
camp (Thuc.7.80.1). Much like the men who were left behind after the battle in the Great 
Harbour, it seems reasonable that those who were too injured to keep pace with the army 
would have been abandoned. These men would then have been useful to carry out the 
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illusion that the entire Athenian army was remaining in the camp.
398
 Either, the men 
stoking the fires would have left before daybreak and escaped or were captured, or, more 
likely, they remained in the camp and were eventually killed or taken prisoner by the 
Syracusans. If they managed to flee and were never caught, they might have very well 
have made it to safety in Catane or in some other friendly territory. This is probably 
wishful thinking. If the soldiers in the camp were too injured to travel with the Athenians, 
it is unlikely they would have been able flee very far. This is especially clear given that 
the 300 men who rushed away on the night of the seventh day of the march were caught 
by the Syracusans the next evening (Thuc. 7.85.2). However, Thucydides says that many 
men who had fled both during the retreat and also after being in a state of servitude, 
found refuge in Catane (Thuc. 7.85.4). Therefore, there is the possibility, albeit unlikely, 
that some of the men who were stoking fires on the Athenian camp evaded the 
Syracusans and eventually reached Catane. On the other hand, if they were captured, 
either away from the camp or in the camp itself, they would have likely been taken as 
private slaves. Some would have been sold for profit while others would have been kept. 
Of course, this is simply conjecture since Thucydides does not mention if men were even 
left at the camp, but the ability to successfully carry out the ruse and the mention of the 
injured men suggests that some men likely remained in the camp. Regardless, the main 
body of the army marched out of the camp late at night.  
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Day Six 
The Athenians changed their direction. Instead of heading northwest, the troops 
headed in a southeast direction. The exact course is difficult to determine, but Thucydides 
provides some geographical features that allow us to get a general idea of the path taken. 
The army marched out in their customary two groups with Nicias in the van and 
Demosthenes commanding the rear (Thuc. 7.80.4). The march was taking place during 
the night, and the columns became separated (Thuc. 7.80.4). Earlier in Thucydides, we 
learn of the mass confusion that took place when the Athenians attempted to seize the 
heights of Epipolae at night (Thuc. 7.43). Demosthenes was delayed because he had 
inferior troops as well as injured soldiers traveling in his column.
399
 What is more, the 
food and water supplies of the men were low, so the soldiers were not properly fed 
(Thuc.7.80.1). It had been 4 days since the Athenians had resupplied their rations from 
the farms and houses on the second day of the march. Also, because the army was 
marching during the night, the Athenians were deprived of sleep. All of these factors 
would have had a negative effect on the marching speed of the troops. The columns 
marched back across the Anapus and likely travelled back southeast. The path likely 
started north of modern Floridia, and led down the Strada Monesteri to the Strada 
Spinagallo and passed through modern Cassibile. Thucydides claims that the men 
reached the sea (Thuc. 7.80.5), which must mean just south of Syracuse, and they 
followed the ‘Elorine Road’ (Thuc. 7.80.5), which still exists today. Thus, the men would 
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 It seems, based on Thuc. 7.82.1, that Demosthenes was saddled with many of the islanders, while Nicias 
had a greater concentration of Athenian soldiers. Further, it stands to reason that some of the injured men 
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have marched south toward the Cacyparis river (modern Cassibile),
400
 which is just under 
2 km north of modern Gallina. Here, at dawn, Nicias’ troops encountered a Syracusan 
guard blocking a ford (Thuc.7.80.6). The Syracusan guard had made a wall and a palisade 
(Thuc.7.80.5). The palisade, in Greek fashion, probably consisted of large wooden stakes 
that were placed slightly apart, while the wall was probably a short stone wall like the 
Syracusans employed at the Acraean Bald. Thucydides summarizes the battle in 3 
words,
401
 and thus it is likely that Athenians and Syracusan casualties were low and more 
in line with a minor skirmish. The Athenian troops likely uprooted the stakes of the 
palisade and quickly assaulted the Syracusan guard. The vast number of Athenians 
overwhelmed the Syracusans quickly and forced them to retreat. Following the Cacyparis 
River inland, the Athenians continued to head south. Thucydides says that this is because 
the guides told them to take this route (Thuc.7.80.7). Hornblower wonders if the guides 
were intentionally misleading the Athenians, or if there was another reason for this choice 
of direction.
402
 Going south would have made the Athenians miss the meeting spot with 
the native Sicels,
403
 which went against the Athenian plans. Green theorizes that Athenian 
scouts had informed the Athenians that the path ahead (along the Cacyparis River) was 
heavily guarded;
404
 however, there is no information in Thucydides to suggest that this 
was the case. On the other hand, it is likely that the Syracusans would have guarded the 
routes along this river in order to intercept the Athenians from combining forces with 
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native Sicels.
405
 Of course, the guides might have simply known an easier way to travel 
to their intended location either in terms of geography, or in terms of food and water that 
could be found along the route.  
At this point, the Syracusans awoke near Cava Castelluccio and realized that the 
Athenians had already left the camp (Thuc.7.81.1). Gylippus was accused of purposely 
allowing the Athenians to escape (Thuc.7.81.1), which probably delayed matters further. 
The Syracusans followed the route that the Athenians had taken (Thuc.7.81.1). 
Thucydides relates that the Syracusans were able to catch up to Demosthenes’ rear guard 
by dinner time which is a testament to the speed of the Syracusan vanguard. 
(Thuc.7.81.1).  
Thucydides claims that Nicias’ column was about 50 stades ahead of 
Demosthenes’ unit (Thuc.7.81.3). While this seems exaggerated, and De Voto would like 
to read 30 stades,
406
 the distance is plausible. Nicias’ army would have been between 6.5 
km and 8.5 km ahead of Demosthenes. This suggests that Demosthenes’ troops were 
either of a much lower quality than Nicias’ or that Demosthenes was simply ineffective at 
keeping his troops on the move or perhaps the men in Demosthenes’ contingent were 
more tired or encumbered. If we assume that at this point, Nicias’ troops had crossed the 
river Erineus and were waiting for Demosthenes’ troops to arrive at their new 
encampment, the distance between the two armies would mean that Demosthenes’ army 
was around Gallina.  
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When the Syracusans approached the rear of Demosthenes’ column, Demosthenes 
decided that it was best to make a stand rather than attempt to march while being 
assaulted as the Athenians had been on several occasions during the retreat (Thuc.7.81.4).
 
407
 Demosthenes positioned his army in a walled area within an olive grove 
(Thuc.7.81.4).  It is said that this was the estate of Polyzelus at some time in the past 
(Plut. Nic. 27.1).
408
 If we consider the area to the direct east of modern Gallina, there are 
a large number of olive trees still standing today.
409
 It is likely that this was the place of 
battle and it strengthens the argument that Nicias’ troops were in fact 50 stades ahead. 
The walls and the trees would have helped Demosthenes’ men avoid projectiles from the 
Syracusans. Regardless, the Athenians could only try to hold their ground and to protect 
themselves. Slowly, casualties would have started to mount. The Syracusans avoided a 
direct assault and instead surrounded the walls and hurled missiles at Demosthenes’ men 
(Thuc.7.81.5). The Syracusans would have employed both cavalry and light infantry to 
carry out this assault.  
After the Athenians had become wearied from the attack, Gylippus attempted to 
break the army apart. He offered the islanders (the allies of the Athenians who were from 
the islands in the Aegean Sea) freedom if they were to come over to the Syracusan side 
(Thuc.7.82.1). Surprisingly, only a few states abandoned the Athenians (Thuc.7.82.1). 
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 Polyzelus is said to have been the brother of Gelon, former tyrant of Syracuse. See: Smith (1870), 472. 
However, the exact location of this estate is unknown, which is unfortunate as it would allow us to obtain a 
better idea in regard to both the location of Demosthenes and Nicias. 
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When we consider that many Sicilians left after the defeat of the Great Harbour, it 
suggests that the islanders did not trust Gylippus, especially since they were starving, 
sick, and tired. On the other hand, it is possible that the islanders maintained a great level 
of loyalty to the Athenians. A more cynical explanation is that the islanders did not defect 
from the Athenians out of fear. If word were to get to Athens that certain subject states 
betrayed the Athenians, the Athenians may have exacted vengeance on these islands.
410
 I 
think the reactions of the various islanders would have followed one of these lines of 
thinking.  
Soon after, Demosthenes succeeded in gaining a conditional surrender under the 
terms that if the Athenians and their allies should give up their arms, then no man in 
Demosthenes’ army would suffer death by violence or imprisonment or by deprivation of 
the bare necessities of life (Thuc.7.82.2). Gylippus agreed to these terms (Thuc.7.82.2), 
but these conditions were not satisfied by the Syracusans. The Athenians placed all of 
their money in overturned shields (Thuc.7.82.3), and were marched back to Syracuse 
(Thuc.7.82.3) on the Elorine Road. Thucydides says that 6000 men were captured by the 
Syracusans on this day (Thuc.7.82.3). Meanwhile, Nicias’ army encamped on a hill just 
south of the Erineus (Thuc.7.82.3), (likely a river just north of the Fiume di Noto).
411
 
                                                 
410
 This is hardly unreasonable given the manner in which the Athenians had treated the Melians in 416BC, 
where all men were put to death and the rest of the population was sold into slavery. The Athenians voted 
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Day Seven 
On the seventh day of the march, the Syracusans managed to catch up to Nicias’ 
troops (Thuc.7.83.1). The Syracusans informed Nicias that Demosthenes had already 
surrendered (Thuc.7.83.1). Nicias was in disbelief and obtained a truce so that he could 
send a cavalryman to confirm the surrender (Thuc.7.83.1). When the messenger returned 
and affirmed that Demosthenes’ men had capitulated, Nicias attempted to negotiate a 
conditional surrender under quite unrealistic terms for his men (Thuc.7.83.2). Nicias 
requested that his army be allowed their freedom, and in return he would have the 
Athenians reimburse the Syracusans for every talent they had spent on the war 
(Thuc.7.83.2). As collateral, Nicias would provide hostages, one man for each talent 
owed to Syracuse (Thuc.7.83.2).  Not surprisingly, the terms were rejected by Gylippus 
and the Syracusans (Thuc.7.83.2).
412
 Gylippus might have been against the terms because 
they conceded no benefit to the Spartans. Further, many battle-hardened soldiers would 
have returned to Athens who would have been able to continue to wage war against the 
Spartans on mainland Greece. The Syracusans likely rejected the conditions owing to 
their enmity with the Athenians and would accept nothing less than a complete surrender. 
Further, the Syracusans might have been suspicious that they would ever actually be paid 
if they allowed the Athenians to leave freely. The Athenians had left many wounded 
behind after the battle in the Great Harbour, so there was also the chance that the 
Athenians would – in a similar way – abandon the hostages to their death and refuse to 
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pay. Ultimately, the best Nicias could hope for was the same treatment that Demosthenes 
had received, and thus his offer must have seemed insulting to the Syracusans. When the 
conditions were rejected, battle commenced (Thuc.7.83.2).  
Unlike Demosthenes’ army, Nicias’ men had at least had some rest, but were 
certainly weary owing to the lack of provisions. Moreover, unlike Demosthenes, Nicias 
did not make a final stand, but decided to keep marching at all costs until the Athenians 
could reach safety. Nicias’ men were of higher quality than Demosthenes’, and thus it 
would take a greater amount of effort to force them to surrender. The Syracusans hurled 
projectiles at the Athenians from all sides, while the Athenians continued to march 
(Thuc.7.83.2). While the panic in the Athenian ranks would have been high, casualties 
probably remained low, as the Athenians had become used to Syracusan tactics at this 
point and they would have concerned themselves with their own defence by creating a 
wall of shields rather than trying to launch an offensive. Eventually, the Syracusans gave 
up the attack and retreated for the evening. Nicias attempted to use the same ruse as he 
had on the fifth night of the march by escaping the area during the night (Thuc.7.83.4). 
However, the Syracusans had been keeping an eye on the Athenian camp and 
immediately raised the paean for battle when they witnessed the Athenians preparing to 
march (Thuc.7.83.4). The Athenians, realizing that the plan would fail, dropped their 
arms and returned to camp (Thuc.7.83.5). Three hundred men of the Athenians did not 
put down their arms and fled, forcing their way through the guards (Thuc.7.83.5). These 
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men were rounded up the next day and taken into captivity.
413
 The Athenians and 
Syracusans rested in preparation for the next day. 
Day Eight 
Nicias’ army continued to march south under constant missile harassment from 
the Syracusans (Thuc.7.84.1). The Athenians eventually reached the river Assinarus 
(Thuc.7.84.2). The identification of this river has been troublesome. The most obvious 
explanation is that the river Assinarus is the modern Asinaro, yet Green proposed that the 
river changed its name and that the Assinarus River is the modern Tellaro River. Pais 
points out that the locals of Noto call the Tellaro River the Attidatu and believes that this 
is a corruption of Assinarus.
414
 This is not a satisfying conclusion.
415
 Today, the River 
Asinaro is also called the Fiume di Noto,
416
 and must be the Assinarus. However, there 
are a few other possible explanations.  
The first is that Thucydides’ distances are incorrect, and Nicias’ army was not 50 
stades ahead of Demosthenes’ troops. The second is that Thucydides measurements are 
correct, and Demosthenes’ troops had yet to cross the Cacyparis and the estate of 
Polyzelus was farther north. The third option is that the Erineus was a waterway that no 
longer exists in its expected form. What is attractive about this hypothesis is that we 
know that the Athenians were desperate for water when they reached the Assinarus River. 
                                                 
413
 A nice narrative technique employed by Thucydides. Instead of mentioning straightaway that the 300 
men were captured, he gives the reader hope that these men may have successfully escaped and only later 
does he mention their capture as an afterthought. 
414
 Pais (1894), 225. This is also the feeling of Green who surveyed the areas of the march in Sicily. 
415
 Hornblower (2010), 729. 
416
 Hornblower (2010), 729. 
  
133 
 
If the Erineus River was the modern Asinaro, it seems that the Athenians would have 
been able to resupply their water, since this is a rather large waterway. However, if the 
Erineus was a waterway that does not have a heavy flow, it would explain why the 
Athenians were so overcome by thirst. Dover has identified the Erineus as the ‘Cava 
Mammaledi’ but he notes that there are no less than seven possible candidates that could 
be the Erineus.
417
 However, this is an issue that cannot easily be settled. I would like to 
argue the most obvious solution that the Assinarus is in fact the modern Asinaro (Fiume 
di Noto). Another possibility is that the Erineus was very close to the Assinarus (within a 
kilometre) so in this way, the distance mentioned by Thucydides would still be accurate. 
We have seen that under heavy assault, the Athenians failed to make much progress. For 
example, on the fifth day of the retreat, the Athenians failed to travel more than a 
kilometer. To conclude this discussion, the modern Asinaro makes the most sense of 
being the Assinarus based on the name. However, in order to vindicate Thucydides’ 
explanation, we must assume that the Erineus was a river that was near the Assinarus and 
no longer exists in any noteworthy form today. For the rest of these events, when I refer 
to the Assinarus River, I will be speaking of the modern Asinaro rather than the Tellaro. 
It is unfortunate that Thucydides does not give the reader the marching distance for the 
day, as this would easily resolve this issue. For example, if Thucydides noted that Nicias’ 
army had travelled 5 km over day 7 and 8, we could be sure that the Assinarus was in fact 
the modern Tellaro. Unfortunately, this problem must be left to conjecture.  
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Regardless, the Athenians continued to march, having defied the expectations of 
the Syracusans. The Athenians approached the River Assinarus, and here we see how 
great the desperation of the Athenian really was. Thucydides narrates it as follows:
418
  
And the Athenians pressed hard toward the Assinarus 
River, partly because being constrained on all sides from 
the assault of many cavalry and of another mob of soldiers, 
partly from their distress and their yearning to drink, they 
think that it would be somewhat easier for them if they 
should cross the river. When they come upon it, they rush 
upon the river, no longer in order, but rather, everyone was 
wishing for himself to be the first to cross and now the 
enemy, pressing upon them, was making it difficult for 
them to cross. For since they were being forced to advance 
crowded together, they fell upon one another and were 
trampled underfoot. Some were destroyed straightaway, 
transfixed by their own spears and equipment and others, 
having become entangled, were swept down the river. The 
Syracusans, having stood on the other bank of the river 
(which was precipitous), from above, struck the Athenians; 
many of whom were greedily drinking and were in disorder 
in the hollow riverbed. And the Peloponnesians, going 
down against them, slaughtered them, especially those in 
the river. The water was spoiled straightaway, but they 
were drinking the water not at all less, and though it had 
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become bloodied and loaded with mud, it was being fought 
over by most (Thuc. 7.84.2-5).
 419
  
Here, Thucydides clearly outlines the effect of dehydration on the Athenian soldiers 
(Thuc. 7.84.2). They failed to defend adequately themselves in any serious manner while 
being heavily assaulted by Syracusan missile infantry (Thuc. 7.84.4). Thucydides says 
that the corpses of Athenian men were heaped upon one another in the river (Thuc. 
7.85.1), while others who managed to cross the river were cut down swiftly by the 
Syracusan cavalry waiting on the opposite bank (Thuc. 7.85.1). The width of the ford 
must have been quite narrow, and this is why the Athenians became so heaped together, 
for if they were to go out of the shallows, they were swept away by the current. At this 
point, witnessing such carnage, Nicias was willing to surrender in order to stop the 
slaughter (Thuc. 7.85.1). Nicias chose to surrender himself to Gylippus, apparently 
trusting him more than the Syracusans (Thuc. 7.85.1). This was because he felt that 
Gylippus would be less harsh with him because he was the man who procured the peace 
with the Spartans in 421 BC and helped to release Spartan prisoners at Sphacteria (Thuc. 
7.86.4). Nicias told Gylippus to do with him what he wished, but to stop the killing of his 
men (Thuc. 7.85.1). Many Athenians and their allies were taken as private slaves (Thuc. 
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ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν 
αὐτοῖς ταραςσομένους. οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ 
ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετό τε ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς 
πολλοῖς. 
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7.85.4), while only about 1000 troops were captured to join Demosthenes’ 6000 troops at 
Syracuse. At this point, other than some men who had fled, the entire Sicilian Expedition 
Corps had been killed or captured. 
Aftermath of the Capture 
Upon the surrender of Demosthenes and Nicias, there was a debate as to what 
should be done with the two generals.
420
 Ultimately, Nicias and Demosthenes were put to 
death (Thuc. 7.86.2). The captives of the Athenians and the allies were put in the stone 
quarries at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.86.2).
421
 The particular quarry is the modern Latomia dei 
Cappuccini. Here, the 7000 captives were huddled together and forced to defecate, 
urinate, sleep, and eat in the same place (Thuc. 7.87.2). What is more, men who died in 
the quarry were simply stacked on top of one another (Thuc. 7.87.2). Illness spread 
                                                 
420
 This ‘debate’ has the greatest inconsistencies between our extant authors in terms of the final phase of 
the Sicilian Expedition. Thucydides does not say much about this debate. In his account, Gylippus wanted 
Nicias and Demosthenes alive to take them to Sparta. However, the Syracusans and Corinthians refused, 
fearing that Nicias’ immense wealth would allow him to escape Syracuse via bribery (Thuc. 7.86.2-4). 
Diodorus, on the other hand has a lengthy debate at Syracuse as to what should be done with the generals 
and the captives. A Syracusan statesman, Diocles, demands that the generals be executed and the captives 
are thrown in the quarries (Diod. 13.19.4). Diocles’ speech essentially follows Thucydides’ account of 
events. However, Hermocrates says that it would be best to treat the captives with moderation (Diod. 
13.19.4). Then, Nicolaus, an old man who had lost 2 sons during the war, gives an incredibly lengthy 
speech. He feels that treating the Athenians inhumanely is barbarous, and acting without mercy would 
show a decline for Syracuse. He pleads for Nicias to be spared, declaring him a man who had shown 
goodwill to Syracuse. (Diod. 13.20-27). Gylippus responds to Nicolaus’ speech, by appealing to the people 
who had lost sons in the war. He reminds the Syracusans of the crimes of the Athenians and concludes that 
they must be shown no mercy (Diod. 13.28-32). The crowd, although nearly having been swayed by 
Nicolaus, approves Gylippus’ speech and adopts the plan of Diocles.  In Plutarch’s account, Eurycles, a 
statesman, proposes that the Athenians and their close allies are sold into slavery and the Sicilian Greeks 
who had joined them be sent to the stone quarries. He felt the generals should be put to death. Hermocrates 
attempts to persuade the Syracusans to show clemency, but is shouted down. Gylippus, like in Thucydides’ 
account, wants the generals to be taken to Sparta, but is abused by the Syracusans. Plutarch further claims 
that Nicias and Demosthenes committed suicide, because Hermocrates had got a message to them in secret 
that the Syracusans were going to have them killed. Plutarch says that this account is from Timaeus, but in 
Philistus and Thucydides, the Syracusans had them executed (Plut. Nic. 28.2-4). This event provided later 
historians with a great opportunity for dramatic set speeches, likely invented, and also showing bias. This 
would explain the large amount of inconsistency in this pivotal moment for the Expedition Corps. 
421
 This is quite possibly the first recorded concentration camp.  
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throughout the quarry (Thuc. 7.87.1). Further, the Athenians were only given a half-pint 
of water and a pint of food each day (Thuc. 7.87.2). Thucydides reports that this amount 
of rations lasted for 8 months (Thuc. 7.87.2), and it seems that after this the size of the 
rations was increased. I question how many men would still have been alive at this point. 
They also had no shelter from the heat of the sun or the cold weather that would come 
during the nights or in the winter (Thuc. 8.87.1). After 70 days, Thucydides says that all 
peoples except the Athenians, Sicels, and Italians, were sold into slavery (Thuc. 87.3). 
This seems to be a roundabout way of saying that the Greek islanders and Peloponnesians 
were sold. 
Athenian Troop Numbers Revisited 
With only 7000 men taken to the quarry as property of the Syracusan state, how 
can we explain the loss of men from the beginning of the retreat until the final surrender 
of Athenian forces? Based on my estimations, we must account for between 23 and 
33000 men. Thucydides states that: 
The (number) of the army having been collected into the 
common stock was not many, the (number) stolen and 
dispersed (by the army) was large, and all Sicily was filled 
with these men, inasmuch as they were not part of a treaty 
such as those having been taken with Demosthenes. Also, 
not any small number had been slain; for this greatest 
slaughter (at the River Assinarus) was not in any way lesser 
than any in this war in Sicily. And in the other attacks in 
the march, which came to pass often, not a few men (but 
rather many) were killed. Nevertheless, many men fled, 
some at the time (during the march), others, afterwards, 
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having become slaves and escaping; for these men, the 
place of retreat was Catane (Thuc. 7.85.3-4).
422
   
We learn a few things from this passage. First, while there were 7000 men taken as state 
slaves, a greater number than this was taken as private slaves. This accounts for a number 
greater than 14000. Further, Thucydides notes that casualties were constant and high 
throughout the march.
423
 Finally, many men had fled during the march and managed to 
escape to Catane. These would likely have been small groups of men who felt that the 
retreat was hopeless and left in small parties, probably taking a roundabout way to reach 
their destination in order to avoid capture by the Syracusans. Thus, it seems plausible that 
over the eight days of marching that a body of 30 to 40000 men were reduced to a mere 
7000 men captured and taken to Syracuse. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has become clear that the Athenians were hindered by a few 
factors. First, the delay after the Battle in the Great Harbour was extremely costly for the 
success of the retreat because it provided the Syracusans with the time to make adequate 
preparations. Second, distrust amongst the ranks was allowed to fester. Third, the lack of 
provisions for the Athenians was absolutely devastating and led to the desperation and 
slaughter at the River Assinarus. Fourth, the Syracusans’ effective use of cavalry and 
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 Thuc. 7.85.3-4. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἁθροισθὲν τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς τὸ κοινὸν οὐ πολὺ ἐγένετο, τὸ δὲ διακλαπὲν 
πολύ, καὶ διεπλήσθη πᾶσα Σικελία αὐτῶν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ὥσπερ τῶν μετὰ Δημοσθένους 
ληφθέντων. μέρος δέ τι οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ἀπέθανεν· πλεῖστος γὰρ δὴ φόνος οὗτος καὶ οὐδενὸς ἐλάσσων τῶν 
ἐν τῷ [Σικελικῷ] πολέμῳ τούτῳ ἐγένετο. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις προσβολαῖς ταῖς κατὰ τὴν πορείαν συχναῖς 
γενομέναις οὐκ ὀλίγοι ἐτεθνήκεσαν. πολλοὶ δὲ ὅμως καὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν καὶ παραυτίκα, οἱ δὲ καὶ 
δουλεύσαντες καὶ διαδιδράσκοντες ὕστερον· τούτοις δ' ἦν ἀναχώρησις ἐς Κατάνην.  
423
 This is not surprising. Consider the Massacre of Elphinstone’s Army in 1842 where a combined British 
and Indian army was almost completely destroyed by Afghani forces while making a 90 mile retreat from 
Kabul to Jalalabad. See Macrory (2002), 197-237. 
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light armed infantry both slowed Athenian progress and lessened casualty rates in the 
Syracusan ranks by avoiding hoplite engagements whenever possible. This is seen most 
clearly in the final engagement with Demosthenes’ column where the Syracusans simply 
pelted the Athenians with projectiles, but never actually engaged with the Athenian 
hoplites. Finally, the disastrous difference of pace between the contingents of 
Demosthenes and Nicias made it possible for the Syracusans to surround each formation 
individually and force both generals into submission. When these issues are combined 
with the lack of resources available to the Athenians both in terms of weapons and food, 
it is clear why the Athenians failed to make the retreat to Catane or any other city that 
was friendly to the Athenians. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
 In my reading of Thucydides’ account of the final phase of the Sicilian 
Expedition, I was amazed that Thucydides does not really answer how and why the 
Athenians failed to complete their objectives in both the Battle in the Great Harbour and 
in the retreat through Sicily. Thus, I set out to explicate Thucydides’ narrative by 
combining his emphasis on the psychological state of the Athenians with Greek military 
tactics which he tends to gloss over. I have suggested that Thucydides passes over the 
more minute details of both naval and infantry combat since his readers would certainly 
be familiar with the mechanics of warfare.  
In order to explain the failure of the Athenians, I applied the Face of Battle 
approach to the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition which I felt was suitable to answer 
the question of how and why the Athenians were unsuccessful in their goals. The Face of 
Battle approach gave me the opportunity to reconstruct the Battle in the Great Harbour 
and the ensuing Athenian retreat with a close consideration of the experience of 
individual units in these engagements. In this investigation, I found that the Athenian 
troops were outclassed by the Syracusans at nearly every level, which is not apparent in 
Thucydides and would not be clear in a more general military history.  
I used Thucydides as my primary source and complemented his account with the 
later sources of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch. Though scholars have questioned the 
reliability of Thucydides (and all other Greek historians), I have made the case that 
Thucydides is a trustworthy source. It is clear that Thucydides had literary ambitions 
based on the stylistic techniques that he employed. I agree that Thucydides uses various 
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narrative techniques in his writing, but I have argued that Thucydides necessarily 
employed the narrative techniques established by his predecessors (Homer, Hesiod, 
Herodotus) for crafting a linear historiographical account of complex historical realities. 
Further, the agonistic nature of Greek society also permeated Greek historiography, and 
thus, Thucydides would have used the narrative techniques of his predecessors and tried 
to surpass them with his prose. Ultimately, I concluded that Thucydides had literary 
goals, but at the same time, his account can be considered reliable. There does not need to 
be a dichotomy between literature and fact.  
In investigating the sources available to Diodorus and Plutarch, I found that both 
authors had access to Philistus, either his original work or through the lens of Ephorus or 
Timaeus. Since Philistus was a Syracusan who was contemporary to the events, and our 
later sources do not contradict Thucydides’ narrative on any major points, I think that it is 
safe to conclude that Thucydides’ account is fairly accurate.  
In my reconstruction of the Battle in the Great Harbour, I discovered several 
reasons for the Athenian defeat. The Athenian failure to confront the Syracusans 
immediately while the Syracusans were building the blockade was the first mistake. The 
very area in which the battle took place was not conducive to general Athenian naval 
strategy. The narrow space did not allow the Athenians to take advantage of their 
superior oarsmen. Thus, the Athenians decided to mimic the fighting styles that the other 
navies of Greece employed. However, the Athenian hoplites were unfamiliar with 
engaging on a ship, and, therefore, were overcome by the Syracusan heavy infantry. 
Furthermore, the modifications that the Athenians made to their ships were not made in 
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secrecy and were successfully counteracted by the Syracusans. This lack of secrecy led to 
the Syracusans using of animal hides which they attached to their outriggers. These hides 
protected their rowers from missiles and prevented Athenian grapnels from hooking onto 
Syracusan triremes. Moreover, the Syracusans controlled a larger portion of the harbour – 
and most importantly – the areas around the exit. Because of this, when a ship was forced 
to beach, it was more likely to land at an area of the shore that was occupied by 
Syracusan heavy infantry. If it was an Athenian trireme, the men would be slaughtered. If 
the ship was Syracusan, it would be pushed back into the water to continue the fight. The 
lack of provisions for the Athenians caused the Athenian troops to be less effective than 
their Syracusan counterparts who certainly came to the battle well-fed. Another factor 
was that the Athenians were forced to leave their ships in the water because of the fear of 
Syracusan attack and limited space in the Athenian stockade. Therefore, the Athenian 
triremes were waterlogged and therefore sluggish in the water, which further nullified 
any advantages the Athenians would have had in terms of maneuvering their triremes. 
Finally, Gylippus’ capture of the Athenian storehouses at Plemmyrium left the Athenians 
without proper supplies to make repairs to their ships either before or during the battle. 
When all of these issues were considered, it became clear how and why the Athenians 
failed to defeat the Syracusans in the Battle in the Great Harbour and escape Sicily.        
In my reconstruction of the Athenian retreat, I again applied the Face of Battle 
approach. First, I argued that it was possible for the Athenians to make it to a safe haven 
in Sicily by citing the accomplishment of Xenophon as described in his Anabasis. 
Second, I have shown that Thucydides statement that 40 000 men were involved in the 
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final march is plausible. Again, I uncovered several reasons for the total annihilation of 
the Athenian Expeditionary Corps. First, the Athenians delayed their march after their 
defeat in the Great Harbour The delay was at first caused by the trick employed by 
Hermocrates, but was extended because of the sorry state of the Athenian army. The 
delay gave the Syracusans the opportunity to set up defences along the major marching 
routes so that they could hinder Athenian progress. The mutiny of the oarsmen and the 
abandonment of the army by Sicels and slaves caused the soldiers to become distrustful 
of one another and hindered the hoplites and cavalrymen because they were forced to 
carry all of their own gear. Similar to the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians were 
lacking provisions, which made the Athenians less effective in battle, and furthermore, 
led to the disastrous encounter at the River Assinarus. The Syracusans used their cavalry 
and light-armed troops in a very effective manner. The Athenians were constantly slowed 
by Syracusan assaults, and these attacks caused far more casualties for the Athenians 
since the Syracusans did not openly engage the Athenians in hoplite combat except when 
trying to block fords and passages. Not only were the Athenians delayed by these 
constant attacks, their inability to counteract the Syracusans was certainly damaging to 
the morale of the army. Finally, Demosthenes’ slow march on the 6th day of the retreat 
had devastating consequences. Since Nicias had gotten so far ahead, it was impossible for 
his contingent to march back and relieve Demosthenes’ men in the battle at the estate of 
Polyzelus. Thus, both Demosthenes’ and later Nicias’ forces could be singled out and 
surrounded by the Syracusans and forced into surrendering. The disadvantages faced by 
the Athenians were simply insurmountable, and it becomes apparent why the Athenians 
failed to make the journey to Catane. After the complete Athenian surrender, I explained 
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how it was possible for the Athenians to have so many troops on the march, but end up 
with only 7000 men in Syracusan captivity. I argue – based on Thucydides’ description – 
that more men were taken as private slaves, many men actually did escape during the 
retreat and made their way to Catane, and finally, Athenian casualties were high during 
the retreat, especially during the attempt to seize the Acraean Heights, Demosthenes’ 
final stand, and the slaughter at the River Assinarus. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Map of the Great Harbour and the position of the Syracusan walls. 
 
Source: Rhodes (2010), 142. 
Figure 2: The reconstructed trireme, Olympias. 
 
Source: Morrison (2000), 232.  
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Figure 3: The position of the ram on the bow of an Athenian trireme. 
 
Source: Gardiner (1995), 49.  
Figure 4: The standard interpretation of the periplous. 
 
Source: Anglim (2001), 228. 
  
152 
 
Figure 5: Whitehead's interpretation of the periplous. 
 
Source: Whitehead (1987), 181.  
Figure 6: The diekplous. 
 
Source: Nelson (1973), 56.  
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Figure 7: The kuklos 
 
Figure 8: The position of the seats for the oarsmen 
 
Source: Morrison (2000), 194.  
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Figure 9: The position of the rudder (and thus the position of the kubernetes) at the 
stern of the ship.  
 
Source: Morrison (2000), 208  
Figure 10: An Attic Black Figure vase showing the position of the helmsman and the 
bow officer. 
 
Source: Morrison (2000), 113.  
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Figure 11: The distance between Syracuse and Catane. 
 
Figure 12: The Corinthian helmet. 
 
Source: Schwartz (2009), 58.  
Figure 13: The Pilos helmet. 
 
Source: Schwartz (2009), 58. 
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Figure 14: Syracusan cavalry formations 
 
Source: Worley (1994), 101. 
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Figure 15: Map of the Athenian Retreat 
 
Legend: 
AC: Athenian Camp (Starting point of the march) 
1: Athenian Campsite at the end of the first day of the march 
2: Athenian Campsite at the end of the second and third day of the march 
4: Athenian Campsite at the end of the fourth day of the march 
5: Athenian Campsite at the end of the fifth day of the march 
6: Athenian Campsite at the end of the sixth day of the march (Nicias’ contingent only) 
7: Athenian Campsite at the end of the seventh day of the march (Nicias’ contingent only) 
A: Battle at the Anapus River crossing (Ponte Di Capocorso) (Athenian victory) 
B: Battle at the Acraean Bald (Syracusan victory) 
C: Battle at the Cacyparis River (Athenian victory; only Nicias’ forces) 
D: Battle at the Estate of Polyzelus (Syracusan victory; Demosthenes surrenders) 
E: Battle at the River Assinarus (Syracusan victory; Nicias surrenders) 
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Figure 16: The Greek hoplite 
 
Figure 17: Peltast 
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Figure 18: Peltast 
 
Figure 19: Archer 
 
Figure 20: Slinger 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Athenian Troop Numbers 
At the beginning of the retreat, Thucydides mentions that there were no less than 
40 000 men among the Athenians and their allies (Thuc. 7.75.5). Hornblower claims that 
such a number is impossible and states further that Thucydides has become “carried away 
by the emotion.”424 Rubincam states that the number of 40 000 must be a rough 
estimate.
425
 I agree with Rubincam, but I believe that the number is probably closer to   
40 000 than Hornblower admits. Much like our own estimations, Thucydides must make 
a guess in regard to the number as it is impossible to keep track of various casualties and 
deserters. Thucydides gives a summary of the troops sent from the Greek mainland to 
Sicily in 415 BC. He states: 
After these things, the Athenians, having gone under sail, 
sailed from Corcyra toward Sicily in sufficient preparation 
with 134 triremes in all, and 2 Rhodian fifty-oared ships (of 
which 100 (triremes) were Athenian, of these there were 60 
swift ships and the others were troop carrying ships, the 
other part of the fleet were from Chios and the other allies), 
and with 5100 hoplites all together (and of these, 1500 
were from the Athenians themselves from the register and 
700 thetes as marines, but the rest of the allies shared in the 
expedition, some of these men were subjects of the 
Athenians, but 500 Argives also, and 250 Mantineians were 
serving for pay (mercenaries), and with 480 archers in all 
(of these, 80 were Cretans), and with 700 Rhodian slingers, 
and with 120 light-armed Megarian exiles, and with 1 
horse-transport ship, carrying 30 cavalry (Thuc. 6.43.1).
426
   
                                                 
424
 Hornblower (2010), 714. 
425
 Rubincam (1979), 85. 
426
 Thuc. 6.43.1. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοσῇδε ἤδη τῇ παρασκευῇ Ἀθηναῖοι ἄραντες ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας ἐς τὴν 
Σικελίαν ἐπεραιοῦντο, τριήρεσι μὲν ταῖς πάσαις τέσσαρσι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ δυοῖν Ῥοδίοιν 
πεντηκοντόροιν (τούτων Ἀττικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν ἑκατόν, ὧν αἱ μὲν ἑξήκοντα ταχεῖαι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι στρατιώτιδες, 
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So, looking at this catalogue of troops, an initial count can be made. There are 5100 
hoplites which include 2200 Athenians, 500 Argives, 250 Mantineians, and the remaining 
2150 hoplites were provided by the subjects of the Athenian empire. Further, there were 
480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 light armed Megarians, and 30 cavalrymen. The total so far 
is 6420 troops. However, now the rowers must be included. The 2 Rhodian penteconters 
would add 100 oarsmen. The 60 fast Athenian triremes would add 10200 rowers 
(assuming each ship was powered by the standard170 oarsmen). In addition, there would 
be the standard 30 support units on each one of these ships (i.e. 10 hoplite marines, 4 
archers, a helmsman, a flute player, a trierarch, a bow officer, a boatswain, a ship 
carpenter, and 10 deckhands). However, the archers and hoplites must be subtracted from 
the total so they are not counted twice. Each fast trireme would include 10 hoplites and 4 
archers, leaving 16 support units a helmsman, a flute player, a trierarch, a bow officer, a 
boatswain, a ship carpenter, and 10 deckhands) that are added to the total number of 
troops. Thus, there are 960 men accounted for on the fast triremes. The 40 troop carriers 
are more difficult to nail down in terms of the number of rowers. Certainly, the number of 
rowers was reduced on these ships in order to make space for a greater amount of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
τὸ δὲ ἄλλο ναυτικὸν Χίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων), ὁπλίταις δὲ τοῖς ξύμπασιν ἑκατὸν καὶ 
πεντακισχιλίοις (καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, 
ἑπτακόσιοι δὲ θῆτες ἐπιβάται τῶν νεῶν, ξύμμαχοι δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι ξυνεστράτευον, οἱ μὲν τῶν ὑπηκόων, οἱ δ' 
Ἀργείων πεντακόσιοι καὶ Μαντινέων καὶ μισθοφόρων πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι), τοξόταις δὲ τοῖς πᾶσιν 
ὀγδοήκοντα καὶ τετρακοσίοις (καὶ τούτων Κρῆτες οἱ ὀγδοήκοντα ἦσαν) καὶ σφενδονή ταις Ῥοδίων 
ἑπτακοσίοις, καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι ψιλοῖς φυγάσιν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, καὶ ἱππαγωγῷ μιᾷ τριάκοντα ἀγούσῃ 
ἱππέας.   
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hoplites. However, how great the reduction is a matter of debate. In terms of hoplites, of 
the 5100, 600 are included on the 60 fast triremes. Therefore, 4500 hoplites, 240 archers 
(240 archers are on the fast triremes), 700 slingers, and 120 light armed troops must have 
a space on the remaining 74 triremes and 2 penteconters. Thus, not including the rowers 
or the support troops, 5560 soldiers are on 76 ships, leaving an average of roughly 73 
soldiers per ship. However, it is impossible to ascertain how many of the 34 ships 
provided by the allies would be fast triremes or troop transports. Thus, for the sake of 
calculation, I split the number of triremes in half, so there are 17 fast triremes and 17 
troop transports.  This would add 3944 oarsmen and 544 crewmen. The penteconter 
seems to have had the same number of crew on deck as the fast trireme, so another 60 
men are counted. What seems attractive is that only the top row of the trireme was 
composed of actual oarsmen. Thus, there would be 62 rowers per transport trireme.
427
 If 
this is correct, all of the soldiers could be sitting comfortably in the seats of the absent 
rowers. In this way, only the standard number of soldiers needs to be on the deck of the 
ship. Of course, these ships will also have the 16 men involved in the running of the ship. 
The remaining ship is the horse transport. This ship would include probably 62 rowers 
(top row), the 30 horses, the 10 hoplites, the 4 archers and the 16 deck crew, plus a few 
men to care for the horses during sail. In terms of certain numbers, we obtain the 
following totals: 5100 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers, 120 light-armed troops, 30 
cavalrymen, 16786 oarsmen (10200 on fast triremes [170 men X 60 triremes], 2480 on 
                                                 
427
 Beloch believed that there were 60 rowers on a troop transport. I think that this is nearly accurate, but I 
would presume that the top level of oar stations would be filled, making it 62 rowers per ship. This way, the 
legitimate oarsmen can also see the water. This is not to say that the additional men sitting in the zugioi and 
thalamioi seats did not provide assistance in the rowing, but they would certainly not have the expertise as 
the other oarsmen. 
  
163 
 
troop carriers [62 men X 40 triremes], 3944 men provided by the allies, 62 men on the 
horse transport and 100 men on penteconters [50 X 2],  and 2192 miscellaneous naval 
units (deckhands, etc.). For the slaves, we can make a rough estimate. If we assume that 
each hoplite had one slave attendant and each trierarch had 2 slaves,
428
 the total number 
of slaves would be 5372. This gives a total of 30780 men, not including the number of 
army support units such as cooks or engineers. Now, this number covers the first segment 
of the expedition.  However, the Athenians gain allies amongst the Italians and Sicilians.  
We are told that there were 3 Etruscan penteconters (Thuc. 6.103.3), 300 
Egestaian cavalrymen, 100 Naxian and Sicel cavalrymen (Thuc. 6. 98.1), and 800 
Campanian cavalrymen (Diod. 13.44.1) and an unspecified number of Sicel troops (Thuc. 
6.103.3). The penteconter crew and rowers would add 198 men. Thus, 1398 men are 
added to the Athenian ranks, plus an unspecified number of Sicels. In the spring of 
414BC, the Athenians decided to send cavalry troops to Syracuse which the 
expeditionary corps desperately needed (Thuc. 6.94.4). I assume that these men were sent 
in 4 troop transports. This adds 368 men from the ship crews plus 250 cavalrymen and 30 
mounted archers.  
In the winter of 414/413 BC, Eurymedon arrived with 10 triremes in order to tell 
the expeditionary corps that a new contingent was being sent (Thuc. 7.16.2). I assume 
that the Athenians used fast triremes for this purpose so that Nicias could receive the 
                                                 
428
 Sargent (1927), 273-74. Hanson (1989), 62. Pritchett (1971), 49-51. 
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news as quickly as possible. Thus, there would be a grand total of 2000 men being sent 
(assuming the standard 200 men per trireme).  
Finally, in 413 BC, Demosthenes’ navy arrived with 73 triremes (which includes 
Eurymedon’s original 10 triremes). With Demosthenes were 60 Athenian triremes and 5 
Chian triremes (Thuc. 7.20.2). Here, I have used a 50/50 split in terms of fast triremes 
and troop transports.  Thus, there would be 37 fast triremes and 36 troop transports, but 
with 10 fast triremes missing in order to assist Naupactus (Thuc. 7.31.5). However, 15 
more triremes are added by the Corcyrans (Thuc. 7.31.5) and 2 by the men of 
Metapontum (Thuc. 7.33.5). I assume that these are troop transports. In this case, there 
would be 8532 rowers and deck crew (not including hoplites and archers). In terms of the 
other troops, there were 5000 hoplites from Athens and her allies (Thuc. 7.42.1), with 
700 more provided by the Thourians (Thuc. 7.35.1), plus an unspecified number from the 
Corcyrans (Thuc. 7.31.5). There were 150 javelin throwers from Iapygia, 300 from 
Metapontum (Thuc. 7.33.4-5), and 300 from the Thourians (Thuc. 7.35.1) plus 
unspecified numbers from the Athenians and her other allies (Thuc. 7.42.1). There were 
also an unknown numbers of cooks, masons, carpenters, slingers, and archers. If we make 
the same assumption in regard to the slaves as with the original expeditionary corps, there 
would be 5846 slaves. In total, there would be 21578 men sent in the second expedition 
plus the vast number of unspecified men. Thus, the final tally of men on the Athenian 
side involved in the Sicilian Expedition was 55654 plus many other unspecified support 
personnel. The number 55654 is broken into 10800 hoplites, 480 archers, 700 slingers, 
  
165 
 
1480 cavalrymen, 30 horse archers, 120 light infantry, 750 javelin throwers, 26264 
oarsmen, 3812 deck crew, and 11218 slaves.  
Of course, we must factor in the number of casualties incurred during the 
expedition. Here, we are given even less information than for the number of troops 
involved. Ray estimates a total of 3375 hoplite deaths in land battles in the expedition.
429
  
However, there were an unknown number of cavalrymen and light armed troops killed. In 
the naval battles, slightly more accurate estimates can be made based on the number of 
ships destroyed. For these calculations, I have assumed that all men die on a sunken 
trireme. This is not necessarily the case, but certainly other men would be slain on ships 
that were not destroyed. If we assume that a similar number of men escaped a sunken 
trireme as the number of men who were killed on the ships that were not sank, we can 
base the number of casualties on the number of troops on a standard trireme.  Four major 
naval battles took place during the expedition. For the first 3 battles, it seems that the 
Athenians used the standard 200 men per trireme. During these first 3 battles, 28 
Athenian triremes were lost.
430
 Thus, we can estimate that 5600 men died. However, in 
the Battle in the Great Harbour, the Athenians likely used around 250 men per ship.
431
 
Since the Athenians lost 50 ships (Thuc. 7.72.3), it is possible that 12500 men were killed 
in this battle. Further, there were large numbers of deserters which would largely include 
slaves and Sicel allies that had lost faith in the potential success of the expedition (Thuc. 
7.75.5). Moreover, Thucydides mentions the illness running through the Athenian camp 
                                                 
429
 Ray (2009), 303. I have added the number of casualties provided by Ray on the Athenian side for every 
battle in Sicily before the Battle in the Great Harbour. 
430
 Thuc. 7.23.4, 7.34.6, 7.52.3.  
431
 See Hoplites in the section Essentials of Naval Combat in Chapter 2: The Battle in the Great Harbour.  
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and this would have certainly caused many casualties (Thuc. 7.50.3, 7.60.2). Thus, I 
conclude that during the course of the expedition, the Athenians lost up to 21475 men 
plus an unspecified number of cavalrymen, light armed troops, deserters and deaths 
caused by illness.   
Thus, for the Athenian retreat, the grand total was 34179 plus the uncounted light 
armed troops , hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters, merchant ship crews, merchants and 
traders that may become stuck with the Athenians, minus the unaccounted number of 
light armed and cavalrymen casualties, deserters, captives and deaths caused by illness. 
Therefore, the total number of men involved in the Athenian retreat might be closer to 
40000 than commentators have assumed. 
Original Expeditionary Corps 
Military Troops 
Troop Type Number Notes 
Hoplite 5100 2200 Athenians, 500 Argives, 250 Mantinean 
Mercenaries 
Archer 480 Including 80 Cretan Archers 
Slinger 700 Rhodian 
Light Infantry 120 Megarian exiles 
Cavalrymen 30 Athenian 
Naval Units 
60 Fast Triremes 
Oarsmen 10200 170 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 960 16 Deck Crew per ship 
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40 Transport Triremes 
Oarsmen 2480 62 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 640 16 Deck Crew per ship 
34 Allied Triremes 
If All Fast Triremes 
Oarsmen 5780 170 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 544 16 Deck Crew per ship 
If All Transport Triremes 
Oarsmen 2108 62 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 544 16 Deck Crew per ship 
If A 50/50 Mix of Fast and Transport 
Oarsmen 3944 170 Rowers on 17 triremes and 62 rowers on the 
other 17 triremes 
Deck Crew 544 16 Deck Crew per ship 
2 Rhodian Penteconters 
Oarsmen 100 50 rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 32 16 Deck crew per ship 
Horse Transport 
Oarsmen 62 62 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 16 16 Deck Crew per ship 
Miscellaneous Units 
Slaves 5372 If we assume that each hoplite has 1 slave and each 
trierarch has 2 slaves 
Cooks ???  
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Masons ???  
Carpenters ???  
130 Merchant Ship 
Crews 
???  
Grand Total of Troops Launched at the Beginning of the Expedition 
30780 + the uncounted cooks, 
masons, carpenters + merchant 
ship crews+ merchants and 
traders that may become stuck 
with the Athenians 
Assuming the average where exact numbers are not 
variable. 
 
Sicilian and Italian Allied Troops 
3 Etruscan Penteconters 
Oarsmen 150 50 Rowers per Ship 
Deck Crew 48 16 Deck Crew per ship 
Cavalrymen 1200 300 Egestaian, 100 Naxian, 800 Campanian 
Sicel Troops ??? Thucydides simply says “many of the Sicel allies” 
(Thuc. 6. 103.2). Beloch argues a grand total of 
10000 troops added. 
Grand Total of Sicilian and Italian Allies 
1398 + unspecified number of Sicel allies 
 
Cavalry Supplement in Spring 414 BC 
Possibly 4 Troop Transports  
Oarsmen 248 62 Rowers per Ship 
Deck Crew 120 16 Deckhands, 10 Epibatai, 4 Archers 
per ship 
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Cavalrymen 250 From Athens 
Mounted Archers 30 From Athens 
Grand Total                                               648 
 
Eurymedon’s Reinforcements Winter 414/413 BC 
10 Athenian Triremes 
Oarsmen 1700 170 Rowers per ship 
Deck Crew 300 16 Deck crew + 10 hoplites + 4 
archers per ship 
Grand Total of Eurymedon’s reinforcements 
2000 This number assumes fast triremes 
were used. This makes sense because 
Eurymedon was sent to get to Sicily 
as quickly as possible to inform the 
Athenians that help was being sent. 
 
Demosthenes’ Contingent in 413BC 
27 Fast Triremes  If we assume 37, but 10 were sent to 
aid Naupactus. 
Oarsmen 4590 170 Rowers per Ship 
Deck Crew 432 16 Deck Crew per Ship 
45 Troop Transports  36 from Athens and her Allies with 15 
taken from Corcyra and 2 taken from 
Metapontum. 
Oarsmen 2790 62 Rowers per Ship 
Deck Crew 720 16 Deck Crew per Ship 
Military Troops 
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Hoplites 5700 + 
??? 
From both Athens and her Allies with 
700 picked up from the Thourians. An 
unspecified number of hoplites are 
taken from Corcyra. 
Javelin Throwers 750 + ??? 150 from Iapygia and 300 from 
Metapontum and 300 from the 
Thourians and an unspecified amount 
in the original sailing from Athens 
Slingers ??? Both with the original sailing from 
Athens and picked up from the 
Acharnanians 
Archers ???  
Miscellaneous Units 
Slaves 5846 If we assume one slave per hoplite 
and 2 slaves per trierarch on each of 
the 73 triremes from Athens and her 
Allies. 
Cooks ???  
Mason ???  
Carpenters ???  
Grand Total 
20828  This assumes that of the 73 triremes 
sent by Athens were divided nearly 
50/50 between troop carrying and fast 
triremes at the beginning. However, 
10 fast triremes were sent to aid 
Naupactus. I assume that the ships 
from the other poleis were largely 
troop transports.  
 
Final Tally of men in Syracuse: 55654 + an unspecified number of other men. 
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List of Casualties and Deserters 
Land Battles Hoplite Casualties 
Anapus River 50 
Terias River 25 
Euryelus 50 
Syca 0 
Lysimeleia 200 
Epipolae 100 
Epipolae II 400 
Epipolae III 2500 
Lysimeleia II 50 
Total Estimated Land Battle Casualties of 
Hoplites + an unknown number of light 
armed troops and cavalry 
3375* These are estimates provided 
by Fred Eugene Ray 
 
Naval Battles Casualties 
Sea Battle in the Harbour I 3 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to 
600 men) 
Arrival of Demosthenes Battle 7 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to 
1400 men) certainly too high of a 
number of casualties since the ships 
were not actually sank, but 7 were 
highly damaged. 
Naval Battle after the Eclipse 18 Athenian Triremes (possibly up to 
3600 men) 
Battle in the Great Harbour 50 Athenian Triremes  (possibly over 
12500 men) 
Total Estimated Naval Battle Casualties Possibly 18100 
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Deserters and Other Casualties 
Deserters Number 
Large Numbers of Sicel Allies and Slaves after 
the Defeat at the Great Harbour 
??? 
Illnesses ??? + the men abandoned at 
Lysimeleia before the march. 
Impossible to estimate the number of deserters 
and casualties caused by illness, but the numbers 
are presumably large.  
 
 
Total Casualties and Deserters: 21475 + an unknown number of deserters and death 
owing to illness. 
Grand Total for the Athenian Retreat: 34179 + the uncounted light armed troops , 
hoplites, cooks, masons, carpenters + merchant ship crews+ merchants and traders that 
may become stuck with the Athenians – the unaccounted number of light armed 
casualties and deaths caused by illness. Thus, the 40 000 mentioned by Thucydides is 
certainly plausible.
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